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Costa Rica embodies many of the characteristics which the 
United States would like to foster in Central America and elsewhere. 
In recent years, however, misunderstandings have often been 
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present in the development of relations between both nations, and 
leaders. These differences have been particularly visible between 
Presidents Reagan and Arias when carrying out their foreign policies 
towards Central America. 
Recent developments in warfare, social and political unrest and 
economic crises in the region added to the emergence of a Central 
American political leadership--independent of U.S. decision making--
have increased international misunderstandings between both 
political speakers. These misunderstandings are shown by Reagan 
and Arias' through their public discourses which have revealed 
deterioration in communication and cooperation between them. 
Since Reagan and Arias come from different cultures, their 
values are different, making it difficult for the two men to 
communicate effectively. Towards discovering the differences m 
cultural values underlying arguments between them, this study uses 
the Toulmin model to provide a critical and interpretative analysis 
of the exchange of political arguments from both leaders concerning 
Central America. Data were collected from public discourses by 
Reagan and Arias. An intercultural communication perspective is 
then used to assess the effects of the arguments on international 
understanding. 
This research was successful in isolating a number of political 
arguments concerning Reagan and Arias' respective policies toward 
Central America, it revealed consistently different underlying 
cultural values. These differences in cultural values may affect the 
mutual understanding between the two political leaders, since their 
discourses did not acknowledge each other's cultural values or 
patterns of thinking. 
At the core of Reagan and Arias' disagreements is the 
ethnocentric assumption that each is similar to the other. This 
assumption is not a recommended strategy for intercultural 
interaction. 
Because of the novelty of this type of interdisciplinary 
interpretative research, the results can not be compared adequately 
with previous research on values in public discourse. 
Further investigation in this area should support the worth of 
studying political argumentation from the combines approaches of 
rhetorical analysis and intercultural communication. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to discover the different cultural 
values that may underlie public arguments between President 
Reagan of the United States and President Arias of Costa Rica, and to 
explore the effect of those possible differences on intercultural 
understanding. The arguments upon which this thesis focuses took 
place in a political and historical context that is briefly summarized 
below. 
Costa Rica and the United States are democracies and 
traditional allies in the American hemisphere. Although the former 
is considered underdeveloped, both countries share similar social, 
political and economic standards according to the World Bank annual 
report (1986). In addition, politicians from both countries have said 
that Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America without "anti-
Yankee" political sentiments. 
In a broadcasted interview (Flores, 1984) former Costa Rica 
President Luis A. Monge explained that this positive attitude toward 
the United States and its government is based on two main factors: 
First, Costa Rica, unlike most Central American countries, has never 
been successfully invaded by U.S. military forces; second, Costa Rica's 
democratic system affords to all its citizens obligations and rights 
similar to those granted to citizens of United States. In fact, in their 
book Confronting revolution: Security through diplomacy in Central 
America (1986), Morris J. Blachman, William M. Leogrande and 
Kenneth Sharpe wrote that "Costa Rica embodies all the 
virtues the United States would like to promote elsewhere in the 
[Central American] region" (p. 17). 
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As with any country, Costa Rica has its differences with the 
United States. But, until recently, these differences rarely led to 
open arguments in political exchanges or in economic relations. 
Historians list five main events that have shaped relations between 
the United States and Costa Rica. The historian Carlos Monge Alfaro 
(1982) wrote about two of these events, and Morris J. Blachman and 
Ronald G. Hellman (1986) about the other three. These include: (1) 
the military invasion of Costa Rica by U.S. mercenaries in 1856; (2) 
the U.S. political intervention in the selection of the president of 
Costa Rica in 1919; (3) the military invasions of Costa Rica in 1949 
and 1955 carried out by Nicaragua which, at the time, was U.S.'s 
closest Central American ally; ( 4) the Costa Rican political, medical 
and economic support to the Sandinistas during the civil war against 
Somoza's dictatorship; and, (5) despite U.S. pressures, the unilateral 
neutrality declared by the Costa Rican government in 1983. 
Tension between the two countries began in 1856 when, after 
the U.S. takeover of the Nicaraguan government, an American 
adventurer named William Walker invaded Costa Rica. Both U.S. 
politicians and members of the private sector supported Walker 
financially and politically. He was defeated by Costa Rican civilian 
resistance (Monge, pp. 208-14 ). 
In 1919, after the fall of the autocratic regime of the Tinoco 
family, the U.S. government intervened in the selection of the 
president of Costa Rica. Monge claimed that the intervention had 
been carried out "in a way which damaged Costa Rican sovereignty" 
(pp. 286-7). 
Tension rose in 1949 and again in 1955 when socialist policies 
adopted by the Costa Rican government of Jose Figueres --supported 
by the U.S. on the onset of the revolution of 1948-- provoked a 
Nicaraguan military intervention backing the former president of 
Costa Rica, Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia. 
During the sixties, the reelected president Figueres supported 
the Sandinistas guerrillas against the heirs of Somoza, and again a 
decade ago Costa Rica supported the Sandinista guerrillas and helped 
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them to organize a democratic government for Nicaragua. As a 
result, relations between the U.S. and Costa Rica were strained as 
were relations between Costa Rica and the U.S.-backed dictatorship m 
Nicaragua (Blachman & Hellman, p. 172). 
The fifth historic event key to Costa Rican -United States relations 
is the decision made by the administration of Costa Rican President 
Luis A. Monge to declare the unilateral neutrality of Costa Rica on 
November 17,1983. This announcement reflected a posture of non-
participation in any U.S. policy based on military attempts to overthrow 
the Nicaraguan regime. As Blachman and Hellman conclude, "U.S. policy 
thus ends up exacerbating the kinds of pressures that are antithetical to 
the very kind of democracy Washington praises and the Costa Rican 
cherish" (p. 181). U.S. interference in Costa Rica has been estimated as a 
problem by the general Costa Rican population. In 1984 a public 
opinion survey polled respondents who were asked to name a country 
that interferes too much in Costa Rica's internal affairs. "Some 43 % of 
those with a high school education named the United States" (Dillon, 
1984, June 17). In what has often been called the "most pro-North 
American country in Latin America," there has been an 
"uncharacteristic irritation about U.S. meddling in their financial and 
political affairs" (Blachman, et al., p. 170). 
In 1987, the new president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, started a 
peace initiative for Central America. He invoked peaceful rather 
than the traditional military solutions to the region's problems and 
opposed the U.S. backed "Freedom Fighters" in Nicaragua (Contras). 
Arias' initiative clearly differed from President Reagan's policies 
toward Central America. In a 1988 interview with reporters of CBS's 
"60 minutes," Arias discussed the different plans and what they 
meant. 
After almost ten years of peace negotiations by different 
groups and increasing pressures from the Reagan Administration, 
Arias' plan initiated a Central American president's summit in 
Guatemala. From this summit the first peace accord for the region 
emerged (Central America presidents' summit, 1987). On August 5, 
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1987, the day before the agreement was reached in Guatemala, 
President Reagan announced his own proposal for peace in Central 
America. A month later, Time magazine described Reagan's attitude 
toward the Arias' peace plan as one of disdain. Reagan, the magazine 
said, charged that the plan " [fell] short of the safeguards" contained 
in an earlier proposal put forward by himself and the Democratic 
Congressional leader, Jim Wright. In response to Reagan's contempt, 
Arias said: "Reagan believes that our plan has loopholes, and I accept 
that it might. No human work is perfect. But now the ball is in the 
court of the Central Americans" (Smolowe, 1987, p.34). 
As the Arias peace plan gained international support, the 
Reagan administration adapted its position. When Reagan addressed 
the Organization of American States (OAS) on October 7, 1987, 
Reagan said that he did not plan to make any demands on any 
Central American president who signed the Guatemala accord. 
However, later in his address Reagan pointed out that "without the 
freedom fighters [Contras], the Sandinistas never would have signed 
the Guatemala accord, and there would be no pressure on the 
Sandinistas to reform" (Reagan., 1987, p. 3). Within the U.S. Congress, 
military support for the Contras decreased. As a result, the Reagan 
administration kept a close eye on the second summit of Central 
American presidents, which took place in Costa Rica in January, 1988. 
Two weeks before the summit, Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, Reagan's 
National Security Adviser, irritated Nicaragua's neighbors by 
suggesting they might suffer U.S. aid cutbacks if they abandoned the 
Contras. Powell also urged them to condemn the Sandinista's 
intransigence as a major obstacle to peace (Greenwald, 1988, p. 39). 
President Arias replied by saying "War is easy. Peace requires 
goodwill from many people" (Greenwald, 1988, p. 39). 
During the 1988 summit the Nicaraguan regime conceded more 
openness in dealing with its domestic civil and military political 
opposition. In the following weeks, the Reagan administration 
shifted its traditionally friendly position towards Costa Rica. The U.S 
State Department managed to expel Guido Fernandez, Costa Rican 
ambassador to the U.S., for intervening successfully against the aid 
for the Contras and fostering the Arias' peace plan. As a result, 
Fernandez quit his post. In Costa Rica several months later, 
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Fernandez stated his impressions to a reporter of CBS's "60 
Minutes"(l988). Citing U.S. government sources, Fernandez said that 
"Oscar Arias has been the spoiler of the U.S. administration policy 
toward Central America." In the same program, Sen. Christopher 
Dodd, D-Conn., chairman of the Committee in Hemisphere Affairs, 
confirmed a drastic change in U.S policy towards Costa Rica. He 
mentioned three examples of this attitude change. First, in 
September, 1986, even though Congress had approved $80 million m 
urgently needed economic support to Costa Rica, the United States 
waited almost one year to release the funds. Second, although Costa 
Rica is of vital strategic value for the United States, the U.S. 
administration delayed almost a year before sending a new 
ambassador to Costa Rica. Third, before the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) the U.S. position had been flexible in helping Costa Rica 
negotiate its payments of its external debt. However, during the last 
two years; it had been extremely difficult for the Arias 
administration to get the U.S. to vote in favor of critical payment 
arrangements of Costa Rica's debt. These changes led President Arias 
in June, 1988, to tell an American journalist that since Reagan 
strongly supported the Contras--who represent the military solution 
rejected by Arias peace initiative--"Costa Rica and the peace plan will 
get much more support either from Mr. Dukakis or Mr. Bush" (CBS, 
60 Minutes, 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
To fully understand the disagreements between Reagan and 
Arias, it is necessary to look beyond the political and historical 
context to possible differences in basic cultural values. This thesis 
identifies what cultural values support each of the respective claims 
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made by Reagan and Arias in speeches and public addresses 
concerning Central American problems. Since Reagan and Arias come 
from different cultures, their values may be different -- making it 
difficult for the two men to communicate effectively. Their mutual 
misinterpretations can be understood better by following a two-step 
process: (1) analysis of arguments; and (2) interpretation of this 
analysis in terms of an intercultural communication perspective. 
RA TI ON ALE AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Few of the writings on values in public discourse and argument 
are concerned with the intercultural approach to the study of 
cultural values. According to Henry Scheele (1984 ), few scholars 
have endeavored to examine closely the values of the speaker either 
in general or interculturally. 
Among the few scholarly works found are the value analysis 
by Henry McGuckin's about Nixon's 1972 Checkers' speech, Wayne 
Thompson's study of values in Barbara Jordan's keynote address 
delivered at the 1976 Democratic Convention, and Scheele's value 
study of Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential acceptance address. Each 
author focused chiefly on the use of value appeals as rhetorical 
strategies that persuade audiences to respond favorably to the 
purpose of winning an issue or goal within an intracultural context. 
All of them (Scheele, 1984; Thompson, 1979; McGuckin, 1968) rely 
on the identification of a set of values which emerges from the 
speech itself. Several additional considerations need to be made to 
support the identification of values within arguments from the 
intercultural perspective. 
First, according to Stanley Paulson ( 1962), students of 
communication recognize that cultural values are often present m 
public discourse. In order to identify values within arguments 
between two different speakers from two different cultures, this 
research will move from the study of arguments in public discourse 
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within the frame of U.S. culture, which is considered here 
"intracultural rhetoric," to the study of arguments in public discourse 
between speakers from different cultures, which is considered in this 
thesis "intercultural rhetoric." 
Second, Paschal Viglionese (1982) suggests that certain areas of 
study which are traditionally kept separate, overlap somehow. The 
separation is 
to define as 
disciplines. 
mainly in response to a need felt among academicians 
neatly as possible the concerns and parameters of their 
Viglionese explained that although interdisciplinary 
collaboration may widen a perspective, for some scholars it often 
seems to cloud neat definitions of research. Condon and Yousef 
(1975) respond to this assertion by stating that the universe of 
communication studies is expanding, and that new metaphorical 
models for the description of communicative acts are continually 
being developed. They conclude that this kind of study, which 
Condon and Yousef specifically call intercultural communication, 
demands a more interdisciplinary approach. 
Third, Lorand B. Szalay (1974), has pointed out that the thrust 
of communication studies is not toward fixed, repeatable messages of 
the literary type, but rather toward categories of situation, processes 
and value systems. Szalay goes on to state that by doing the same 
type of communication research abroad as we have done at home, as 
in many cross-cultural values studies, the necessary information for 
more effective international relations and communications cannot be 
obtained. The rationale for using the same techniques in domestic 
and in intercultural situations is supported by such factors as 
professional interests, institutional inertia, and cultural egocentrism. 
It is bound to reinforce cultural myopia, concludes Szalay. Other 
social sciences are displaying an increased interest in the impact of 
values upon argument in international political exchanges. An 
example of this trend is the emerging Global Humanism School. Mel 
Gurtov, a representative of the school, explains in his book, Global 
Politics in the Human Interest (1988), that the line which once so 
neatly divided domestic from foreign affairs and foreign from global 
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affairs is now much harder to find. Conflicts which involve countries 
like the United States, such as the intervention in Central America, 
affect people and nations well beyond the participants. He suggests a 
need for additional tools to analyze them. Gurtov states that 
"international affairs are still politics, but political science is no 
longer sufficient for the study of international affairs" (p.6). 
Fourth, if communication researchers try to apply a single set of 
values to both Reagan and Arias' arguments, they will bias the 
analysis. As Condon and Yousef pointed out, when values are stated 
only from the perspective of one society, it is difficult to make 
comparisons which are needed for international understanding. 
Therefore, the culturally different contexts of the arguments demand 
an intercultural approach. 
According to Condon and Yousef, any intercultural study of 
values seeks underlying principles as categories both for 
distinguishing cultures and for finding commonplaces among 
cultures. But since each culture is a system with its own assumptions 
and consistent within itself, different cultures will express different 
types of reasoning. Condon and Yousef make an important warning 
regarding analyzing arguments from the intercultural perspective. 
They said that what appears to be non sequitur in another society 
may actually be quite logical [consistent] given the assumptions of 
that culture. 
A unique reason for studying Costa Rica and United States 
presidential discourse in terms of cultural values is provided by 
Barbara Stanford (1987). She says in the United States there is an 
overemphasis on the problems and failures of other countries. This 
tends to give people a very distorted picture of the world, a sense of 
despair, and a feeling that there is not much reason to become 
acquainted with other countries. Stanford also points out that, 
worldwide, there are few studies about Costa Rica and less 
curriculum materials about Costa Rica than about any other Central 
America country. This lack of information is due to a research bias 
which allows more attention to cultures whose international 
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situations can be considered bad news. She suggests more research 
on Costa Rica, particularly about its value system not only to fight the 
scholarly bias, but to enhance U.S. understanding of other countries' 
cultures. Consequently, this thesis poses the following research 
questions in order to explore interculturally political arguments from 
public discourses concerning Central American issues between 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and Oscar Arias. 
Research Questions 
1. What arguments are present in Reagan's and Arias' public 
discourses concerning their respective policies toward Central 
America political, economic and military problems? 
2. How do Reagan's and Arias' particular arguments reveal their 
respective underlying cultural values? 
3. How might the difference in underlying cultural values affect the 
mutual understanding evident in their discourse? 
Before pursuing these research questions, it is essential that 
the reader have a clear understanding of the key concepts used 
throughout this thesis. 
Definitions 
Argument: Toulmin (1958) and Condon and Yousef (1975) 
define argument as the process of determining and providing 
"proofs" going from evidence (data) to conclusions (claims), 
making inferences and deductions, and in one way or another 
going from what is known or assumed to an appropriate 
conclusion. 
Persuasion: Brembeck and Howell (1976) define persuas10n as 
communication intended to influence choice. The word 
communication denotes that this phenomenon is symbolic and 
attempt has a predetermined goal, the word influence 
suggests that behavioral change of some sort is sought and the 
word choice reflects the view that the receiver has options 
available to him. 
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Propaganda: Brembeck and Howell consider propaganda a 
form of persuasive campaign designed to influence large 
numbers of people, usually in non-face-to-face situations. Its 
purpose may be concealed or revealed. 
Cultural Value: Anthropologists Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn 
(1951), have written extensively on value theory. They say 
the only defining point of values generally agreed upon by 
scholars deal with normative as opposed to existential 
propositions. Values deal with what is judged to be good, bad, 
right or wrong. Statements based on values describe the ideal 
or the standards by which behavior is evaluated. They do not 
necessarily describe actual behavior. 
Intercultural communication: Richard E. Porter and Larry A. 
Samovar ( 1975) say that intercultural communication occurs 
whenever a message producer is a member of one culture and 
a message receiver is a member of another. In this 
circumstance, we are faced with problems inherent in a 
situation where a message encoded in one culture must be 
decoded in another. The process of coding allows us to move 
from the traditional analysis of values based on listing values 
in accordance with intracultural research. 
DESIGN OF Tiffi STUDY 
This study will employ a critical and interpretative case study 
methodology. 
The Data 
The data for this study are public addresses given by Ronald 
Reagan and Oscar Arias. The documents examined deal with the U.S. 
foreign policy towards Costa Rica and Central America, and involve 
the concepts of peace, war, freedom, communism and democracy. 
1 1 
This thesis selected as data persuasive discourses identified as 
argumentation rather than propaganda. Winston L. Brembeck and 
William S. Howell (1976) point out that "argumentation is a form of 
persuasion that employs essentially reasoned discourse while using 
non-logical appeals as supplementary means of influence"(p. 19). 
Propaganda is a type of persuasive campaign designed to influence 
large numbers of people, usually in non-face-to-face situations. Its 
purpose is either revealed or concealed, and employs such vehicles 
as organization, mass media, the stage, books, and billboards to carry 
its messages. Despite the fact that both argumentation and 
propaganda may be based on persuasive messages, they differ in 
their means and ends. The former as derived from these definitions 
offers a reasoned choice among options, the latter not. The former 
yields evidence to support its conclusions, the latter not. 
The Methodology 
Most critical and interpretative research identifies value 
expressions and notes their frequency to determine their importance 
within discourse. The interest in this thesis, however, is to identify 
the actual cultural values which may support the arguments in 
Reagan and Arias' discourses. Another concern is to learn how the 
sets of underlying cultural values may affect mutual understanding 
interculturally. To do this, this research looks at Reagan and Arias' 
discourse in relation to their cultures. In both cases this study 
travels from the particular to the general and from the speech to the 
culture. 
To identify accurately the structure of each discourse, this 
thesis relies on the Toulmin (1958) model for the study of 
argumentation. According to Toulmin, an individual who makes an 
assertion puts forth a claim - "a claim on our [the listener's] attention 
and to our beliefs" (Toulmin, p. 11). He explains that the claim 
implicit in an assertion is like a claim to a right or a title. Its merits 
depend on the merits of the argument which can be produced in its 
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support. Whatever the particular nature of the assertion may be 
eg., President Reagan praising the "Contras" or Oscar Arias blaming 
the "Contras" - the assertion can be challenged and attention can be 
drawn to the grounds (backing, data, facts, evidence, considerations, 
features) on which the merits of the assertion are dependent (p. 11). 
Hence, the scheme for this thesis' methodological purposes uses three 
key terms: (1.) The data (D), which yield evidence, lead to (2.) the 
conclusion, which is a claim (C ), by way of (3.) the warrant (W). 
Terms of evidence leading to conclusions by way of warrants can 
usually be phrased in this form: given evidence, therefore 
conclusions, because of warrant(s). Sometimes all three are explicitly 
stated in an argument, but more often the data and the warrant (and 
occasionally the claim) are omitted. The relationship between data 
and the claim can be symbolized as a continuum that is intersected 
by a warrant which lends authority for taking the step from one to 
the other. 
The model to analyze arguments looks like Figure 1: 
D ------------------ } (So) C 
I 
(Since) W 
Figure 1. Diagram illustrating three main components of 
most arguments according to Stephen Toulmin's model. 
Or, to give an example see Figure 2: 
Contras---------------------------} (So) 




Anti-communism favors freedom 
Figure 2. An Example of a Simple Argument 
Diagrammed with the Toulmin Model. 
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Toulmin makes it clear that the explicit appeal in the argument 
goes directly from the claim to the data, which is relied on as a 
foundation. The warrant is, in a sense, incidental and explanatory, its 
task being simply to explicitly register the legitimacy of the step 
involved and to refer it back to the larger class of steps whose 
legitimacy is being presupposed. Data and warrants differ in their 
appeal: data appeal to the explicit grounds of a claim and warrants to 
the implicit principles which the claim conveys. In addition, one may 
remark that warrants generally, certify the soundness of all 
arguments of the appropriate type, and accordingly must be 
established in quite a different way from the facts we produce as 
data which is argument specific. (See Toulmin, 1958, pp. 99-100.) 
The three elements of an argument take different forms. Evidence or 
data (D) may be observed as sense data, they may be hypothetical, 
or they may be an assertion of something assumed to be true or 
known to be valid. Conclusions also take many forms: judgments of 
better or worse, explanations of causes or predictions of future 
events, and directive statements for policies or actions. Even though 
the model of arguments presented implies a certainty of conclusions 
arising from evidence of one or another, several scholars (Rieke & 
Sillars, 1975; Condon & Yousef, 1975; Toulmin, 1958) say that 
conclusions are not certain. Thus it is the function of argument to 
state what is most likely. Aristotle pointed out that people do not 
argue about what is certain nor what cannot be known - so rhetoric 
and argumentation fills the vast middle ground of more or less, 
better or worse, and so on. 
In a second part of Chapter IV, a second model of intercultural 
analysis of arguments developed by Condon and Yousef (1975) will 
be used in combination with a summary of cultural assumptions and 
values designed by Edward C. Stewart, Jack Danielian and Robert J. 
Foster (196~). Both tools have in common that they focus on the 
range of possible solutions to common human problems which shape 
the value systems of most societies, whether Western or non 
Western. It is not too much to say that a complete argument is 
bound by assumptions based on experience and values. The choice 
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of "evidence" is as likely to be derived from expected conclusions as 
the reverse, and the warrants that link them are not significantly 
different from value orientations (Stewart, et al.). The three main 
elements of an argument are the same across cultures, according to 
Condon and Yousef. But they do say that how one classifies 
something, and what one chooses to notice or ignore, depends a great 
deal on the language and values of the culture. For this reason, it is 
helpful to attempt to distinguish data from evidence whenever 
possible. At the point of evidence we have already symbolically 
transformed the data through the language and value system of the 
society in which it arises. With conclusions and warrants structurally 
tied together, the relationship between language and culture is even 
closer. What must be stressed is that the relationship of the 
evidence, warrant and conclusion in conventional argumentative 
analyses is one of consistency. Thus, in different cultures, the"same 
evidence" can lead to quite different conclusions which are each 
logically consistent. This is possible because of different warrants 
directed toward different goals and based on different values and 
assumptions of different cultures. 
Condon and Yousef provide a chart of the value orientations 
and Stewart, Danielian and Foster provide a summary of contrasting 
cultural assumptions and values which this thesis uses in Chapter IV 
in identifying the cultural values implicit in the warrants of Reagan 
and Arias' arguments. (See Chart XVI.) For instance, in the 
hypothetical argument used in this chapter, the warrant (Anti-
communism favors freedom) would be analyzed using the Condon 
and Yousef chart of value orientations and the Stewart, Danielian and 
Foster's summary of cultural assumptions and values to draw the 
cultural value(s) that may underlies the argument. Assumptions 
about human nature, the natural world, and the supernatural appear 
most frequently in arguments. To these Condon and Yousef added 
related categories. These are the concept of a moral order in society, 
the influence of 'outsiders' in their thoughts as well as actions, and 
assumptions about natural laws or basic truths (p. 219). These 
categories are especially relevant to evidence because they involve 
culturally related predispositions toward witnesses and physical 
evidence. 
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Chapters I and II of this thesis describe the arguments found, 
using Toulmin's model, from each speaker's discourses. Next, Chapter 
IV cross-examines the data collected, by looking at the warrants of 
each speaker's arguments, interpreting similarities and differences 
which, in terms of cultural values, affect intercultural understanding 
through arguments. Any interpretation of the data relied upon the 
lists value orientations used by Condon and Yousef in linking 
argumentation and cultural values and the summary of cultural 
assumptions and values used by Stewart, Danielian and Foster in 
contrasting American cultural patterns and those of other nations. 
The last chapter is concerned with the conclusions and their potential 
significance for future research. Basically, Chapters II, III and IV 
must be described as parts of a three-phase process which takes into 
account the warning Rieke & Sillars (1984) have included in their 
analysis of arguments. They stated the following: 
A process of analysis which permits you to examine all 
relevant evidence before you search for a claim would 
seem ideal. Unfortunately, argumentation and the decision 
making associated with it spring up in the midst of a 
problem area, there is no beginning place for it. In general 
argumentation we do not have the luxury of an ideal 
method (p. 52). 
Both authors cite Morris Cohen's view concerning with this 
methodological issue. Cohen states: 
Starting with the problem which initiates mqmry, 
coupled with skepticism with respect to traditional 
beliefs, ones pursues hypotheses, testing them by 
the method of trial and error (p. 52). 
As we can observe from both remarks, the study of 
argumentation is difficult. However, Rieke and Sillars point out that 
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although the potential for chaos in creating or analyzing argument 1s 
great, it need not to occur because 
every problem has a storehouse of knowledge and 
standards by which selection takes place. There is a 
simple control on the mechanism; the human mind is 
unable to tolerate chaos, moving inevitably to 
decrease the number of options and focus on something I' 
about which it can be reasonable (p. 52). 
POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE 
This study attempts to continue the interdisciplinary direction 
called for by several authors cited earlier in this chapter. Combining 
the humanities (Rhetoric) and social science (Communication) 
approaches of Speech Communication, this study takes a wider 
approach to the topic of argument and culture, generating at least the 
following benefits: 
A. The results of this study may indicate that the method is 
generally useful, and intercultural researchers will then have a 
tool with which to analyze other international arguments from the 
intercultural perspective. 
B. This work will be heuristically valuable. By analyzing a 
contemporary political event, we can explain the causes of 
misunderstanding by looking at public arguments interculturally. 
We can also reconcile two different approaches to the study of 
values; the cross-cultural approach and the intercultural 
approach. 
C Studying discourse from the intercultural viewpoint will increase 
the accuracy of assessment needed to overcome misunderstanding 
between cultures. By considering potential cultural assumptions 
implicit in a public discourse, we can increase understanding 
between different cultures by clarifying differences. 
CHAPTER II 
REAGAN'S USE OFNARRATNE FORMS 
AND ARGUMENT ON CENTRAL 
AMERICAN ISSUES 
Between 1980 and 1988, the United States government 
engaged in what President Ronald Reagan called "our moral 
responsibility" (Reagan, 1983, p. 454) towards democracy, freedom 
and free enterprise in Central America. Reagan's rhetoric and actions 
during those eight years focused on Nicaragua, and what he 
considered the "region's threatened nations" (p. 453) the democratic 
countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. During 
this period, Reagan defined through public discourse a policy towards 
Central America to three main audiences, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. 
general public, and the Latin American governments. 
Reactions from the diplomatic arena to Reagan's Central 
American policy differed from the less successful response of 
American audiences. The emergence of Latin American and 
European efforts to bring peace to Central America without isolating 
Nicaragua, such as the Contadora group, the Cartagena Group, Arias' 
peace initiative and economic aid from the European Economic 
Community, illustrated the reaction in the diplomatic arena. The 
approval of humanitarian and military aid to the so called "freedom 
fighters" until the emergence of regional peace initiatives --
independent of U.S. decision-making-- and the explicit demand from 
U.S. citizens (43.7% of a 1987 public opinion poll) for less 
involvement in Central American affairs (Janda & Schrodt, 1987, 
p.85) illustrated the reaction within the United States. 
Other factors should be taken into account to fully explain the 
failure of U.S. policy in Central America. This chapter focuses on the 
role Reagan's rhetoric played in persuading the aforementioned 
audiences to support his policy. Reagan was referred to as "the 
Western world's most gifted communicator" (Lewis, 1987, p. 106). 
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As pointed out by Lewis (p. 106) he manipulated his language, his 
strategy, or his style to make himself and his policies appear to be 
attractive. The form ·which prevails in most of his speeches has been 
identified by Lewis as recurring to narrative forms which embody 
American values. Says Lewis, 
story telling is fundamental to the relationship between 
Reagan and his audience. Stories are not just a rhetorical 
device that Reagan uses to embellish his ideas; Reagan's 
message is a story. Reagan uses story-telling to direct his 
policies, ground his explanations, and inspire his audiences, 
and the dominance of narrative forms helps to account for 
the variety of reactions to his rhetoric (p. 107). 
Using Lewis' ideas on narrative form, I plan to identify two 
kinds of stories used by Reagan in his discourses concerning Central 
American issues: anecdotes and myths. The former defines the 
character of an issue, and is illustrated and reinforced in quick 
stories, jokes or incidents that are "the verbal counterpart of the 
visual image." The latter structures Reagan's message. Myths are 
the pedagogic images of the nature and destiny of man (p. 108). 
Lewis also suggests that Reagan's narratives are based on three 
elements: story, moral and common sense. The story is the primary 
basis for defining the situation, morality is the primary basis for 
justifying public policy, and common sense is the primary basis for 
analyzing political issues. 
Reagan, as pointed out by Lewis, uses the narrative form to 
carry a clear message to those whose experience leads them to accept 
the story as either true or as true-to-life and whose values lead them 
to accept the moral. By identifying the audience members (as 
Americans), the narrative "makes those who accept this identity 
accountable to a system of values" (p. 109). The success of Reagan's 
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public discourse depends on the audience's value identification with 
Reagan, the speaker. 
A complementary approach is provided by Stephen E. 
Toulmin's The uses of argument (1958). As Reagan expresses his 
viewpoints about a situation using narrative forms, he makes 
assertions and puts forth claims. 
As pointed out in the first chapter, the scheme used here 
consists of three key terms: 1) The data (D), which yield evidence, 
lead to 2) the conclusion, which is a claim (C), by way of 3) the 
warrant (W). The warrant becomes vital for the purposes of this 
study because within warrants are the underlying values which 
sustain the claims. The warrant must be examine in order to find the 
moral or values in Reagan's narrative arguments. 
In order to describe and analyze Reagan's discourses, in the 
light of Lewis' narrative forms and Toulmin's approaches, twenty-
seven arguments from seven discourses have been selected. The 
following criteria has been used to select and analyzed both Reagan's 
discourses: explicitness of the claims made, disregard of redundant 
arguments, and focus on Central American issues. 
used in the next chapter with Arias' discourses. 
Similar criteria are 
All twenty-seven 
arguments were studied, and twenty-three were chosen for this 
chapter to represent sufficiently the different common themes or 
lines of argument used by Reagan. Each of the chosen discourses are 
described; their arguments are made explicit; the themes which they 
support are introduced; and the type of reasoning as well as the 
warrants supporting the claims are described and analyzed. 
DESCRIPTION OF ARGUMENTS 
This chapter is based on data from seven discourses made 
public by Ronald Reagan between 1982 and 1988, concerning specific 
U.S. foreign policy toward Central America in general and Nicaragua 
in particular. These discourses were chosen as representative of the 
policies articulated by the Reagan administration during its eight 
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years in power. Three of them were presented before the U.S. 
Congress, two during the "State of the Union" address (1987 and 
1988), and one as requested by the President (1983). Two other 
discourses were delivered to the American people via television and 
radio in 1984, 1986, and the last two before specifically Latin 
American audiences in 1982 and 1987. The main topic of these 
discourses are described below. 
"The problems in Central America" (1983), a speech delivered 
to a joint session of Congress, had three main objectives: (1) to 
explain the strategic value of Central America to the U.S. and the 
threat of a Nicaragua Soviet-Cuban backed government; to U.S. 
security, (2) to describe the road to democracy, freedom, and peace 
that most Central American countries, except Nicaragua, have 
followed; and (3) to advise that the U.S should act now instead of 
regretting inaction later. 
The 1987 and 1988 "State of the Union" addresses, delivered to 
Congress, had two common objectives: (1) to address the cause of 
freedom as well as the willingness of the U .S to support its allies in 
Central America, and (2) to remind Congress that the U.S. does not 
need to intervene directly in Central America if the Nicaragua 
freedom fighters are helped by the Congress. 
"Central American Policy: No communist colonies in America" 
(1984) and "Nicaragua: Aiding the Contras" (1986) were speeches 
delivered to the American people. They shared three basic concerns: 
(1) Soviet and Cuban dominance in Central America through 
Nicaragua; (2) new requests for aid to the Nicaragua freedom fighters 
to finish-off a"terrorist" state, and (3) threats to flourishing 
democracies in Central America and U.S interests, represented by 
Nicaraguan expansionist intent. 
"Aid to the Caribbean Basin: Freedom is our common destiny" 
and "Central America at a critical juncture" were addresses delivered 
before the Organization of American States on February 24, 1982 and 
on October 7, 1987, respectively. Both seem to have had four main 
purposes: (1) to stress the consubstantiality of US interests and 
those of Latin American and Caribbean countries by looking at the 
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similarity between US values and Latin American and Caribbean 
values; (2) to encourage counteraction of the peace rhetoric from the 
Sandinistas by exploiting some aspects of the new peace initiatives 
led by democratic nations in the region and downplaying others; (3) 
to describe the expansionist and threatening role of Nicaragua as a 
terrorist state backed by Cuba and Soviet Union; and (4) to stress 
moral commitment of the U.S. to allies in the region and to the 
freedom fighters against Nicaragua. 
Seven recurrent themes can be found in these seven 
discourses: 
(1) Central America is of great strategic value for the U.S. both 
because of the past history of the region and because of a "common 
destiny" for both US and the Caribbean basin countries. 
(2) Nicaragua is a threat because of the military build-up and 
communist ideology encouraged by Soviet and Cuban presence. 
Therefore, the Sandinistas can't be trusted. 
(3) Democracy, economic freedom, human rights are flourishing m 
Central America despite Nicaragua danger. 
( 4) Freedom fighters must be funded because they are fighting 
communism thus protecting America's doorstep. 
(5) The U.S. has a moral commitment to defend freedom, 
democracy and economic freedom everywhere, but particularly it 
must do so in its zones of influence. 
(6) The U.S favors diplomatic efforts, dialogue, and peace, but the 
Sandinistas are only interested in aggression and terrorism. 
(7) Unwillingness from the U.S to aid its allies in Central America 
and restrain Soviet expansion may weaken the trust of other allies 
who depend on the U.S. to protect them. The U.S. has a stake in 
preserving stability. 
These seven themes are illustrated in Reagan's rhetoric by a 
selection of arguments which are representative of the whole set of 
arguments by each speaker's discourse. (See appendix of arguments.) 
Each argument, is part of the twenty-seven studied, and each is 
assigned a Roman numeral in the arguments chart on the next pages. 
There is a continuous reference to these numerals in describing and 
analyzing each speech's narrative structure after the following 
descriptive section of this chapter. 
Arguments offered by Reagan in supporting of the first 
common theme, Central America' strategic value, are shown in 
Chart I. 
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Regarding the second common theme, that the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua cannot be trusted because they are communist, backed by 
the Soviets and the Cubans, Reagan offers several arguments as 
shown in Chart II. 
In considering his third theme, that Central America is a region 
of flourishing democracies where economic freedom and human 
rights are improving, Reagan puts forth the arguments shown in 
Chart Ill. 
The fourth common theme repeated in Reagan's discourse 1s 
that Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters are striving for freedom and 
democracy against the Sandinistas communists, and thus the 
Freedom Fighters defend American interests and principles. These 
claims are supported by the arguments in Chart IV. 
The fifth common theme is represented by claims made by 
Reagan concerning a moral commitment toward freedom and 
democracy in Central America and support for those who fight for 
freedom and independence as shown in Chart V. 
The sixth common theme claims U.S. commitment to the use of 
negotiation and diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Central America 
as opposed to the violent tactics of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. 
Reagan's supportive arguments are in Chart VI. 
The last topic is grounded in the Reagan Administration's 
concern that weaken the U.S. alliance with Central American nations 
remain strong. As Reagan put it, if Central America fell into 
communist hands, the security of the U.S. and its allies would be 




THE FIRST COMMON THEME, CEN1RAL 
AMERICA' STRATEGIC VALUE 
Discourse .llaa Warrant 
No P. # 
1 322 
(I) 
[There are several 
reasons why the US 
and Latin America 
share a common 
destiny] 
(Since) Nations who seek 
and share common destiny 
are consubstantial. 
Argument by generalization 
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(II) 
John F. Kennedy said 
that "all people in 
America have the 
mission to demonstrate 
that man's unsatisfied 
aspiration for economic 
progress and social 
justice can best be 
achieved by free 
men working within 
People who share some 
aspirations are the same 
the framework of 
democratic institutions." 







directly affect the 
the securit)' and 
well-being of [US] 
people." 
parallel case 
Region which affects the 
and security and well-being 
of the U.S.are as important 
as the U.S.proper. 
Nicaragua is a Soviet- The Soviet Union and Cuba 
Cuban backed back regimes because of 
communist regime. a desire to dominate. 
Argument by sign 
.c.l.a.im 
"We are the new world 
We [Latin America and 






people of the 
hemisphere [are] one." 
(So)"Central America 
is the U.S.lifeline to 
outside world." 
(So) "[The] Soviets and 
[the] Cubans can 
become the dominant 






THE SECOND COMMON THEME, COMMUNISTS 
CANNOT BE TRUS1ED 
Dill w fil.Llill1 Qfilm. 
24 
No p # 
7 261 
(XXVI) 
The Sandinistas broke 
their promises for 
democratic reforms 
by failing to comply 
with international 
accords. 








not grant freedom 
to all its citizens." 
by classification 
Backed by U.S. 
diplomatic effort in 
the region, 
democracy in C.A. 




(Since) Past violations 
of trust can only be 
overcome by large 




The only thing that can 




challenge is to take 
irreversible steps 
towards democracy." 
(So) "The Sandinistas 
in Nicaragua are not 
democratic." 
(So)"[U.S] diplomatic 
efforts for democracy 
in Central America 
will fail if communism 





THE TIIlRD COMMON TIIEME, DEMOCRATIC 














"People in CA want 
hope and better 
lives." 
Argument by generalization 
Warrant 
(Since) Moves toward 
democracy reflect 
a general trend. 
(Since) Only democracy 
and freedom guarantees 




(So) "Political freedom 
is winning a battle ] 
against totalitarism. 
[ ... ] Freedom is finding 
its way in Central 
America." 
(So)"Central American 
people want freedom 
and democracy." 
THREEEXAMPLESOFREAGANSARGUMENTSONTHE 
FOURTH COMMON THEME, DEFENSE OF THE 







Freedom Fighters are 
fighting communism m 
hopes of democracy. 
Argument by cause 
5 259 The Freedom Fighters 
(XXII) are struggling against 






"Nicaraguans are against 
tyranny and they fight 
for this ideal. 
Argument by parallel case 
w ill:lllli1 
(Since) Those who support 
and fight for democracy 
help the U.S. 
(Since) Noble struggles 
prevail. 
(Since) Those who fight 
communism in Nicaragua 
today and those who fought 
for independence in 1776 
are alike. 
.Q..a.im 
(So) "The resistance 
has contributed 
directly to the 
security of the U.S." 
(So)"Freedom fighters 
won't allow the Soviets 
to have a beachhead 
[in Central America]." 
(So) "They [Freedom 







COMMON THEME, U.S. MORAL COMMITMENT 








The U.S. is committed to 
preserve freedom and 
democracy anywhere, 
particularly, on its 
doorstep. 
by cause 
2 452 President Truman said 
(XII) in 1947 that the "US 
must support free 
peoples who are 
res1stmg attempted 
subjugation by armed 
minorities or by 
outside pressures." 
Argument by parallel case 
w fil.I.fill1 
(Since) The commander-in-
chief (President) is the 
protector of that moral 
commitment. 
(Since) Today the situation 
is the same as then. "The 
political and strategic 
stakes are the same 
[ in C.A.j" 
Q..aim 
(So) Reagan "won't 
walk from the fight for 
freedom in Central 
America." 
(So)"President 
Truman's words are as 




FIVE EXAMPLES OF REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS ON THE 
SIXTII COMMON THEME, U.S. GOOD INTENTIONS 
ANTAGONIZED BY NICARAGUA'S ACTIONS 
Discourse Dru.a 




The "Sandinistas are 
transforming their 
nation into a safe house, 
a command post for the 
international terrorism." 




There are signs that 
Nicaragua isn't 
preparing for peace. 
by sign 
U.S. intentions: 
3 482-83 The "U.S. doesn't start 
(XIII) wars." 
Argument by sign 
2 451 The U.S. works in good 
(VIII) faith towards 
Nicaragua and other 
regional countries. 
Argument by sign 
Warrant 
(Since) Nations that harbor 
and support terrorists are 
outlaws. 
(Since) To stand for peace, 
a nation cannot harbor 
aggressive intentions. 
(Since) U.S. defense policy 
stresses military strength 
to preserve peace and 
freedom. 
Since) The US acts in good 
faith to those who also 
act in good faith. 
2 452 The "U.S. has What is true of these 
(X) attempted to have a cases is true of all. 
dialogue w/Nicaragua. These are signs of war. 
But, [Nicaragua] persists 
in spreading violence." 
Argument by Sign 
Qa.im 
(So) "Nicaragua is an 
outlaw regime." 
(So) "Nicaragua 
doesn't stand for 
peace." 
(So) The "U.S. will be 
never be the 
aggressor." 
(So) "Our actions were 
hardly the actions of a 
nation implacably 
hostile to Nicaragua." 
(So)"Nicaragua refuses 
make peace[ ... ] They 
are against peace." 
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CHART VII 
TIJREE EXAMPLES OF REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS ON TIIB SEVENTII 
COMMON TIIBME, U.S. STAKE IN PRESERVING 







Those who dissented 
in the past from the 
US position against 
the Nazis and US 
involvement in WWII 
did not stop the war. 
Argument by analogy 
2 452-3 
(XI) 




in Central America is 
as simple as it is 
sinister- to destabilize 
the entire region from 
the Panama Canal to 
Mexico." 
Argument by cause 
1 325 "Freedom's foes would 
(V) stamp out human 
rights, pluralism, and 
free institutions. n 
Argument by sign 
Warrant 
(Since) Isolation didn't 
stop the Nazis in the past 
there is no reason why it 
can stop the Sandinistas or 
the communists. 
(Since) The US has a stake 
in preserving stability. 
(Since) The US supports 
freedom (police role) 




instead of preventing 
it. n 
(So) The "US will 
support the security 
of the region's 
threatened nations." 
(So) "Freedom and 
peace requires help 







According to Lewis, Reagan's narrative discourse combines 
three key elements: the story which is told, the moral which provides 
a direction to the story or situation narrated, and the common sense 
which makes the story intelligible and any disagreement with the 
story irrelevant. The sample arguments given above are the basis to 
locate and analyze narrative forms in Reagan's rhetoric on Central 
American issues. Each argument is part of the twenty-seven 
mentioned, and each is assigned a Roman numeral in the arguments 
chart on the previous pages. There is a continuous reference to these 
numerals in describing and analyzing each speech's narrative 
structure. 
The data given by Reagan to justify his claims are often stories 
or anecdotes. In this section the story-situation, moral and common 
sense elements are introduced according to the lines of arguments 
common to the seven discourses previously described. This section 
follows, in order, the seven lines of argumentation, focusing on one 
story at a time. The arguments presented are illustrations, and not 
exhaustive of all those available. 
Reagan's 1983 address on "The Problems in Central America," 
stressed the Caribbean basin's strategic value, which was the first 
line of argument, through reminiscences of events which occurred 
during World War II. "In early 1942 a handful of Hitler's 
submarines sank more tonnage there than in all of the Atlantic 
Ocean. And they did this without a single naval base anywhere in 
the area" (p. 450). This reminiscence was compared with a 
description of the modern Soviet submarine brigade which operates 
in Cuba, the Soviet-Cuban military presence now in Nicaragua, and a 
Libyan airlift camouflaged supply of weapons to Nicaragua which 
was discovered by the Brazilian government. Because the Libyan air 
cargo could not use the Grenada airfield due to U.S. military 
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intervention of the island, this last element, is brought by Reagan as 
a favorable argument to foster an active role of his country in the 
region's affairs. These three stories were told one after another by 
Reagan, to show again how the evil-enemies of the U.S - Nazis, 
communists, and terrorists- used the Caribbean Basin to dominate 
and threaten U.S. security and well being (Argument VII). 
The question Reagan posits at the end appeals to the common 
sense of his audience. "If the Nazis during War World II and the 
Soviets today could recognize the Caribbean and Central America as 
vital to our interests," he asks " shouldn't we also?" The moral 
behind this story is explained to the audience by using common 
sense. That moral is the appropriateness of American goals, the 
moral right the U.S. has to protect its own well being. By recognizing 
the strategic value of Central America and the Caribbean Basin, the 
right of the U.S. to get involved is validated in the name of defense of 
its own interests. Reagan does not stop there. In fact, to assure the 
validity of U.S. concerns on Central America, he equates Central 
Americans to U.S. citizens. By listing several similarities between US 
colonization and Latin American colonization, Reagan asserts that 
"We are the new world[ ... ] We [U.S. and L.A.] are all America." 
(Argument I) He also uses the credibility of President John F. 
Kennedy to support the notion that in the"commitment to freedom 
and independence, the people of the hemisphere are one." (Argument 
II) If we are all consubstantial, then we may logically conclude that 
happenings in Central America are the United States' business. 
In Reagan's 1987 address to the Organization of American 
States, "Central America at a Critical Juncture" (Discourse 6), several 
events are presented in support of the second line of argument. The 
harassment by the Sandinistas of an authorized peaceful 
demonstration in Managua is recounted, as well as other events 
which would prove that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua are 
undemocratic and thus untrustworthy (Discourse 6, Argument XXIII). 
In the aforementioned address, Reagan presents freedom as a 
concept which doesn't exclude anybody. "Democracy," he says, 
"doesn't mean selectively granting temporary freedoms in order to 
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placate world opinion but permanent, across-the-board human 
rights, guaranteed by a constitution and protected by the checks and 
balances of democratic government" (Discourse 6, p. 2). 
Reagan's 1988 "State of the Union" address included a story 
which relates to the third line of argument, that democracy is 
flourishing in Central America. Democracy is an inevitable outcome 
in that region, Reagan argued, because it is based on "the love of 
freedom that God places in each of us and whose defense He has 
entrusted in a special way to this nation" (p. 258). In this discourse, 
he claimed that movement toward "economic freedom is indivisible 
of political freedom - and against totalitarian rule" (p. 261). Reagan 
uses "tide" as a metaphor for this movement towards democracy in 
Central America, and as a force which the Sandinistas cannot deny 
unless their cause is not freedom (Argument XXVII). While Reagan 
praises the tide of freedom, he subordinates this drive to two factors: 
Freedom Fighters emerging worldwide (Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Angola, Nicaragua), and the American tradition of fostering freedom 
abroad which is illustrated by Lafayette, Pulanski and Von Steuben 
during the American Revolution of 1776. Reagan's story begins 
inductively. He tells of the emergence of democracies everywhere, 
the role of freedom fighters in creating conditions for 
democratization in Nicaragua, and the importance of international 
democratic support to freedom fighters anywhere shown by the 
American Revolution. The story makes sense because of the common 
places Reagan touched upon, such as the role of international 
freedom fighters in the U.S.' war for independence and the 
knowledge that communist regimes backed by the Soviets are 
embattled by Freedom Fighters. 
The moral, that the U.S. goal of helping democratic forces 
makes democracy flourish is correct, is shown by idealizing those 
who die fighting for freedom anywhere as fighting for the same 
cause as revolutionary Americans did. Reagan says "[They are] 
fighting and dying for the same democratic liberties we hold sacred. 
Their cause is our cause. Freedom." He allows no difference between 
the Freedom Fighter and the American people; "they are like us," he 
says. This approach, which is further analyzed in Chapter IV as 
relating to ethnocentrism , permits his audience to consider that 
democracies in Central America should be structured like the U.S., 
because the values of the people are the same. 
32 
In Reagan's 1986 address on "Nicaragua," the Nicaraguan 
government is referred to as " a second Cuba, [and] a second Libya" 
(p. 386), while the Contras are said to be "freedom fighters" who are 
"like the French Resistance that fought the Nazis" (p. 388). The 
discourse is rooted in the fourth line of line argument which 
advocates that Freedom Fighters are Americans because they protect 
America's doorstep by fighting communism (Argument XVIII). The 
moral direction is given by accepting that there is a "right way" 
which Americans use to solve problems, particularly in dealing with 
its traditional foes: atheism, communism, and Naziism. 
As Lewis has pointed out in referring to the same discourse: 
By using the daily dilemmas of diets and allowances 
and the widely accepted evils of the Nazis and Cuba as 
parallels to current American policy-making, Reagan 
suggests that what might have been seen as complex and 
distant problems are amenable to simple and familiar (if 
not always pleasant) solutions (p. 293). 
Finally, people make sense of this complex situation by only 
following the didactic metaphor employed by Reagan: Sandinistas = 
Nazis, while Freedom Fighters= French resistance. This example also 
reflects the type of reasoning known as analogy which is, among 
other reasoning types, later explored when the way how Reagan 
asserts his arguments is explained by the warrants found. 
The fifth line of argument is conveyed strongly in Reagan's 
1987 speech "Central America in a critical juncture" (Discourse 6) to 
the Organization of American States. Reagan shares his own 




He argues that the Central American peace initiative began 
1979 OAS- negotiated settlement, to bring democracy and 
Central America and says the Sandinistas won't comply with 
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the democratic expectations of its neighbors. The reason, he says, 1s 
that they are a regime backed by the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, and 
therefore, should not be trusted (Discourse 6, Argument XXV). In the 
same address before the OAS, Reagan said that "the Soviet-bloc 
Cuban forces must leave" Central America (Discourse 6, p. 2). The 
reason they must depart, however, is not rooted in Latin American 
concerns, but those of the U.S. "We will not tolerate communist 
colonialism on the American mainland. Freedom in Nicaragua, 
liberation from all tyrants, domestic and foreign- that is the 
commitment of the United States, a bipartisan consensus on the 
conditions that will satisfy U.S. security interests" (Discourse 6, p. 2). 
The moral is presented here as a goal-setting that is, communism 
cannot be negotiated in American's mainland which includes, 
consubstantially, Central America and the Caribbean. This policy is 
called a bipartisan consensus by Reagan himself. The consensus is 
inclusive, says Reagan, of "every democratic nation in the 
hemisphere." So, again, those Central American nations are 
presented as like the U.S.; they are American. And Reagan 
attributes to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters the same purposes, 
origin and situation of the Freedom Fighters of the United States' 
independence of 1776 (Argument XXIV). To make sense of their 
situation, Reagan demands the audience think only in American 
terms. 
In Reagan's 1986 address "Nicaragua: Aiding the Contras" 
(Discourse 3, Argument XIV), his 1984 presentation"Central 
American Policy: No communist colonies in America" (Discourse 4, 
Argument XVI) and his 1983 talk " The problems in Central America" 
(Discourse 2, Argument VIII) there are explicit references to the 
sixth common theme, that the U.S. has good-will and peaceful 
intentions versus Sandinista ill-will and terrorist-warfare intentions. 
Reagan tells the story of how much money and military presence the 
Soviets have invested in Nicaragua, and contrasts this with the 
mostly altruistic, economic, and technical aid the U.S. gives all the 
nations of Central America and the Caribbean (Discourse 2, p. 451 ). 
He points out that a second difference between U.S. and Sandinista 
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policy toward the region is that the U.S. insists on diplomatic efforts 
rather than military intervention, which the Sandinistas promote 
(Discourse 4, pp. 482-83). The third part of the story relates the fact 
that Nicaragua offers refuge and training to international terrorist 
groups such as PLO, the Red Brigades, and guerrilla movements from 
elsewhere in Central America, whereas the U.S. shows continuous 
support for international cooperation and rule of law (Discourse 4, p. 
387). The moral of each element in the story - good will vs. ill will, 
diplomacy vs. violence, international law vs terror are explained in 
common sense terms. This three-fold story is neatly explicit in the 
following remarks: In Reagan's 1984 speech "Central American 
Policy" (Discourse 3) he said " the defense policy of the United States 
is based on a simple premise: We do not start wars" (p. 483). In his 
1983 address "The Problems of Central America" (Discourse 2) 
Reagan asks, "Can anyone doubt the generosity and good faith of the 
American people?" (p. 451). Finally, in his 1986 speech, "Nicaragua," 
(Discourse 4) he asks, "will we permit the Soviet Union to put a 
second Cuba, a second Libya, right on the doorsteps of the United 
States?" (p. 386). 
The last common theme to Reagan's discourses concerns testing 
the willingness of the U.S. to protect its allies and interests in Central 
America. In Reagan's 1984 presentation "Central American Policy" 
(Discourse 3, Argument XV) a new story was unfolded to justify U.S. 
involvement in Central America, showing the U.S.'s willingness to 
defend its allies and interests. Reagan compares those who dissent 
from his policies towards the region with those who fostered 
isolationism during the thirties, a policy which allowed fascists to 
take power in Europe and part of Africa. 
Like these new isolationists, those of the past" knew what was 
happening ... but chose not to face the terrible challenge history had 
given them," says Reagan. Here Reagan's purpose is to label those 
who dissent from modern U.S. policy toward Central America as 
isolationists who become accomplices of terrorism and international 
transgression, and enemies of freedom and democracy. Instead of 
preventing WW II, Reagan remarks, the isolationist of the 30's 
"assured it" (p. 486). 
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This half-century flashback narrows the complexity of 
democratic opposition to Reagan policies within the United States. 
The moral direction given was that of doing, engaging in action "to 
stop the aggressors" rather than retreating to the passive posture of 
"wishful thinking" of the isolationist. 
Warrants 
The seven common themes or lines of argument found in our 
sample of seven discourses concern U.S. policy towards Central 
America and have proven useful to locate and analyze narrative 
forms. Even though myth structures the fabric of stories in Reagan's 
discourses, it is not the intention of this thesis to study the myths in 
Reagan's discourse. There are two reasons for this: first, the study of 
the myths is appropriate only in a specific narrative study, thus it 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis; second, other elements of 
Reagan's narrative forms such as stories and anecdotes pervade the 
warrants by showing principles or moral direction of his arguments 
which relate more directly to the thesis' goals. Therefore this 
chapter focuses on the warrants underlying Reagan's claims given 
certain data. 
Lewis' narrative approach has proven useful by illuminating 
how story, moral and common sense existed in Reagan's choice of 
narrative forms, as well as how it conjured up alternative 
conceptions. All the stories analyzed were chiefly supported by 
warrants. As has been explained in the methodology section of the 
first chapter, the warrants rarely are explicit in the rhetoric. In fact, 
the implicitness of them is what allows the speaker to establish a 
link with his audience. The warrant provides justification for the act 
of inference require to move from data to claim (Sweeney, 1981, p. 
42). 
36 
Chart VIII (p. 40) shows a sample of warrants related to each 
specific line of argument, numbered from one to seven, according to 
the type of reasoning used by Reagan to assert his arguments case by 
case. Even if not exhaustive, the chart shows a noticeable dominance 
of argument by sign in his discourses. Out of the twenty-seven 
arguments studied for this research, twenty-two of which are shown 
in Chart VIII, argumentation by sign counts for 48%. Arguments by 
generalization, cause and classification together account for another 
44%. 
Argument by sign is a type of reasoning known legally as 
argument from circumstantial evidence. A sign type is based on a 
warrant that everything, condition, or idea has characteristics which 
will tell you whether or not it is present. (See Rieke & Sillars, pp. 75-
6.) This type of reasoning seems to fit Reagan's concerns for specific 
details or facts to support an argument. In fact, argument by sign is 
frequently used by Reagan in connection with all lines of arguments, 
but particularly those concerning the idea of "threat" to the United 
States well-being coming from Soviet and Cuban presence in 
Nicaragua, and the spreading of leftist guerillas in Central America. 
Reasoning by sign is stressed chiefly when dealing with aspects 
of the Central American crisis which are unclear, or unknown, and 
which are presented to the audience as unfamiliar (Arguments VIII, 
X, XIII,XVI, XVII, XX, XXIII, XXVI, XXVII). 
Arguments by generalization, which follows inductive 
reasoning (see Rieke & Sillars, p. 73) are preferred by Reagan m 
arguing the consubstantiality of U.S goals and those of Central 
American countries covered under the umbrella of a "common 
destiny" which validates U.S involvement in Central American affairs 
(Arguments I, XIV). 
Reagan applies reasoning by classification to specific cases or 
elements which have been identified as a member of one class. In 
order to exploit what he conceived as existing similarities between 
U.S. and Central American countries a remark, which was made by 
John F. Kennedy, was recalled to put all nations into the common 
destiny category (Argument II). Similarly, to back U.S. diplomatic 
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efforts in the region Reagan puts forth a categorization according to 
which the future of democracy is not possible in the presence of 
expanding communism (Argument XXI). 
Reasoning by cause is considered Western. Western cultures, 
like that of the United States, tend to see people, things, and ideas as 
causing events. In this type of argument, the data function as a 
cause for the claim, and the warrant is a statement justifying the 
cause-effect relationship (p. 7 4 ). Reagan turns his attention to this 
type when clarity and simplicity are more important. This type is 
not useful to make a case about "Soviet-Cuban threat" which requires 
facts to be credible. This type is useful when linear understanding is 
required, when there is no other way to explain a stance. As Reagan 
points out "The resistance has contributed directly to the security of 
the U.S." Why? Because those who support and fight for democracy 
help the U.S. ( Argument XVIII). Reagan also said "I won't walk 
away from the fight for freedom in Central America." Why? Because 
he is the commander-in-chief of the United States, thus he is the 
protector of the moral commitment of preserving freedom and 
democracy anywhere (Argument XXV). Other types of reasoning, 
such as parallel case, analogy, and authority, are downplayed in 
Reagan's arguments. It seems their importance is sacrified for the 
sake of the dominant role of reasoning by sign. The narrative style 
which has been described to be characteristic of Reagan's rhetoric 
has the sign type as a better means to achieve soundness and 
consistency because of the Reagan liking for specific details. Also, 
the issues addressed by Reagan often have origins - dubious, 
unknown, incomplete information- and they are hard to prove by 
using any type of reasoning but sign. Reagan's arguments studied 
are supported by the warrants and types of reasoning displayed in 
Chart VIII. 
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CORRELATION OF WARRANTS AND CLAIMS 
To make clear the correlation between Reagan's warrants and 
claims an additional task has been undertook. Figure 3 (below) 
shows the degree of connectedness between warrants and the claim 
they support. In the figure, the warrants summarized on chart VIII 
are grouped according to their degree of connectedness between 
Reagan's warrants and between Reagan's warrants with respect to 
claims. The following synthesis takes into account all twenty-seven 
of Reagan's arguments (See Figure 3) to draw the main warrants and 
its respective claims. 
The first general warrant (Wl) is concerned with 
consubstantiality. For example, [Nations who seek and share 
common destiny are consubstantial] ( Argument I) synthesizes the 
warrants which underlie the following claims: 
(1) "We are the new world [ ... ] We [ U.S. and Latin America] are all 
America" (Argument I, p. 322). 
(2) In the "commitment to freedom and independence, the people 
of the hemisphere are one" (Argument II, p. 322). 
(3) "[U.S.] must help Central America and the Caribbean people to 
protect those values and principles that shape the proud heritage of 
this hemisphere" (Argument VI, p. 325). 
(4) "Central America is the U.S. lifeline to the outside world" 
Argument VII, p. 450). 
The second general warrant (W2) is concerned with political 
dualism, for most nations there are only two political alternatives, 
communism or democracy (capitalism). This is shown by the 
warrant [Communism and democracy are the two world ideologies at 
struggle] (Argument Ill) which synthesizes into one the warrants 
related to the following claims: 
(1) "There are only two possible futures for Central America: 
[Democracy or dictatorship]" (Argument III, p. 324). 
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The third general warrant (W3) concerns the U.S.' role as 
international policeman of stability and freedom. The warrant [U.S. 
supports freedom - U.S. as a policeman] (Argument V) synthesizes 
the warrants which underlie the following claims: 
(1) "Freedom and peace requires U.S. help for those nations 
confronted with communist aggression" (Argument V, p. 325). 
(2) "U.S. will support the security of the region's threatened 
nations" (Argument XI, p. 452-3). 
(3) Reagan "won't walk away from the fight for freedom in Central 
America" (Argument XXV, p. 4). 
The fourth general warrant (W4) describes the U.S. as a 
responsible and fair power. The warrant [the U.S. acts in good faith 
to those who also act in good faith] (Argument VIII) is at the core of 
the warrants which support the following claims: 
(1) "Our actions were hardly the actions of a nation implacably 
hostile to Nicaragua" (Argument VIII, p. 451). 
CHART VIII 
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF WARRANTS LINKED TO TYPES 
OF REASONING SUPPORTING REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS 












Nations who seek and 
share common destiny are 
consubstantial. 
People who share the same 
aspirations are the same. 
Regions which affect the 
security and well-being of 
the U.S. are as important as 
the U.S. proper. 
The Soviet Union and Cuba 
back regimes because of a 
desire to dominate. 
Past violations of trust can 
only be overcome by large 
acts of good faith. 
Democracy guarantees 
freedom for all. 
The only thing that can stop 
democratization is violent 
communist expansion. 
Moves to democracy reflect 
a general trend. 
Only democracy and 
freedom guarantees people's 
hope for a better future. 
Those who support and 












Those who fight communism Parallel case 
in Nicaragua today and those 
who fought for US independence 
in 1776 are alike. 
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CHART VIII 
COMPREHENSNE LIST OF WARRANTS LINKED TO TYPES 
OF REASONING SUPPORTING REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS 
(continued) 












Noble struggles prevail. 
The commander-in-chief 
(President) is the protector 
of that moral commitment. 
Today the situation is the 
same as then (1947). 
(Since)"The political and 
strategic stakes are the same 
[in Central America]." 
Nations that harbor and 
support terrorists are outlaws. 
To stand for peace, a nation 
cannot harbor aggressive 
intentions. 
U.S. defense policy stresses 
military strength to preserve 







The U.S. acts in good faith to Sign 
those who also act in good faith 
What is true of these cases is 
true of all. These are signs of 
war. 
Sign 
Isolation didn't stop the Analogy 
Nazis in the past, there is no 
reason why it can stop the 
Sandinistas or the communists. 
The US has a stake in preserving Cause 
stability. 
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Figure 3. Graph correlation between general warrants 
and claims in Reagan's arguments. 
(3) "the U.S. has sought and still seeks - a negotiated peace and a 
democratic future in a free Nicaragua" (Argument XIX, p. 388). 
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(2) "the U.S. will never be the aggressor" (Argument XIII, p. 482). 
The fifth general warrant (W5) concerns depriving the 
insurgency in Central America from political legitimacy. The warrant 
[Those who turn against their own are only out for themselves] 
(Argument IX) illustrates the claim below. 
(1) "Salvadoran guerillas are a small minority who want power for 
themselves and their backers" (Argument IX, p. 451). 
The sixth general warrant (W6) concerns those few signs of 
war or ill-will from which a general negative evaluation can be 
made. An example of this is the warrant [ To stand for peace, a 
nation cannot harbor aggressive intentions] (Argument XX). This is 
the core principle of the warrant which supports the following 
claims: 
(1) "Nicaragua refuses to make peace [ ... ] They are against peace" 
(Argument X, p. 452). 
(2) "Nicaragua "is an outlaw regime" (Argument XVII, p. 387). 
(3) "Nicaragua doesn't stand for peace" (Argument XX, p. 388). 
(4) "The Sandinistas in Nicaragua are not democratic" (Argument 
XXIII, p. 2). 
The seventh is a general warrant (W7) and applies opinions 
from the 1930's and 1940's to contemporary problems. The example 
offered is the warrant [Today the situation is the same as then] 
(Argument XII) which supports the following claims: 
(1) "President Truman's words are as apt today as they were in 
1947" (Argument XII, p. 452). 
(2) "[Isolationism] assures war instead of preventing it [in Central 
America]" (Argument XV, p. 486). 
(3) "Freedom fighters won't allow the Soviets to have a beachhead 
[on the U.S. doorstep]" (Argument XXII, p. 259). 
The eighth general warrant (W8) is concerned with democracy 
guaranteeing freedom and development. The example selected is 
that of [ Only democracy and freedom guarantees people's hope for a 
better future] (Argument XIV) which is at the core of warrants to the 
following claims: 
(1) "Central American people want freedom and democracy" 
(Argument XIV, p. 485). 
(2) "Political freedom is winning a battle against totalitarism. 
Freedom is findings its way in Central America" (Argument XXVII, 
p. 261). 
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The ninth general warrant (W9) concerns the threat posited by 
totalitarism on democratic systems and actions. This principle is 
illustrated by [Soviet Union and Cuba back regimes because of a 
desire to dominate] (Argument XVI) .. This warrant is at the core of 
those principles supporting the following claims: 
(1) "The Soviet Union and Cuba can become the dominant powers 
in the regional corridor" (Argument XVI, p. 386). 
(2) "[U.S.] diplomatic efforts will fail in Central America if 
communism prevails and expands from Nicaragua" (Argument XXI, 
p. 259). 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter a select number of Reagan's public discourses 
on Central America were described and analyzed. Using Lewis' ideas 
on narrative forms, Reagan's free-flowing speech was broken down 
to three elements: story, moral and common sense. Analysis 
demonstrated how Reagan used his chosen form of narrative to guide 
his audiences along the path he constructed from data to claim. 
Reagan's success depended on the degree to which a particular 
audience identified with the values underlying his words. 
Toulmin's approach to analyzing argument provided a 
complementary angle to this chapter's research. Using the data and 
claims put forth on Reagan's speeches the chosen research 
methodology extracted the corresponding warrants, which provide 
authority to move from data to claim and determined the types of 
arguments employed. Reagan used argument by sign in nearly half 
the discourses studied here. Warrants found to be repetitive through 
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the block of Reagan's discourse chosen for this study provide a base 
for determining cultural values which are inherent to his speeches 
and necessary to identify and understand in order to truly 
comprehend his words. 
CHAPTER III 
ARIAS' USE OF ARGUMENT ON 
CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUES 
From the onset of his administration, President Oscar Arias 
defined the course of action of the Costa Rica government towards 
Central American problems as "in keeping with our highest ethical 
values. These values," he said, "should govern domestic policies as 
well as international relations with other governments" (Inaugural 
address, May 8, 1986, p. 9). 
During the preceding political campaign the preservation of 
Costa Rica's peace and neutrality, despite the on-going political-
military struggle in Central America had been one of the most 
important issues. For instance, in his inaugural address, Arias called 
for an international "Alliance for Freedom and Democracy" in Central 
America after promising (1) to keep Costa Rica neutral, (2) to foster 
economic and social changes lawfully, and (3) to defend the country 
from freedom foes using only international law. (The army had been 
abolished in Costa Rica in 1948, by the former president Jose 
Figueres.) (Monge, p. 14) 
Between 1986 and 1989, Oscar Arias designed and executed 
domestic and international policies based on his three promises. The 
Alliance for Freedom and Democracy of early 1986 was replaced by 
the Arias' Peace Plan for Central America in mid 1987. The Peace 
Plan called for a cease-fire, peace negotiations among all the 
belligerent forces in Central America nations, an end to outside aid to 
rebel groups, and the adoption of democratic reforms. (Guatemala's 
summit, 1987) According to Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith 
in their handbook Modern Latin America (1989) all five Central 
American republics endorsed the plan, as did the U.S. (albeit 
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reluctantly). The Nobel Prize committee gave Arias the 1987 Peace 
Prize, but by early 1988 it was clear that his ambitious peace efforts 
faced great odds, given the bitter ideological and geopolitical 
interests underlying the region's warfare (p. 322). 
During his administration, Arias defined a policy towards 
Central America through public discourse to four main audiences: the 
general public of Costa Rica, the governments and citizens of the U.S., 
Latin America and Europe. Reactions to his policy both in the 
diplomatic arena and by international audiences show its lasting 
success, no matter how much opposition or how many obstacles the 
plan has encountered. The emergence of Latin American, U.S. (non-
governmental), and European political, moral and economic support 
for the Costa Rican peace initiative, which was designed to bring all 
the conflicting parties to the negotiating table rather than isolating 
any of them, illustrates the reaction in the diplomatic arena. 
Additional success followed the 1st and 2nd summits at Esquipulas, 
at which all participating Central American nations committed 
themselves to reach regional peace. The disapproval of U.S. policy 
towards Central America, in general, and the reduction of 
humanitarian and military aid to the so called "Freedom Fighters," 
well-known in Central America as "Contras," in particular, were due 
to four main factors: (1) the emergence of the regional peace 
initiative independent of U.S. desires; (2) the explicit demand from 
the U.S. public (43.7% in a 1987 poll) for less involvement in Central 
American affairs (Janda & Schrodt, 1987, p. 85); (3) the effort by the 
leaders in Central America to find their own solutions to their areas' 
conflict through the Arias' peace initiative rather than following the 
leadership of the out-of-region Contadora group members (Mexico, 
Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia); and (4) the winning of the Nobel 
Peace Prize by Arias. The last factor illustrates the positive reaction 
to Arias' peace plan before international audiences. 
As was mentioned in Chapter II, other factors should be taken 
into account to fully explain the success of the Costa Rican president's 
policy in Central America. This chapter focuses on the role of Arias' 
rhetoric in persuading the aforementioned audiences to support his 
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plan. Unlike Reagan, Arias has not been called a gifted 
communicator. In fact, during his race for the presidency of Costa 
Rica, between 1984-86, he was criticized for his ineffective attempts 
to communicate with large audiences. According to an official text, 
Arias was more effective in his interpersonal relations with rank-and 
file members of the social-democratic party, "Liberaci6n Nacional" 
(National Liberation), where he held the highest positions including 
the office of general secretary ( 1979-1984) (Oscar Arias: El lider de 
la nueva generaci6n, 1985). 
Victor Ramirez, who was the media and publicity advisor for 
Arias during the 1984-86 presidential campaign, has said that Arias 
was sent to New York to be coached to improve his speech delivery 
and non-verbal communication. This account was confirmed by 
Guido Fernandez in his book, The first Sunday of February (1986). 
Fernandez said that Joe Napolitan, who is a veteran campaign advisor 
well known for his role in the triumph of John F. Kennedy during the 
sixties, suggested the idea. According to this account, Napolitan has 
said that 
Oscar Arias doesn't need to worry because he lacks 
the appearance of John F. Kennedy, or because he 
doesn't inspire trust as Winston Churchill, or because 
he lacks the skills to communicate like Ronald Reagan 
[ ... ] but he is who he is, so he needs to feel good about 
being himself, not trying to project a different image 
because of what he thinks people wants from him 
(p. 272). 
The campaigner suggested that Arias go to New York for 
cosmetic changes, rather than radical surgery. According to 
Fernandez, the coaching session took place in September, 1985. 
According to Ramirez, the main reasons such action was taken were 
that Arias was so ineffective in several political stumps because of 
physical problems related to his voice, pitch, and articulation, and 
because his political message was often better understood by voters 
through the media and political advertising, which defused the 
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awkwardness of Arias' communication "skills" (V. Ramirez, personal 
communication, December 10, 1985). Nevertheless, Arias' speaking 
ability was considered a disadvantage during the political campaign 
(Fernandez, 1986, p. 26). 
Compared to Reagan, President Arias has a hard time trying to 
manipulate his language, his strategy, or his style to make himself 
and his policies appear to be attractive. It is also noticeable that the ,. 
form which has prevailed in most of his pre- and post-presidential 
speeches has not been identified as narrative forms. In fact, it has 
not been categorized as any formal structure. He sometimes used 
poems or philosophical remarks, and occasionally even short 
anecdotes. Although these elements are an accessory to the 
structure, they lack the attachment or congruency with the whole of 
the discourse that is prevalent in Reagan's speeches. With Arias, 
these types of inclusions seem intended to embellish the discourse 
rather than to increase persuasion. Most of Arias' discourses are 
concerned with some sort of intellectual transcendentalism. He 
appeals to abstract ethical or spiritual categories which, contrary to 
Reagan, are never fully explained, detailed or defined. In fact, Arias' 
advisers have said that "Oscar [Arias] developed a style on the 
political stump which evolved from the academic chair to an 
emotional rhetoric" (Fernandez, 1986, n.p.). It is noteworthy to point 
out that even though all of Arias' speeches have been compiled, 
published, and translated from Spanish into English, French, and 
German, there has been little research based on his rhetoric, even 
among Costa Rican scholars. Both the nature of Arias' discourse and 
the reasons for the lack of information concerning it are beyond the 
scope of this research, although those topics may have relevance to 
future studies. 
The discussion here will consider Arias' discourses using 
Stephen E. Toulmin's approach to argument (1958). As demonstrated 
in the preceding chapter, this approach is useful in describing and 
analyzing political arguments . The same methodological 
assumptions concerning the Toulmin model described in Chapter I 
were taken into account in studying the public discourses of Oscar 
Arias. 
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In order to describe and analyze Arias' discourses, twenty-
three arguments were selected. The same criteria used to pick 
Reagan's arguments were followed in choosing Arias' arguments. The 
latter have been chosen to represent the different themes used by 
him and discussed in this chapter. Each of the chosen discourses is 
described, its arguments extracted, the themes which it supports 
introduced, and the types of reasoning as well warrants supporting 
its claims described and analyzed. 
DESCRIPTION OF ARGUMENTS 
This chapter is based on data from seven discourses presented 
publicly by Oscar Arias between 1986 and 1988, concerning the 
specifics of Costa Rican foreign policy towards Central America in 
general, and Nicaragua in particular. These discourses were chosen 
as representative of the policies articulated by the Arias 
administration during its first three years in power. Three of them 
were presented before U.S. audiences between 1986 and 1988, one 
to President Reagan (1986), one to the media (1986), and one before 
U.S. students (1988). Two other discourses were presented to Latin 
American audiences, in 1986 and 1987. Another discourse was 
delivered to the Costa Rican people in 1988. The last discourse 
discussed was given to a European audience in 1987. The main 
topics of those discourses are described next. 
"The roads to freedom" (1986) speech delivered to President 
Reagan and the press, is concerned with two main objectives, to 
explain ( 1) that threats to peace and democracy can only be 
overcome if all tyrannies are destroyed, and (2) that Central 
American democracies can only avoid war and oppression if given 
fair treatment in international trade and finance. 
"Democracy in the Americas" (1986) an address delivered to 
the U.S. media, has two main claims: (1) despite the fact that in this 
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era Latin America is returning to democracy, this return will remain 
unstable if severe economic pressures on these new democracies 
continue, and (2) democracies should not intervene militarily in 
Nicaragua's affairs, but politically encourage democratic reform. 
The speech "Architects of the century of peace" (1988) was 
delivered before the 1988 graduates at Georgetown University in 
Washington D.C. It had a three-fold purpose and demonstrated: (1) 
that the Arias Peace plan is being crucified by the enemies of peace, 
(2) that there is no reason to support a military solution for Central 
American problems, and (3) that Central Americans are committed to 
peace. 
"Peace- supreme hope of the world" (1988), an address 
delivered to Costa Rican academics and laymen at the Peace 
University in Costa Rica, was concerned with one claim, that in 
Central America there is no peace because there is no reconciliation 
between opposite parties in the on-going struggle. Both speeches 
"Opportunities for democracy in Latin America" (1986), presented to 
Latin American delegates to an International Democratic Exchange 
Conference in Costa Rica, and "The Peace is first" (1987), delivered to 
the president of Mexico and his cabinet, had four main purposes: (1) 
to establish that there won't be peace and justice without democracy, 
(2) to state that if deeds don't encompass words of peace in Central 
America, the subsequent accords will be useless, (3) to increase the 
awareness that if concerns of the majority are not incorporated into 
political agendas, democracies will fail with a resulting spreading of 
violence, and ( 4) to remark that is too early to talk about the 
consolidation of democratic process in Latin America. 
The address "Peace doesn't recognize borders" ( 1987), was 
delivered before European diplomats, academicians and politicians m 
Oslo, Norway, after Arias received the Nobel Peace Prize. It was a 
summary of the Arias political agenda. Five goals were achieved m 
this speech: (1) to explain that the peace process may never be 
finished because its development and preservation is part of 
democratic life, (2) to encourage democracy everywhere by giving no 
political or economic support to tyrannies, (3) to frame the peace 
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initiative as basically anti-dogmatic and for freedom, (4) to reiterate 
that majority concerns must be included in political agendas to help 
democracy defeat tyranny, and (5) to remind the listeners that as 
long as the aforementioned objectives are achieved, democracy 
cannot be overpowered by totalitarism. 
Six common themes can be drawn from these seven discourses: 
( 1) Threats to peace and democracy can be overcome if all 
tyrannies fall, and democracy is successful. 
(2) Only fair treatment in international trade and finance can 
assure the political and economic stability of countries which are 
returning to democracy. 
(3) Peaceful dialogue, rather than military intervention, is viable to 
solve Central American conflict. Democracies should encourage 
political reforms, but should not intervene militarily in other 
countries' affairs. 
( 4) The Arias Peace Plan is opposed only by those who favor war in 
Central America. 
(5) Violence spreads when majority concerns are not included in 
Central American political agendas. 
(6) There will be no permanent peace in Central America without 
reconciliation. Arias points out that in order to achieve peace and 
democracy requires deeds, not just words, and cooperation even if 
political agendas differ. These six common themes, found in the set 
of discourses studied, have been illustrated in Arias' rhetoric by the 
arguments shown in six corresponding charts . 
In considering the first common theme, regarding overcoming 
threats to democracy, the arguments offered by Arias look like the 
Chart IX. 
Following the second common theme, which questions how 
new, unstable Latin American democracies can possibly form without 
fair treatment in international trade and finance, Arias establishes 
his position through the Chart X. 
The third common theme is concerned with the viability of 
peaceful solutions to the Central American conflict. It tacitly rejects 
military intervention in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua, 
53 
by defining democracies as nations which encourage political reform 
without physically intervening in other countries' affairs. The 
selection of arguments in Chart XI are used by Arias to support this 
point. 
Following the fourth line of argument, the examples in Chart 
XII show Arias' intention to correlate his initiative to peace-seeking 
people, and opposition of it with those who favor war and are against 
Central America's wishes for peace. 
The fifth line of argument, which addresses the need of Central 
American countries to include concerns of the majority, especially 
peace, on their political agendas is supported by the arguments 
included in Chart XIII. 
The sixth line of argument reveals Arias' concern that the 
peace accord, be carried out by the five Central American Presidents 
in 1987. Arias assumes that reconciliation, expressed by working 
together to reach national and regional goals which were agreed 
upon by consensus, is a pre-requisite to permanent peace and 
democracy. The Chart XIV demonstrates this. 
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CHART IX 
THREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS 
ON THE FIRST COMMON 'IHEME, DEMOCRACY 







Democracy causes peace 
Argumentation by cause 
4 36 
cxxxvn 
History shows that those 
who are afraid of 
freedom have allowed 
signs of oppression to 
exist. 




Costa Rica has been 
strong, free and 
democratic without 
having an army. 
by generalization 
w a.r.r..a.n1 
(Since) Only democracy 
can guarantee reconciliation, 
allow peace, and preclude 
violence from 
crossing borders. 
(Since) Political oppression 
can only be created by 
people who are afraid of 
freedom and have no human 
values. 
(Since) What free people 
believe in their souls 
and live daily can't be 
taken away. 
llii.m 
(So) "Only if we 
endeavor to enable 
all people to enjoy 
democracy ,[and) 
cause the downfall 
of all tyrants 
equally, can we 
prevent threats to 
world peace from 
growing in the 
Americas." 
(So) "The only 
defense against the 
enemies of freedom 









THREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON 
THE SECOND COMMON THEME, FAIR TREATMENT 
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 
Discourse Data 
No P. # 
1 17 
(XXXIII) 
Internal and external 
factors are 
detrimental to Central 
American economies. 
Argument by cause 
4 6 New democracies do not 
(XXXVII) receive the economic 
and political support 
expected from interna-
tional economic 
institutions and the 
industrialized world. 
Argument by sign 
1 12 
(XXIX) 




being forced on 
Latin American countries. 
Argument by classification. 
Warrant 
(Since) Good economic 
conditions precludes 
poverty and social 
unrest. 
(Since) Economic and 
political support from the 
the industrialized world 
and international 
economic institutions 
are a pre-requisite for 
democracy .. 




(So) "Central America 
needs [ ... ] fair 
treatment in trade 
and finance to 
avoid war and 
oppression." 
(So) "[It] is too 
early to talk 
about consolidation 
of a democratic era 
in Latin America." 
(So) "Sacrificing 
the political system 
of freedom to very 
severe economic 
pressures could have 
serious consequences 
for the political 




FOUR EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON THE THIRD 
COMMON TIIEME, VIABILITY OF PEACEFUL 
SOLUTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Discourse Data 
No P. # 
1 13 
(XXX) 
Costa Rica is peaceful, 
neutral and believes in 
self-determination 
for Nicaragua and all 
countries. 
Argument by generalization 
7 19 
(IL) 
The USSR and the US are 




Argument by parallel case 
Warrant lliim 
(Since) Physical intervention (So) "Nicaraguans 
in other country's affairs is are the ones who must 
not appropriate for neutral, solve their internal 
peaceful democracies. problems." 
(Since) Conflict between (So)"There is no 
superpowers is not different reason to support the 
from conflict between use of military force 
Central American nations. in the solution of the 
Central American 
conflict." 
5 14 Nuclear and conventional (Since) Nuclear war and (So) "[We must] 
(XXXXVI) wars have their own 
horrors. 







Argument by generalization 
conventional war are 
equally harmful and 
threatening to 
humankind. 
(Since) The oppression of 
people should never be 
supported. 
equally fight together 
against the possibility 
of other Hiroshima, [or 
another] Vietnam." 
(So)"We should be 
neither political or 
economic allies of 
governments which 
oppress their people." 
Discourse 
CHART XII 
THREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON 
TIIE FOUR1H COMMON TIIEME, CORRELATION 
BE1WEEN PEACE-MAKING AND OPPOSITION 
TO WARFARE 
D .ala. Wfilll!ll CT.aim 
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N P. # 
5 14 
(XXXXV) 
Some people pursue war 
in Central America. 
Argument by classification 
7 15-6 "The Central American 
(XXXXVIII) Peace Plan is being 
crucified [as Christ was 
in his time]." 




Various events and 
people in Central 
America show a 
desire for peace. 
by generalization 
(Since) The pursuit of war 
is antagonistic to the 
pursuit of peace. 
(Since) The force of peace 
should not be silent. 
(Since) The desire for peace 
is permeating Central 
America. 
CHART XIII 
(So) "No matter how 
noble the crusade is 
[peace efforts], some 
wish for and 
encourage its failure." 
(So) "History 
repeats itself [with 
the Peace plan]." 
(So) "Central America 
is committed to 
peace." 
TWO EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON THE 
FIFTH COMMON THEME, ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF 
MAJORITY CONCERNS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 











In Central America, 
people are affected by 




desire for freedom had 
not been adequately 
addressed by politicians 




(Since) People denied a 
a voice will respond with 
violence. 
(Since) The people's call 




problems and violence 
will continue 
spreading." 
(So) "Ignoring the 
clamor for freedom 
may condemn Latin 
America to another 







TIIREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON 
TIIE SIXTH COMMON TIIEME, RECONCILIATION 
AS PRE-REQUISIIB FOR LASTING PEACE 
D.iWl 
P. # 
There are many view-
points and interests in 
the Central American 
conflict. 
Warrant 
(Since) "[Peace] cannot be 
forced in the smallest 
nations nor can it be 
imposed by the biggest 
nation." 
Qfilm 
(So) "The endless 
process [of peace] 
requires that we 
work together." 
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Conflicting parties in 
Central America are 
having a hard time 
reconciling their 
differences to reach a 
peace accord with one 
another. 
by cause 
Several discussion have 
taken place to foster a 
a major role for Central 
Americans in the 
peaceful solution of 
their own conflicts. 
Argument by classification 
(Since) Reconciliation is a 
prerequisite to peace. 
(Since) Words are part of a 
commitment, action is the 
next logical step. 
(So) "[In Central 
America] there is 
no peace because 
there is no 
reconciliation." 
(so) "Peace and 
democracy demand 
datelines and deeds, 
not just words. The 
accords in good faith 
bring us closer to 
peace, if we are able 
to put them into 
practice." 
ANALYSIS 
Arias' arguments have not been analyzed using available 
approaches to analyze argument such as those of Lewis' narrative 
forms(1987), Wander's ideological criticism (1984), and McGee's 
ideograph ( 1980) which apply to the study of political 
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argumentation. Because those approaches mainly focus on 
intracultural aspects of presidential rhetoric, and there are no similar 
or alternative studies on Costa Rican discourses or Arias' presidential 
rhetoric they did not seem appropriate for this chapter. Despite that 
fact, Arias' rhetoric carries a message which is consistent and has 
received the attention of many audiences around the world. The 
attention paid to Arias' words contributed to the success of his peace 
plan. 
The respective common themes or lines of argument drawn 
from Arias' arguments, introduced above, serve as guidelines to 
analyze his discourse. The data Arias presents to justify his claims 
are often factually insufficient, but related to situations tacitly or 
contextually understood by his audience. In other words, where 
Reagan uses an inductive pattern of thinking - moving from details 
to general principles -, Arias does the opposite, trying to 
communicate broad principles while demanding an active effort from 
his audience. Because deductive reasoning dominates European and 
Latin American patterns of thinking, Arias claims that he "speak [s] 
of our problems with the simplicity of [his] people." Arias further 
explains that Costa Ricans decided that their "problems would be 
solved by reason and reason alone. [This may explain why] there is 
no violence in our behaviour, nor threats in our speech" (Discourse 1, 
p. 12). 
Arguments 
In Arias' 1986 addresses, "Roads to freedom" and 
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"Opportunities for democracy in the Americas," both of which 
directly relate to his first line of argument, the threats to democracy 
come from the absence of a set of intertwined elements of 
democratic living, such as freedom of expression, pluralism, dialogue 
and transaction, and equality, within any nation. Arias assumes that 
democracy cannot be defended if those elements do not exist. 
"Freedom is out of reach for dictators only if it is based on freedom, 
justice, and the absence of poverty" (Discourse 4, p. 5), he says. 
Democracy, then, prevails as long as the system increases the 
political and economic participation of its citizens. Ideally, 
democracy must not foster what Arias considers traits of the 
enemies of freedom, envy, selfishness, fear, and immorality (p. 5). 
Arias' 1986 speech "Democracy in the Americas" provides a 
strong support for the second line of argument. Arias has posited 
here two pre-conditions for democracies if they are to prevail in the 
Americas. They are the following: that all tyrannies, whether from 
the left or the right, must be overcome, and that democracies must 
be accorded better economic treatment from those nations which 
already have privileged economic positions in the world. His stance 
is derived from thinking in a North-South direction rather than a 
geopolitical East-West configuration. This approach is consistent with 
the ideological position of his political party, which is a member of 
the International Socialist party and has subscribed to the Brandt 
report on North-South relations. Basically, that document suggest 
policies which address the inequality, in terms of economic exchange, 
between third world countries and superpowers and industrialized 
countries. Through most of his discourses Arias suggests that 
violence in Central America is not, as Reagan assures, due to the 
expansionist intent of Soviet-Cuban backed regimes in the region, but 
chiefly a result of the underdevelopment of Central American 
economies as well as the dominance of dictatorial regimes whose 
concerns reflect those of a small powerful elite, rather than those of 
the majority. 
Arias' 1986 address "Democracy in the Americas" (Discourse 1), 
which was already cited, and his 1988 speech "Architects of the 
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century of peace" (Discourse 7) are fundamental to understanding his 
third line of argument. They provide a basis to define the role of 
democratic systems in political and military crises in other countries. 
On this topic, Arias draws heavily on his Costa Rican experience. He 
claims that "peace and social progress can only be achieved in open 
societies with democracies where the government is chosen through 
free and pluralistic elections" (Discourse 1, p. 13). Costa Rica is not 
neutral regarding the alternatives of democracy and dictatorship, but 
will take that position in face of a war. The role of a democracy is to 
encourage change peacefully, without physically intervening in 
another country' affairs. And because Arias stresses that equality, 
among other elements, sustains democracy, he expects that between 
democracies or states equality should be the source of peaceful 
change. This correlates with a strong desire which Arias made public 
during the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly in 
1986. There he expressed Costa Rica's "desire to see all of the great 
powers remove themselves from Central American disputes." He 
said: "Costa Rica does not tolerate the fueling of war or the extension 
of death in the region by external forces" ( p. 15). Arias specifically 
demanded that the same civilized treatment that dominated the 
USSR-US armament talks be applied in Central America. "If the 
conflicts between superpowers are solved through dialogue, there 1s 
no reason to foster the use of military force in the solution of the 
Central American conflict" (Discourse 7, p. 19). 
In Arias 1987 speech, "Peace doesn't recognize borders" 
(Discourse 5), which relates to the fourth line of argument, Arias 
explores the topic of commitment, to either peace or war. Those who 
attack and mock the Peace Plan are compared by Arias, in a rare use 
of reasoning by analogy, to those who tried to crucify an ideal of 
peace by crucifying a man, Christ. The analogy is extendable to 
many polarities such as moral-immoral, good-bad, peace-war, friend-
enemy, etc. The purpose of the comparison seems to be to establish 
a tacit difference between those who are committed to peace, and so 
to the Arias Peace Plan, and those who are not. This is particularly 
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important to Arias because one of the premises of the peace process 
initiated in Guatemala in mid-1987 is that all the presidents who 
signed the peace accord known as Esquipulas I, were committed to 
peace. Thus, any disagreement about the procedures to reach that 
desirable peace are bound to the acceptance of the plan, even if 
critical. Those who rejected it, chose the easy way "to forecast defeat 
rather than triumph, war rather than peace," said Arias (p. 7). They 
value hate more than love, and military victory more than human 
reason, Arias continued (P.14). He disregarded those who opposed 
the peace plan in order to ensure the right, perhaps a moral right, of 
those who are working for peace to talk about it. However, as in 
most of his claims concerning this line of argument there are no 
substantial facts or details offered as data. Given certain data lacking 
specifics the audience is obliged to draw deductively a conclusion. 
For instance, given the data that some people pursue war in Central 
America, Arias claims that "no matter how noble the crusade is when 
started [peace efforts], some wish for and encourage its failure" 
(Argument XXXXV). Neither the specific people nor the reasons why 
they oppose the peace plan are mentioned. Only the warrant "the 
pursuit of war is antagonistic to the pursuit of peace" sustained the 
move from data to claim. A sort of tacit understanding seems to 
prevail between Arias and his audience. Perhaps Arias never 
mentions names, countries, and facts for giving grounds to his claims 
because the details are already known by the audience, or perhaps 
the audience may at least infer who or what they are. 
Arias 1986 speech "Opportunities for democracy in the 
Americas" (Discourse 4) addresses the fifth line of argument more 
precisely than any other discourse made by Arias. After explaining 
the poor economic conditions which frame the return of democracy 
to most Central American countries, Arias stresses that its advent 
heightens the expectations of the majority, which are oppressed 
under dictatorships. As a result, there is a growing demand for 
political and economic participation in the less resourceful 
democratic regimes. Lack of response from the government 
encourages the underprivileged country people to move to the 
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urban areas and increases social unrest. Arias deplores this 
situation. "Ignoring the clamor for freedom may condemn Latin 
America to another century of horror and death," he says (Argument 
XXXXIII). Arias holds the opinion that as long as concerns of the 
majority are not addressed by new democratic leadership, as is the 
practice under dictatorships, new migratory tides will begin and 
violence will spread rapidly. This is consistent with the thesis he has 
developed for the last fifteen years. That is, democracy only works 
and prevails as long as a "greater participation of the population in 
the process of adopting decisions" takes place, creating a "society 
capable of producing the basic necessities for its population under a 
basically democratic political and economic control system" (Arias, 
1973, p. 9). Aside from suggesting the inclusion of popular 
concerns in the political agenda, Arias does not explain if such a 
situation is avoidable. His presentation of the problems is more a 
diagnosis than a cry for change. And, his claims here, like others 
previously cited, (such as the need for a fair economic treatment and 
threats to freedom) are tied together. The responsibility for making 
a difference is divided between the returning democracies, which 
fight against great odds, and the United States, whose government 
and economic agencies, public and private, financed dictatorships all 
over Latin America for years. It seems, as Arias points out, that "the 
international political support in favor of the re-establishment of 
democratic regimes is not consistent with the goodwill expended m 
the economic arena" (p.7). In fact, Arias remarks that the still 
existing Latin American dictatorships enjoy better economic 
treatment than do new democracies (p. 6). 
The last theme claims reconciliation as the pre-requisite for 
peace in Central America, framed by the Arias peace plan. In his 
1988 speech, "Peace- Supreme hope of the world" Arias presented 
arguments to justify reconciliation as a primary step to carry out the 
peace accords signed the previous year in Guatemala by the five 
Central American presidents. As he does in many arguments, Arias 
frames the claim that "[In Central America] there is no peace because 
there is no reconciliation," in contemporary history (Argument 
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XXXXVII). However, rather than citing historical facts he begins a 
monologue in which he thoughtfully asks himself about the origin of 
"a bloody and martyred Central America" (p. 8). The story is 
abruptly interrupted by a claim, tied to a moral chain of concurrent 
elements, which allows peace to exist. Arias says "there is no peace 
because there is no reconciliation. There is no reconciliation because 
there is no justice. There is no justice because there is no 
compassion; there is no compassion because there is no love" (p. 8). 
After the claim is established he seems to have no need for 
elaboration. As indicated earlier, Arias draw general conclusions 
without explicitly addressing the reasoning process through which 
the conclusion has been obtained. Following the process of reason 
seems to be the work of his audience. 
In general, thoughts proclaimed in a self-reflective fashion are 
Arias' basis for making claims. Nevertheless, as it is shown in the 
next section, Arias often uses reasoning by generalization to build his 
arguments. 
Warrants 
The six lines of argument found in our sample of seven 
discourses concerning Costa Rica's policy towards Central America 
have been illustrated by sample arguments using Toulmin's model. 
All the claims analyzed were chiefly supported by warrants. The 
warrants, as has been explained, are rarely made explicit by the 
speaker. In fact, their implicitness is what allows the speaker to 
establish a link with his audience. As Jeffrey R. Sweeney (1981) 
elaborates, the warrant provides justification for the act of inference 
require to move from data to claim. 
This chapter as well as Chapter II is concerned with showing 
the warrants of the speaker's discourses. Chart XV below shows a 
sample of those warrants related to each specific line of argument, 
numbered from one to six, and according to the type of reasoning 
used by Arias to assert his arguments case by case. Although not 
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exhaustive, the chart shows a noticeable dominance of argument by 
generalization in his discourses. From the twenty-three arguments 
studied, seventeen of which are shown in Chart XV, argumentation 
by generalization counts for 36% of all Arias' arguments studied for 
this particular research. Arguments by cause account for 22% of the 
total, and arguments by sign, parallel and classification make up 40%. 
Clearly, reasoning by analogy is disregarded by Arias. 
Argument by generalization uses a reasoning which can move 
from small examples to general principles or viceversa. This process 
works deductively in Arias' arguments. He offers a few outlines as 
the claim from which one may infer deductively the supporting data. 
Two arguments illustrate Arias' preference for the deductive 
generalization type of reasoning. First, when Arias claims that 
"Democracy is the only road to peace and justice [in Central America]" 
(Argument XXXV), which is a broad statement, the data he offers 
should be inferred deductively because is not explicit in his 
argument. In fact, the grounds for the claim he asserts are not 
specific or detailed [Undemocratic regimes deny individual rights]. 
In another case, Arias puts forth the claim that "The endless process 
[of peace] requires that we work together" (Argument XXXIX). The 
data from the latter could be inferred deductively [There are many 
viewpoints and interests in the Central American conflict] Despite 
the fact, that Arias sometimes gives specifics which we can infer as 
data, these specifics are broad statements rather than particular 
details or facts. The data of reasoning by generalization was used by 
Arias to argue the stability of democratic systems which fulfill their 
citizens lives even in the face of totalitarism (Arguments XXXVI, 
XXXXIV), and he defined a democracy as a system that does not, 
intervene militarily in other countries affairs (Argument XXX). 
Reasoning by cause ranks second in importance. In this type of 
argument, the data function as a cause for the claim, and the warrant 
is a statement justifying the cause-effect relationship (Rieke & 
Sillars). Arias' reasoning by cause differs from Reagan's reasoning m 
that he approaches life events such as war, peace, democracy and 
freedom more wholistically. That is, he points out causes of 
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problems, but does not commit himself to one cause, or one effect. 
His arguments should be seen as part of a whole set of interacting 
causes and effects. This causal reasoning seems more interactive 
than that of Reagan's arguments as outlined in the following 
discussion. Arias uses reasoning by cause when clarity and 
simplicity are important. This is not the case of the "Soviet-Cuban 
threat" which, to be accepted by the listeners, attains from the 
speaker plenty of convincing details. This is a case of linear 
understanding to which the causal path of reasoning fits better. As 
Arias points out, "Central America needs fair treatment in trade and 
finance to avoid war and oppression." Why? Because good economic 
conditions preclude poverty and social unrest (Argument XXXIII). 
Therefore, there is a causal relationship between severe economic 
pressures on a democratic system and the presence of war, 
oppression, poverty or social unrest. In another speech, Arias said 
"[In Central America] there is no peace ... " Why? He answered 
because "there is no reconciliation." Indeed, conflicting parties in 
Central America are having a difficult time reconciling their 
differences in their attempt to reach a peace agreement with each 
other (Argument XXXXVII). The causal relationship between peace 
and reconciliation is quite clear. 
Considering reasoning by classification, Arias seldom uses 
specific cases or elements which behave as a member of a class with 
which they have been associated. The only situations in which Arias 
uses this type of reasoning is to differentiate himself and those who 
support the peace initiative he leads, from those who disapprove or 
attack the plan (Argument XXXXV), and when he wishes to 
distinguish between words and deeds concerning the peace initiative. 
Because Arias has shown a lesser interest in providing specific 
details or facts to prove his arguments than Reagan, reasoning by 
sign, which is preferred by Reagan, is quite unimportant to Arias. 
The only circumstance in which this type of reasoning acquires 
relevance here is in connection with the idea of the "instability" of 
Central American freedom systems due to economic, rather than 
military, pressures (Argument XXXVII). Other types of reasoning, 
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such as parallel, analogy and authority, are downplayed in Arias' 
arguments. Their importance seems to be thwarted by the dominant 
role of reasoning by generalization. The lack of a clear-cut style, 
which has been described as characteristic of Arias' rhetoric, uses 
reasoning by generalization in order to achieve soundness and 
consistency. Nevertheless, the primary issues addressed by Arias 
cultural context, political decision-making by consensus, among other 
factors -- often don't require probing via other types of reasoning, 
but should be examined by generalization. 
Arias' arguments that were analyzed are supported by a 
selection of warrants and the types of reasoning which are 
represented in Chart XV. 
CORRELATION OF WARRANTS AND CLAIMS 
For the purposes of making clear the correlation between 
warrants and claims in Arias' arguments, the warrants summarized 
on chart XV are grouped according to the degree of connectedness 
between Arias' warrants and claims (See Figure 4.) This time all 
twenty-two of Arias' arguments are taken into account to draw the 
main warrants and their respective claims. 
The first general warrant (W.1) is that fair treatment in 
international trade and finance guarantees democratic stability. The 
example selected is that [Unfair economic and political development 
is only possible in peace] (Argument XXIX), which underlies the 
following claims: 
(1) "Sacrificing the political system of freedom to very severe 
economic pressures could have serious consequences for the political 
future of Latin America" (Argument XXIX, p. 12). 
CHART XV 
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF WARRANTS AND TYPES 
OF REASONING SUPPORTING ARIAS' ARGU1\1ENTS 











Only democracy can guarantee 
reconciliation, allow peace, and 
preclude violence from crossing 
borders. 
Political oppression can only be 
exerted by people who are afraid 
of freedom and without human 
values. 
What free people believe in their 
souls and live daily can't be taken 
away. 
The oppression of people should 
never be supported. 
Good economic conditions 
preclude poverty and social 
unrest. 
Economic and political support 
from the industrialized world and 
international economic institutions 
is a pre-requisite of democracy. 
Unfair economic treatment 
precludes democracy. 
Physical intervention in other 
country's affairs is not 
appropriate for neutral, peaceful 
democracies. 
Conflict between superpowers 
is not different from conflict 
between Central American nations. 
Nuclear war and conventional war 
are equally harmful and threate-













COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF WARRANTS AND TYPES 
OF REASONING SUPPORTING ARIAS' ARGUMENTS 
(continued) 









The pursuit of war is antagomsuc 
to the pursuit of peace. 
The force of peace cannot be 
silenced. 
The desire for peace is permeating 
Central America. 
People denied a voice will respond 
with violence. 
A people's call for freedom cannot 
be suppressed for long. 
"[Peace] cannot be forced in the 
smallest nations nor can it be 
imposed by the biggest nation." 
Reconciliation is a pre-requisite 
for peace. 
Words are part of a commitment. 
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Figure 4. Graph correlation between general 
warrants and daims in Arias' arguments. 
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(2) "Central America needs [ ... ] fair treatment in trade and finance 
to avoid war and oppression" (Argument XXXIII, p. 17). 
(3) "[It] is too early to talk about consolidation of a democratic era 
in Latin America" (Argument XXXVII, p. 6). 
The second general warrant (W.2) concerns the role of 
democracies in avoiding military intervention in other countries 
affairs. This is shown by the warrant [Physical intervention in other 
country's affairs is not appropriate for neutral, peaceful 
democracies], (Argument XXX) which synthesizes the available 
warrants to the following claims: 
(1) "Nicaraguans are the ones who must solve their own internal 
problems" (Argument XXX, p. 13). 
(2) "Costa Rica is neutral with respect to war" (Argument XXXI, p. 
13 ). 
(3) "There is no reason to support the use of military force in the 
solution of Central American conflict" (Argument IL, p. 19). 
The third general warrant (W.3) states how democracies can 
defend themselves from the threat imposed on them by totalitarism. 
This is illustrated by the warrant [Only democracy can guarantee 
reconciliation, allow peace, and preclude violence from crossing 
borders] (Argument XXXII), which lies at the core of the principles 
supporting the following claims: 
(1) "Latin America is living an era of a return to democracy" 
(Argument XXVIII, p. 11 ). 
(2) "Only if we endeavor to enable all peoples to enjoy democracy, 
[and] cause the downfall of all tyrants equally, can we prevent 
threats to world from growing in the Americas" (Argument XXXII, 
p. 32). 
(3) "Democracy is the only road to peace and justice" (Argument 
xxxv, p. 5). 
( 4) "The only defense against the enemies of freedom is to 
strengthen freedom and democratic institutions" (Argument XXXVI, 
p. 5). 
(5) "[Democracy] is invulnerable before the totalitarian attacks" 
(Argument XXXXIV, p. 12). 
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The fourth general warrant (W .4) names Central American 
leaders as responsible for putting peace into practice . The warrant 
[Words are part of a commitment; action is the logical next step] 
(Argument XXXIV) is at the core of the warrants which support the 
following claims: 
(1) "Peace and democracy demand datelines and deeds, not just 
words. The accords in good faith bring us [Central Americans] closer 
to peace, if we are able to put them into practice" (Argument XXXIV, 
pp. 11-2). 
(2) "Migratory problems and violence will continue spreading" 
(Argument XXXVIII, p. 6). 
(3) "Ignoring the clamor for freedom may condemn Latin America 
to another century of horror and death" (Argument XXXXIII, p. 11). 
The fifth general warrant (W.5) claims reconciliation and 
cooperation as necessary supports for peace. The warrant ["[Peace] 
cannot be forced on the smallest nation nor can it be imposed by the 
biggest nation" (Argument XXXIX) supports the following claims. 
(1) "The endless process [of peace] requires that we [Central 
Americans] work together" (Argument XXXIX, p. 5). 
(2) "[We all must] equally fight together against the possibility of 
another Hiroshima, another Vietnam" (Argument XXXXVI, p. 14). 
(3) "[In Central America] there is no peace because there is no 
reconciliation" (Argument XXXXVII, p. 8). 
The sixth general warrant (W.6) concerns peace as a desirable 
outcome, opposed only by those who favor war. An example of this 
is the warrant [Peace is to be sought as desirable] (Argument XXXX). 
This is the core principle of the warrants which support the following 
claims: 
(1) "I can't accept defeatism" (Argument XXXX, p. 7). 
(2) "No matter how noble the crusade is [peace efforts], some wish 
for and encourage its failure" (Argument XXXXV, p. 14). 
(3) "History repeats itself [with the Arias Peace Plan] " (Argument 
XXXXVIII, pp. 15-6). 
(4) "Central America is committed to peace" (Argument L, p. 23). 
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The seventh general warrant (W .7) is concerned with 
individual rights and freedom, as opposed to totalitarianism, 
oppression and dogma. The warrant, [The oppression of the people 
should never be supported] (Argument XXXXI) maintains the 
following claims: 
(1) "We [democrats] should be neither political or economic allies of 
governments which oppress their peoples." (Argument XXXXI, p. 41) 
(2) "Dogmas are the enemies of human creativity [individual 
freedom] " (Argument XXXXII p. 11). 
SUMMARY 
Although Oscar Arias has not been considered as talented a 
speaker as Ronald Reagan, his public discourses on Central American 
policy have met with consistent success. Chapter III examined the 
role Arias' words played in convincing audiences of the validity of 
the claims presented in his discourse. Unlike Reagan's speeches 
Arias' seem to have no specific structure and no clear style. He tends 
to cite fewer facts than Reagan and to speak on a more philosophical 
or idealistic plane. 
As was done in Chapter II to Reagan's discourse, in this chapter 
Toulmin's model of analyzing argument was applied to a selection of 
Arias' public speeches on Central American policy. The warrants 
underlying Arias' discourse - reflecting cultural values inherent in 
Arias' words- were determined. Types of reasoning employed were 
examined; Arias used argument by generalization more than any 
other type of reasoning. Finally, following the pattern of Chapter II, 
the warrants repetitive through Arias' speeches studied in this 
research were displayed according to the degree to which they 
connected corresponding data and claims. This data will provide a 
base for determining the cultural values Arias' relies upon to 
effectively communicate with his audiences. 
CHAPTER IV 
CULTURAL VALUES AFFECTING PO LID CAL ARGUMENTS 
EXCHANGED BE1WEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND ARIAS 
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the data 
collected: It looks at the warrants of each speaker's arguments, 
interprets their similarities and differences in terms of cultural 
values, and draws implications for an intercultural communication 
perspective. By doing so, this chapter finds that since Arias and 
Reagan belong to different cultures, their political arguments are 
underlaid with different cultural values which may affect their 
mutual understanding. 
The interpretation of the data presented relied on three 
sources: the list of value orientations used by Condon and Yousef 
(1975) in linking argumentation and cultural values, the summary of 
cultural assumptions and values developed by Stewart, Danielian and 
Foster (1969) and, Edward C. Stewart's cross-cultural perspective of 
American cultural patterns (1971) in contrasting U.S. patterns with 
those of other cultures. These three sources have relied heavily on 
the original five sets of value orientations proposed by Florence 
Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck in their study, Variations in value 
orientations (1961). Condon and Yousef have kept the three 
variations for each set, but they have added to the original five sets, 
for a total of twenty. Thus, a new chart of value orientations 
combining the three sources has been developed to suit the need for 
the identification of value orientations found in each speaker. (See 
Chart XVI ) 
In referring to the chart, this chapter takes into consideration 
the following aspects: (1) All the variations summarized may exist in 
any society beyond the United States and Costa Rica; (2) this 
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summary 1s neither definitive nor exhaustive, and to apply it to the 
specific inquiry of this thesis concerning communication between 
political speakers from particular cultures, it has been necessary to 
make major adjustments. 
Each of the sources consulted for this section provides a 
different, but complementary approach to the authors' common field: 
intercultural communication. Condon and Yousef provide a base for 
understanding relativism in public argument that is, the different 
cultural frames, which, existing across cultures, give different 
perspectives to help describe, interpret and evaluate political claims 
because of differences in cultural values reflected in warrants. 
Nevertheless, "culturally [influential] rhetorical forms themselves 
help shape one's world view, one's thoughts, and one's actions" 
(Condon & Yousef, 1975, p. 233). Stewart, Danielian and Foster 
established a cross-cultural set of categories within which the 
cultural values and patterns of thinking underlying public argument 
explain differences between different cultural speakers. Finally, 
Stewart provides the four different components to classify the 
cultural values underlying Reagan and Arias' arguments by way of 
warrants. They are form of activity, form of relation to others, 
perception of the world and perception of the self (Stewart, 1971, p. 
26). These components are fully explained through the three 
sections of this chapter: first, cultural values underlying warrants, 
which relate warrants to cultural values using the XVI, which is 
based on E. C. Stewart et al.'s (1969) and Condon and Yousefs value 
orientations lists; second, a brief description of distinctive patterns of 
thinking operating in Reagan and Arias' arguments, which enhance 
our understanding of how cultural values affect reasoning; third, 
conflict(s) between Reagan and Arias' arguments, obtained by 
eliciting and discussing conflicts between arguments when comparing 
them; and fourth, implications according to the intercultural 
communication perspective. 
It is important to emphasize that cultural values cannot be 
found alone, because they are part of a vast fabric of culture. As has 
been observed, values classify within the perception of human 
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nature which under a broad perception of the world (Stewart, 1971, 
p. 26) merge into one another subconsciously as human behavior 
does in an underlying value system. Stewart points out that "each 
component of a culture affects the others and, in turn, is limited by 
them." In American culture, for instance, the stress on the value of 
equality among all is sometimes incompatible with achievement and, 
also, freedom (Williams,1964, pp. 27-8). Therefore, this chapter 
stresses the prevailing cultural values over those which may be 
there implicitly, but may be dependent on the main value. 
I have established in chapters II and III that warrants carry 
important information which increases understanding of how and 
why arguments are made. The arguments selected from either 
Reagan's or Arias' discourses about the Central American conflict 
have been explored and their main warrants summarized in Charts 
XVI and XVII. 
CULTURAL VALUES UNDERLYING ARGUMENTS 
In order to first relate Reagan and Arias' warrants to cultural 
values this section relies on the data from chart I to XVIIII and 
figure 3 of Chapter II for Reagan's cultural values, and from chart IX 
to chart XV and figure 4 of Chapter III for Arias' cultural values. 
Reagan's warrants are analyzed first, followed by Arias' warrants. 
Reagan's warrants 
In chapter II, Reagan's warrants were summarized into nine 
categories which are orderly consubstantiality (WI), political dualism 
(W2), U.S. international role as policeman (W3), U.S. fairness and 
maturity (W4), legitimacy (W5), signs of war and ill-will (W6), old 
solutions to new problems (W7), only democracy guarantees freedom 
and development (W8), and totalitarism threatens democratic 
systems and actions (W9). 
CHART XVI 
CULTURAL VALUE ORIENTATIONS 
AND PA TfERNS OF 1HINKING 
A. Cultural Value Orientations: 
FORM OF ACTIVITY 











1. Independence 2. symmetrical-obligatory 3. complementary-
Fair-play 
1. fairness 
PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD 
2. mixture of both 
Progress and the concept of time 
1. linear-causal chain of 2. interaction of events 
event s (one event affecting the 
the other) 
PERCEPfION OF SELF 
Individualism-interdependence 
1. Individualism 2. Individuality 
Good and Evil 




3. events are 
cyclical (no 
events, only a 
time and space 




Based on sets of value orientations proposed by Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961), Stewart, 
Danielian, Foster (1969), Stewart (1971), and Condon and Yousef (1975) 
B. Patterns of thinking: 
1. Dichotomous (Dualistic) 2. Non-dichotomous 3. Relativistic (or 
third perspective) 
1. Inductive 2. Circular 3. Deductive 
Based on Edward C. Stewart (1971) list of patterns of thinking connected with cultural 
values. 
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The general warrant 1 concerns consubstantiality, which is 
common ground. Reagan, as speaker, seems to seek common ground 
with his audience showing that the United States and Central 
America or the Caribbean basin are really very much alike. This is 
true of most of his addresses whether to Latin American or U.S. 
audiences. As shown in 1982 "Aid to the Caribbean Basin": he claims 
"We are the new world [ ... ] We [U.S. and Latin America] are all 
America" (Argument I, p. 322); 1983 "The Problems in Central 
America" where in stressing the strategic value of 
Central America he puts forth the claim "Central America is the U.S. 
lifeline to the outside world" (Argument VII, p. 450); or 1986 
"Nicaragua" where in defending the "Contras" Reagan says "The 
resistance has contributed directly to the security of the United 
States" (Argument XVIII, p. 388). 
Reagan's focus on common ground as warrant for the 
aforementioned claims supposes the existence of the theme of 
equality. The term has been estimated by Stewart (1971, p. 46) as 
one which pervades the American (U.S.) social relationship. 
Consubstantiality or common ground is rooted in the value of 
equality understood here as one of humanness, "We're all human 
after all," explains Stewart. Paraphrasing it, "We're all [U.S. and 
Central America] America [after all]" a claim that implies that the 
link Reagan wanted to establish with his audience was one of an 
interpersonal relationship. In other words, Reagan apparently was 
not talking down to the people listening, but horizontally as in typical 
interpersonal relationships, conducting a communication between 
presumed equals. The purpose, which is explored to a greater extent 
in the discussion section of this chapter, seems to reduce the risk of 
confrontation with seemingly different audiences from different 
social strata and culture by establishing an atmosphere of equality. 
By using the list of value orientations from XVI, the general 
warrant 1, common ground, fits into the category of the value 
equality under form of relations to others . 
The general warrants 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 can be summarized into 
one chief concern, dualism, that is the use of an "either/or" pattern. 
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Reagan, as speaker, seems to warrant many of his claims by 
suggesting to his audience that there is always a choice between only 
two alternatives, and that one of them, usually implicit as a rejection 
of the explicit one, is better than the other in dealing with or 
describing the Central American or Caribbean basin problems. This 
is noticed in addresses such as the 1982 "Aid to the Caribbean Basin" 
where he claims that "There are only two possible futures for Central 
America: [Democracy or dictatorship] (Argument III, p. 324); or the 
implicit appeal to a positive choice instead of the negative alternative 
explicit in the warrant as in 1983 "The problems in Central America" 
where in depicting negatively the leftist guerrillas Reagan says 
"Salvadoran guerrillas are a small minority who want power for 
themselves and their backers" (Argument IX, p. 451); or 1987 
"Central America at a critical juncture" where in dividing the political 
scenario into democrats or antidemocrats he says "The Sandinistas m 
Nicaragua are not democratic" (Argument XXIII, p. 2). 
Reagan's use of dualism, which has been cited above as an 
"either/or" pattern, as warrant for the aforementioned claims has 
been widespread in most of his speeches. Dualism supposes the 
existence of the theme of good versus evil, and the existence of a 
choice between them. In the logic of Reagan speeches, he tends to 
judge every situation as being good or bad. The term dualism, as 
used in this chapter, is considered by Condon and Yousef ( 197 5, 
p. 97) as one connected with how human nature is perceived in 
American culture. Dualism is underpined by the values of choice, 
good and evil and change. In Stewart's words "while religion in the 
U.S. is committed to the doctrine that man is evil 
by nature, most Americans are unlikely to give the 
concept much thought. More likely they will see 
man as a mixture of good and evil or a creature of 
his environment and experience. Most important, 
they will stress his ability to change" (1971, p. 59). 
Through the arguments linked to the above mentioned 
warrants, this value orientation takes many forms: susp1c10n 
towards the Sandinistas "Nicaragua is an outlaw regime" (Argument 
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XVII, p. 3 87), pessimism about Soviet and Cuban political intentions 
in Central America "Foes of freedom will destabilize Caribbean basin 
countries" (Argument IV, pp. 324-25). Therefore, Reagan claims 
there is a choice between one alternative that is better than another, 
good versus evil, in a scenario where things can change for the good 
only if the U.S is allowed to intervene. This last element implies the 
value of "doing" which is located under the category of form of 
activity according to Condon and Yousef (1975), and Stewart, 
Danielian and Foster (1969) and Stewart (1971). 
By using XVI , the general warrant 2, to which has been added 
warrants 5, 6, 8 and 9, dualism, fits into the category of the value 
choice between good or evil under perception of the world . 
The general warrant 3 is concerned with the U.S. role as the 
international policeman, that is, assuming task-oriented activities 
such as a moral commitment to preserving freedom and stability in 
and out of the United States. Reagan, as speaker, seems to warrant 
some claims by suggesting to his audience that there is a moral 
obligation from the U.S. to its allies in Central America and elsewhere 
which is manifested by engaging in some activities which can change 
the future for the better no matter how serious the problems are. 
This is noticeable in addresses such as the 1982 "Aid to the 
Caribbean Basin" where he claims that "Freedom and peace requires 
help from the U.S. to those nations confronted with communist 
aggression" (Argument V, p. 325); or the explicit commitment 
acquired unilaterally by the U.S. with Central American nations, 
whether or not its governments agree. Additional support to U.S. 
international policing is found in Reagan's 1983 "The problems in 
Central America" where he says that the "U.S. will support the 
security of the region's threatened nations" (Argument XI, pp. 452-
3); and 1987 "Central America at a critical juncture" where Reagan 
makes personal his position towards the region, by saying that he 
"won't walk away from the fight for freedom in Central America" 
(Argument XXV, p. 4). 
Reagan's use of a police role, which has been cited above as 
engaging in task-oriented activities because of a moral commitment, 
8 1 
as the warrant for the aforementioned claims, has permeated his 
rhetoric. Policing supposes that there is a duty. In his 1988 "State of 
the Union" address Reagan has noted that "the love of freedom that 
God places in each of us ... has [been] entrusted in a special way to this 
nation [by God]" (p. 258). He supported this vision in the work ethic-
-doing. In the logic of Reagan speeches, he tends to place a high 
value on action which yields the principle that one can improve upon 
the present. Following such logic, action and hard work will bring 
about what the individual, the nation and the government wants; 
hence, Reagan describes his policies as having what Clyde and 
Florence Kluckhohn call the attribute of effort-optimism (194 7). 
That is, through one's effort or hard work one will achieve one's 
ambitions. No goal is too remote, no obstacle is too difficult, for the 
individual or nation which has the will and the determination and 
which expends the effort. Stewart summarizes the spirit of this 
when saying "hard work is rewarded by success" (1971, p. 34). 
As Reagan highly regards task-oriented action, "doing", he also 
stresses other values such as "individualism" and "progress". The 
form of activity developed as a category by Stewart (1971 ).includes 
the aforementioned values as an interrelated group. It is possible to 
delineate them from the Reagan's arguments already cited and put 
them under a form of activity. Therefore, the warrant of the U.S 
policing the world is underpined by Reagan's action values. Reagan, 
the speaker, uses them to enable his administration to carry out the 
policies he wishes, such as supporting the "Contras" and increasing 
economic and military pressures against Nicaragua or other 
opponents. In Reagan's arguments linked to the general warrant 3, 
the value orientation using action to change Central American 
conflicts, stresses the value "doing" to change the present time, thus 
tacitly implying a temporal orientation to the future. In Florence 
Kluckhohn's words the most distinctive feature of the value of doing 
"is a demand for the kind of activity which results in 
accomplishments that are measurable by standards conceived to be 
external to the acting individual" ( 1963, p. 17). Through the 
arguments linked to the mentioned warrants, this value orientation 
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has taken two main forms: Reagan insists on "getting things done" 
when he says that he "won't walk away from the fight for freedom in 
Central America" (Argument XXV, p. 4). He also shows that the U.S. 
will take action, employing phrases like the "U.S. will support the 
security of the region's threatened nations" (Argument XI, pp. 452-
3). 
By using XVI, the general warrant 3 fits into the category of 
the value doing, which is closely related to the values of progress and 
individualism. Doing is under form of activity . 
The general warrant 4 concerns the U.S. image as a fair power, 
that is one which engages in fair play. Reagan tries to persuade his 
audience of his administration's ability to maturely and responsibly 
handle international crises, particularly in Central America. This is 
true of three of his speeches delivered to the American people as, for 
example, his 1983 speech "The Problems in Central America" where 
in diminishing the impact of the economic embargo and the funding 
of the "Contras," he sets forth the claim that "Our actions [are] hardly 
the actions of a nation implacably hostile to Nicaragua" (Argument 
VIII, p. 451 ); in the 1984 speech "Central America policy" Reagan 
notes the good will of his country in world affairs by saying that "the 
U.S. will never be the aggressor" (Argument XIII, p. 482-3); and in a 
1986 speech "Nicaragua" Reagan depicts U.S. policy towards Central 
America as one of peace-seeking rather than that of a belligerent 
supporter of the "Contras", by saying that "the U.S. has sought and 
still seeks - a negotiated peace and a democratic future in a free 
Nicaragua" (Argument XIX, p. 388). 
Reagan focuses the above mentioned claims on fair-play 
warrant and supposes the existence of the warrant as a cultural 
value. The term fair-play has been defined by Stewart (1971, p. 53) 
as one which pervades American decision-making. Margaret Mead 
points out that fairness doesn't consists of rules which ought to be 
followed as 
The inclusion of [the] other person's weakness inside the 
rule so that "fair play" [encompasses] a statement of relative 
strength of the opponents and it ceases to be fair [when it] 
beat a weak opponent (Mead, 1965, p. 143). 
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In Reagan's arguments the notion of "fair-play" stands for his 
administrations fair share in world and regional affairs as well as its 
concern in acting fairly towards other nations. Therefore, Reagan 
cannot initiate action if it involves aggression since he, according to 
the logic of his arguments, does not believe in beginning a war. It 
resembles his claim that the "U.S. will never be the aggressor" 
(Argument XIII, pp. 482-3). Nevertheless, it becomes very 
important to him to be able to say "they started [war]," and then of 
course, "we'll finish it." According to Stewart, "the significance of the 
value - accommodation to the weakness of another-- is brought out 
in the mutual misunderstanding of the concept of fair play between 
Americans and member of other cultures" (1971, p. 54). 
Fair-play is rooted in the value of fairness understood here as 
one of "accommodation to the weakness of the other" explains 
Stewart. In Reagan's words that would equal the claim, "Our actions 
were hardly the actions of a nation implacably hostile to Nicaragua" 
(Argument VIII, p. 451 ). This claim implies that the link Reagan, the 
speaker, wanted to establish with his audience is again, as in the first 
general warrant, a connotation of an interpersonal relationship. In 
other words, Reagan appeals to his audience by exploiting the value 
of fairness which is shared by the American audience. The purpose, 
which is explored more in depth in the discussion section of this 
chapter, seems to enhance the seriousness and consideration with 
which the decision-makers view a hostile or friendly confrontation 
with Central American nations. 
By using XVI, the general warrant 4, fair play, fits into the 
category of the value fairness under form of relation to others . 
The general warrant 5 covers the adequacy of "cold-war" 
solutions to contemporary problems. Reagan tries to persuade his 
audience of the validity of old policies to new problems, implying 
that the usefulness of those policies is directly related to the 
sameness of political conditions along different stages in history. The 
applicability of such analogy in terms of Reagan's decision-making 
processes depended on the selective perception of causes as 
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producers of the present crisis in Central America as existed in the 
region during the cold war years. This is evident in the claims that 
suit the following three discourses: in the 1983 speech "The Problems 
in Central America," Reagan posits Truman's success in preventing 
communism from expanding in 1947, by stating that "President 
Truman's words are as apt today as they were in 1947" (Argument 
XII, p. 452); in the 1984 speech, "Central America policy" Reagan 
engages again in an analogy by finding the U.S. citizens' opposition to 
his policies in Central America as a repetition of the isolationism 
during World War II, he then claims that "[Isolationism] ensures war 
instead of preventing it" (Argument XV, p. 486); and, in the 1987 
"State of the Union," address Reagan causally finds that the Soviets 
are at war and consequently want to have a beachhead at the U.S. 
doorstep and he warns that "Freedom Fighters won't allow the 
Soviets to have a beachhead [in Central America]" (Argument XXII, p. 
259). 
At first glance, Reagan seems to have relied heavily on the 
past, but to consider that his arguments are not directed to the 
future seems attractive. However, his concept of time is eminently 
suited to a rational view of the world. One can distinguish various 
moments in time, note their relationship, and convey their 
connection by calling the preceding moment a cause and the next an 
effect. The description made by Stewart ( 1971, p. 65) identifies 
Reagan's predilection for seeing the world, Central America in 
particular, in rather simple terms and, ideally, evoking a simple 
cause and effect sequence to explain events. 
Despite Reagan's apparent lament for the passing of the good 
old days, he is optimistic that the future will be bright if one 
acknowledges the lessons of the past in a linear fashion, suggesting 
that the same cause produces the same effect. This made his 
arguments future-oriented or concerned with progress. As has been 
pointed out by Condon and Yousef "the past, too, is not denied or 
forgotten; more likely it is interpreted as a more distant present" 
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(1975, p. 110). Reagan's focus on progress from the past, old 
solutions to new problems, warrants the aforementioned claims and 
supposes the existence of progress as a cultural value. Reagan 
introduced an appealing past, whether the lessons of the cold war or 
isolationism during WW II, to his audience, but moves forward to 
show its applicability under new historical conditions. The 
differences are neglected and the similarities enhanced, thus 
allowing Reagan to master the past and to conquer the future. 
Reagan draws from history what he needs, and forgets the rest. 
Social inequality, external debt, corruption, civil war are not the 
causes of Central American problems, at least not the ones 
externalized in Reagan's rhetoric. In his arguments he sees Central 
America as being threatened, invaded, troubled by external factors--
Soviets, Cubans and communism. By using XVI, the general warrant 
7, old solutions to new problems, fits into the category of the value 
progress under Perception of the world . 
Arias' warrants 
In Chapter III, Arias' warrants were summarized into seven 
categories which include: fair treatment in international affairs and 
finance in order to guarantee democratic stability (WI), non-
intervention in other nations' affairs (W2), democracies' self-defense 
capability against totalitarian threats (W3 ), leaders' responsibility to 
change words into deeds (W 4 ), cooperation (W5), peace as a 
desirable outcome over war (W6), individual rights and freedom as 
opposed to totalitarian oppression and dogma (W7). 
The general warrants 1, 4, and 5 are permeated by the 
concepts of fair treatment in international affairs and finance, and 
social reciprocity within underdeveloped Central American societies 
as a means to achieving democratic stability. That is, first, fair play 
based on cooperation between democratic nations, particularly aid 
from the rich to the poor countries, and second, acknowledgment of 
people's needs and possibilities within social classes in democratic 
86 
nations. Arias, as speaker, seems to seek an understanding with his 
audience about the fragility of democracies before poor external and 
internal economic conditions because of unfair international trade 
and finance and because of internal social injustice and lack of 
cooperation to carry out politic and economic reforms. He also 
implies that democracies, whether economically rich or poor, should 
respect each other- but that the wealthy might help those that are 
not as wealthy. This is true of most of all his addresses as 
demonstrated in a 1986 speech entitled "Democracy in the 
Americas," in which Arias claims that "Sacrificing the political system 
of freedom to very severe economic pressures could have serious 
consequences for the political future of Latin America" (Argument 
XXIX, p. 12); in a 1987 speech, "Peace doesn't recognize borders," 
Arias stresses the notion that peace in the region cannot be achieved 
without acknowledging popular needs, he warns that "Ignoring the 
clamor for freedom may condemn Latin America to another century 
of horror and death" (Argument XXXXIII, p. 11); or, in a 1988 speech, 
"Peace -supreme hope of the world," he explains that the first step to 
filling the gap between political enemies and classes divided because 
of social injustice is social reciprocity and cooperation. In his own 
words, "[In Central America] there is no peace because there is no 
reconciliation" (Argument XXXXVII, p. 8). 
Arias focuses on fair-play based on international cooperation 
and national social reciprocity warranting that these claims seem to 
underpin two value categories: form of activity and form of social 
relations. The first category is understood as the link between the 
individual and the concrete event in the world. It reflects other 
assumptions, such as the second category - form of social relations, m 
the context of a specific moment and place and the demands of a 
given situation (Stewart,1971, p. 26). According to the reading of 
Arias' arguments, being, which is form of activity, is the dominant 
cultural value underlying warrants 1, 4 and 5. Likewise, Arias' 
warrants underlie the values of fair-play and cooperation, which are 
under the form of social relations in Stewart list. These values 
require further explanation. Although Arias' exhortation to change 
87 
words into deeds "Peace and democracy demand datelines and deeds, 
not just words. The accords in good faith bring us [ Central 
Americans ] closer to peace, if we are able to put them into practice" 
(Argument XXXIV, pp. 11-12) seems at first a typical American 
orientation to action, but it is not. The inclusion of the qualifier "if" 
makes any claim a proposal, an intent, not an assertion to which 
action or reaction automatically follows. In other words, Arias 
apparently was not talking literally. As explained by Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck 
In the being form of activity, there is a preference ... 
for the kind of activity which is a spontaneous expression 
of what is conceived to be "given" in the human personality. 
As compared with [other value orientations], it is a 
nondevelopmental conception of [form of] activity. It might 
even be phrased as a spontaneous expression in the activity of 
impulses and desires; yet care must be taken not to make 
this interpretation a too literal one (1961, p. 16). 
Arias' being orientation toward activity, which is explored 
more deeply in the discussion section of this chapter, seems to 
enhance his persuasiveness before Central American audiences and 
political leadership, particularly the presidents who came together to 
sign the peace accords and who are responsible for carrying out 
political and economic reforms in their own countries. 
In considering the values of fair play and cooperation, more 
precise definitions must be applied. Cooperation for Arias is not 
necessarily given for the sake of action, but because it often implies 
that the Costa Rican, in particular, and the Central American, in 
general, doesn't easily yield in matters of principles. For instance, m 
dealings with the different pro or anti-government in the Central 
American scenario, Arias has acknowledged that "[We all must] 
equally fight together the possibility of another Hiroshima, another 
Vietnam" (Argument XXXXVI, p. 14) but that first reconciliation must 
be achieved, "[In Central America] there is no peace because there is 
no reconciliation" (Argument XXXXVII, p. 8). In other words, Arias' 
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audience has a difficult time adjusting its private and national goals 
to those of the region or making a practical adjustment "to getting 
the job done," because it would be interpreted by the audience as a 
compromise of principles. In other words, Arias' intent to increase 
understanding and inform the U.S. and European audiences about the 
Central American viewpoints and needs precedes any intent by 
making the principles a matter of agenda. That happens when he 
promotes among the above mentioned audiences a major 
understanding and support for a new international economic order, 
based on such principles as fair international trade and finance, 
cooperation of rich countries in favor of poor countries, and social 
justice, and acknowledgment of public needs and rights within 
nations. To him, as well as to most of his Latin American audience, 
principles should precede any orderly list of priorities in any agenda. 
Agreement around the contents of an agenda should be underpined 
by an acceptance of principles ruling the whole process whether 
economic or political. 
The third value, fair-play, can be better understood by relying 
on Condon and Yousef s value orientation of complementary-
obligatory social reciprocity, located in Chart V under Stewart's form 
of relation to others. Condon and Yousef have indicated that this 
value orientation supposes, in a sense, that a people or a nation, are 
forever indebted to other(s), "especially those of superior ... status" 
(1975, p. 81). This pattern stresses the importance of the obligation 
of returning, in kind or worth, what has been given, be it an actual 
thing or a favor. In the pattern of complementary-obligatory values, 
the interaction valued is between unequals, what is often called, by 
Arias, the North-South relationship between the U.S. and Central 
America. The United States, as well as other industrialized nations, 
has certain obligations to its democratic allies, or zones of influence, 
and they in turn have obligations to the U.S. Failure to meet these 
obligations, of course, can alter the countries' relationship and thus 
such systems are difficult to stop because the mutual obligations 
have accrued over a long period of time. 
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By using XVI, the general warrants 1, 4 and 5, fair 
international treatment and local social justice, fit into the three-fold 
values of being, which is located under form of relations to others , 
and fairness and cooperation (that is complementary-obligatory 
social reciprocity) located under form of activity . 
The general warrants 2, 3 and 7 concern two ingrained themes: 
(1) non-intervention in other nations' affairs, which is a focus on 
influence from the outside; and (2) the individual as a pillar of 
freedom and democracy. The first concept is included by Condon 
and Yousef as one of the categories suggested to link arguments with 
cultural values by way of warrants (1975, p. 220). Arias regards 
outsiders' influence in the internal affairs of a nation as having 
serious consequences, particularly when linked to economic or to 
military pressures whether directly or through a proxy such as the 
"Contras." By relying on Condon and Yousefs ideas, it is noted that 
Arias' claims, warranted by non-intervention, implies that he 
perceives "social constraints and the power structure of society as 
the motivating agent in human events." That is, people and nations 
exert influence only through acts, not through thoughts. The second 
concept, individual rights and freedom, reveals Arias' confidence in 
the strength of his countrymen and Central American neighbors' 
characters, values, and idiosyncrasies. Following Stewart's ( 1971, p. 
69) observations of Latin American individuality, the people on 
whom Arias relied to carry out the defense of democracy against its 
foes seem to live in cultures where authority (usually family) or 
tradition exercise considerable control over the individual. 
Therefore, Arias may seek to persuade an audience, which may be 
outside the region, of the pivotal principles underlying his claims: 
non-interference from outside in Central American affairs, and 
reliance on people's individuality to defend democracy. This is true 
of most of his addresses whether they be to Latin American or to U.S. 
audiences as shown in his 1986 speech "Democracy in the Americas": 
where Arias claimed that "Nicaraguans [were] the ones who must 
solve their internal problems" (Argument XXX, p. 13); in his 1988 
speech, "Architects of the century of peace," in which he pointed out 
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the breakthrough in U.S.-U.S.S.R relations and the reduction of 
nuclear armaments. Later he claimed "There is no reason to support 
the use of military force in the solution of Central American conflicts" 
(Argument IL, p. 19); in another 1986 speech, "Opportunities for 
democracy in Latin America," Arias praised democracy and assigned 
to individuals the responsibility of defending freedom and 
democracy, "The only defense against freedom's foes in 
strengthening freedom and democratic institutions" (Argument 
XXXVI, p. 5); or in a 1987 speech "Peace doesn't recognize borders" m 
which Arias made a case for others to imitate Costa Ricans who 
benefit from democracy, making it, Arias claims, "invulnerable 
before the totalitarian attacks" (Argument XXXXIV, p. 12). 
Arias' focus on outsiders' influence and the individual as 
warrants for the aforementioned claims supposes the existence of 
two values, with one merging into another -- independence into 
individuality. Individuality has been estimated by Stewart (1971, p. 
70) as pervading Latin American perceptions of self and of society. 
It carried political and social freedom as well as an implication of 
solitary action; but, in contrast with U.S. individualism, it lacked the 
idea of the self as the source and sole-limiting factor. There is in 
Arias' arguments, warranted by individuality, a strong attachment to 
family and the immediate group. Actually, individual's dependence 
on society is not deplored. It explains why Arias stresses the need 
Central America has for fair international treatment in trade and 
finance and its rejection of outsider influences. That is, from Arias' 
perspective the region wants help which doesn't constrain its 
individuals' freedom. Another claim made by Arias should clarify 
the point. This is taken from a 1986 speech, "The roads to freedom," 
a direct address before President Reagan, "Only if we endeavor to 
enable all peoples to enjoy democracy, [and] the downfall of all 
tyrants equally, can we prevent threats to peace throughout the 
world from growing in the Americas" (Argument XXXV, p. 32). To 
paraphrase this claim: only if the United States and other 
industrialized countries create conditions for Central American 
countries to have economically stable democracies where benefits 
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can be divided justly between individuals, and the same powers do 
not again enthrone dictators, can Central Americans defend 
democracy without outsider influences. 
By using XVI, the general warrants 2, 3 and 7, non-
intervention and the individual as pillars for freedom and 
democracy, fit chiefly into the category of the value individuality 
under perception of the self, although the values being and present 
orientation lie behind the same set of warrants. 
The general warrant 6 concerns peace as a desirable outcome 
over war, that is what is called in this section a relativistic "both/and 
another" pattern. Arias, as speaker, seems to warrant many of his 
claims by suggesting to his audience that there is always a choice, 
but not necessarily between only two alternatives, and neither of 
them being the absolute best. 
Although Arias sometimes explicitly rejects one of the 
alternatives, he often does so by choosing what he considers to be 
the most appropriate choice within the context of the situation at 
hand, rather than openly judging an alternative as bad or evil. It 
makes his judgments less comparative and more contextual, less 
linear and more relativistic in over-looking the cause-effect 
relationship as a means to deal with Central American problems. 
This is apparent in addresses such as in 1987, "Peace doesn't 
recognize borders," where the appropriate response to defeatist 
statements about the Costa Rican peace plan, which according to him 
paralyze people and jeopardize peace efforts in Central America, 1s 
that he "can't accept defeatism" (Argument XXXX, p. 7); also in that 
address, even when he implicitly appeals to a positive choice instead 
of the negative alternative, such as the choice between war and 
peace, he is not absolute, "No matter how noble the crusade is [peace 
efforts], some wish for and encourage its failure" (Argument XXXXV, 
p. 14); or 1988 speech "Architects of the century of peace," he 
stressed the commitment to peace made by most Central Americans, 
labeling their choice not as the "right one", but merely by claiming 
that "Central America is committed to peace" (Argument L, p. 23). 
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Arias' use of a relativistic "both/and another" pattern, differing 
from the Reagan's "either/or" pattern, warrants the aforementioned 
claims which are widespread through his discourses. This pattern 
supposes the existence of choice beyond good and evil, and black and 
white comparative judgment. In the logic of Arias speeches, he 
judges solutions as being best within the appropriate context. This 
observation may be misinterpreted if a comparison is made using an 
absolute standard or a literal reading of his discourses. Arias in fact, 
criticizes cruelty, violation of human rights, social injustice, 
oppression and war as undesirable outcomes to the Central American 
situation, but his judgments are oriented to creating consensus 
among his audiences rather than towards dividing the world 
between "good guys, and bad guys, "good and evil", or "black and 
white". 
By contrasting Arias with Reagan's judgment some important 
differences emerge. They are, first, Arias doesn't base his 
comparison only on his country's experiences as Reagan generally 
does. The only exception is when he speaks of the Costa Rican 
democratic experience; second, his viewpoints rarely pose a threat m 
the other Central American democracies by comparing how well-off 
they are with respect to Costa Rica, as happens with Reagan. In 
Arias' speeches there is no mention of the leftist guerrillas or the 
rightist "Contras" as good or bad movements, more likely he points at 
the danger of war and poverty for democracy than to one cause, one 
effect. Whether this finding suggests that it is not the subject matter 
as much as it is the way of thinking about almost everything that 
leads to this relativistic distinction, is further developed in the 
discussion part of this chapter. 
In Arias' arguments the link to the general warrants 6, the 
direction toward contextual appropriateness in Central American 
problem-solving methods, stresses essentially the value of seeing 
human nature as a mixture of good and evil, but above all capable of 
change. Through the arguments linked to the mentioned warrants, 
this value orientation takes many forms: optimism about the peace 
efforts "Central America is committed to peace" (Argument L, p. 23), 
and will to influence attitudes "We [democrats] should be neither 
political or economic allies of governments which oppress their 
peoples " (Argument XXXXI, p. 41). 
By using XVI, the general warrant 6, peace as desirable 
outcome over war, fits the value of choice by seeing the individual 
and the world as a mixture of good and evil under the category of 
perception of the world. 
The chart XVII lists the findings of this first section, in 
accordance with the four components of value orientations and 
assumptions cited at the opening of this chapter. 
93 
CHART XVII 
FINDINGS ON VALUE ORIENT A TIO NS 
FROM REAGAN AND ARIAS' ARGUMENTS 
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Components: Warrant # Reagan's arguments Warrant # Arias' arguments 
Form of activity 3 Doing 
Form of relation to others Equality 
Perception of the worid 2.5.6.8.9 Choice between 
good and evil 
7 Progress 
















mixture of good 
and evil 
Individuality 
Based on sets of value orientations proposed by Kluckhohn & Strodbeck (1961 ), Stewart. 
Danielian, Foster (1969), Stewart (1971 ), and Condon and Yousef (1975) 
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PA TIERNS OF TIIlNKING UNDERLYING ARGUMENTS 
Cultural differences in patterns of thinking are important 
issues for both Reagan and Arias' perception of the world and each 
other. They can not be separated from the main focus of this 
research: cultural values affecting political argumentation. In fact, 
the inclusion of patterns of thinking used by both speakers will make 
the differences between Reagan as an American thinker and Arias as 
a European-oriented Costa Rican more striking. 
Two types of patterns of thinking have been explicit between 
Reagan and Arias in the previous chapters: inductive-deductive and 
dichotomous (dualistic)- non-dichotomous (relativistic) ways of 
thinking. Because dichotomous patterns and relativistic patterns 
were fully discussed in connection with the value choice of good and 
evil, this section explores in more detail the first type of thinking 
which pervades Reagan and Arias' argumentative reasoning. 
It has been noted in Chapter II that Reagan used argument by 
sign in nearly half the discourses studied here, where in Chapter III, 
it has also been noted that Arias used argument by generalization 
more than any other type of reasoning. Each type of reasoning 
stresses a different type of thinking in public argumentation: the sign 
type stresses induction, and the generalization type, deduction. 
Reagan is not one hundred percent inductive, and Arias is not 
totally deductive, therefore the use of the term "more" will precede 
any characterization of their opposing styles. Reagan is more 
inductive than Arias because he sees the world as composed of facts 
which he relies upon to make his claims. The inductive process of 
thinking (beginning with facts and then proceeding to ideas) has an 
operational quality that makes Reagan's thinking culturally 
grounded. He expresses an incessant need to systematize the 
perception of the world, Central America in our research, into a 
frame that enables the U.S. and him to act. 
Arias is more deductive than Reagan; he is more concerned 
with ideas, rather than facts. Because of his deductive thinking he 
tends to attach primacy and reality to ideas and theories. His 
deductive and abstract style of thinking give priority to the 
conceptual world. Although the empirical world is not necessarily 
disdained in his arguments, it is treated with a symbolic and 
demonstrational attitude. 
96 
As a deductive thinker, Arias relies heavily on his ideas and 
theories so that it suffices for him to show one or two connections 
between his concepts and the empirical world. It explains why most 
of his claims use few facts as data, where Reagan fully details the 
grounds for his claims. Arias does not feel compelled in the same 
way as Reagan is to amass facts and statistics. He prefers to 
generalize from one concept to another, or to present facts by means 
of logic. As noted by Stewart, the deductive thinker has a faith and 
trust in the powers of thought which the American places upon his 
methods of empirical observation and measurement. 
An important implication of the use of these opposite ways of 
thinking is that Arias, as deductive thinker, considers ideas as part of 
the world of reality, that is he considers them as organic and alive, 
while Reagan, the inductive thinker, considers concepts more in the 
nature of a construct or an invention and only "facts" as real. 
INTER CULTURAL CONFLICT INV ALUES AND STYLES 
This section consists of three main divisions: first, it focuses on 
some of the potential and explicit conflict(s) derived from the 
exchange of arguments between Reagan and Arias, in describing and 
dealing with the Central American problems; second, the implications 
of each speaker's cultural values, found in the intercultural setting of 
political arguments exchanged between the speakers from different 
cultures; and, third, the implications of each speaker's patterns of 
thinking, drawn from the cultural values underlying their arguments, 
in affecting intercultural understanding. 
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Intercultural conflicts 
To depict some of the potential and explicit conflicts between 
Reagan and Arias, a small selection of the total arguments from each 
speaker studied during this research has been made. In order to 
elicit differences or similarities between such arguments from both 
speakers, their claims and its supporting warrants are matched up. 
For each general warrant, whose underlying cultural value has 
been previously elicited, a corresponding claim was selected. For 
instance, to Reagan's general warrants 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 which underlie 
the cultural value "choice," corresponds the following claim, "There 
are only two possible futures for Central America:" [Democracy or 
dictatorship]" (Argument III). In addition, because warrants are 
linked to each speaker's cultural values discussed in the first section 
of this chapter, the respective warrants have been reduced in 
number. Hence, Reagan's nine categories of warrants became five 
categories ruled by the following cultural values: Equality for 
general warrant 1, choice for general warrants 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9, doing 
for general warrant 3, fairness for general warrant 4, and progress 
for general warrant 7. On the other hand, Arias' original seven 
categories of general warrants have became three ruled by the 
following cultural values: being-fairness-cooperation for general 
warrants 1, 4 and 5; individuality for general warrants 2, 3 and 7; 
and, choice and individual as mixture of good and evil for general 
warrant 6. 
In applying the chart XVI several conclusions can be drawn. 
First, claims' content and warrants from each speaker are different 
when contrasted. Second, despite the fact that some cultural values 
found in each speaker's warrants may imply some commonality, for 
example fairness and choice, that is only superficial, as noticed in the 
third part of this section. Third, differences which may be conflictive 
rather than commonalties between Reagan and Arias' arguments can 
be elicited from the chart XVI. 
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The conflicts respectively are between U.S. policing (Doing) and 
non-intervention (individuality), dualism (choice) and peace as 
desirable outcome over war (choice based on individuals as mixtures 
of good and evil), and between the U.S as a fair power (fairness) and 
fair international treatment and social reciprocity (being, fairness, 
and cooperation). 
The nature of the conflict between claims, warrants and values 
from each speaker goes beyond grammar and semantics. Each 
speaker articulates claims which are opposites. In Argument V while 
Reagan claims that the U.S. must help those countries confronted 
with communist aggression because freedom and peace require it, 
Arias in Argument XXXVI responds that the only defense in a 
democratic system against freedom's foes is the individual, who 
believes and benefits from the system. Thus, it is possible to infer 
that if the individual doesn't benefit from democracy or that 
democracy doesn't respond to individual needs, any attempt from 
outside to help would be useless, or make matters worse. Rather 
than U.S. intervention, Arias in Argument XXIX claims that Central 
America in particular, and Latin America in general, needs an 
improvement in trade and finance relations from the North to the 
South. It, Arias says, should accompany increasing social justice 
within Latin American democracies. Then, Reagan in Argument XIII 
argues in favor of U.S. defense and that his country "will never be 
the aggressor" that is, the United States is a mature power based on 
fairness to relate to those who are weak such as Central American 
nations. Reagan doesn't address the need to change the international 
economic order greatly influenced by the U.S. He just disregard 
Arias' argument by stressing what seems an American value, fair 
play. Therefore, for Reagan it is inconceivable to consider that the 
U.S. could be unfair to its democratic allies at "the U.S. doorstep." 
Another conflict emerges from Reagan's dichotomous pattern of 
judgment and Arias' relativistic or contextual pattern of judgment, as 
shown in their respective Arguments III and XXXXV. Where Reagan 
only sees a choice between democracy and dictatorship in Central 
America, Arias also sees a choice but beyond the good-evil 
99 
comparison, he praises peace over war avoiding judging the parties 
involved in the latter whether or not their political agendas are 
democratic. 
Cultural Values: implications 
In order to explore some of the potential implications of the 
conflicts already elicited between Reagan and Arias' arguments, this 
section further discussed two aspects which can bring more light to 
the understanding of each speaker' patterns of thinking and cultural 
values, even if they did not have a corresponding value in Chart 
XVII. The first aspect concerns the implications of each speaker's 
cultural values, found in the intercultural setting of political 
arguments exchanged between speakers from different cultures; 
and, the second aspect concerns the implications of each speakers' 
patterns of thinking, drawn from the cultural values underlying their 
arguments, in affecting intercultural understanding. As pointed out 
before cultural values cannot be found alone, "each component of a 
culture affects the others and, in turn, is limited by them" (Stewart, 
1971, p. 26), On the other hand, patterns of thinking underlying and 
embodying those cultural values make useless the study of the 
components of each argument if not acknowledged properly. 
Equality and Progress. The fact that these two value 
orientations could not be matched up with any opposite value 
orientations for the purposes of this chapter demands some 
attention. Certainly, Arias did not elicit a value contrast, but it 
doesn't mean that equality and progress are values shared in his 
culture. However, it should be noted that these values underlie 
better Reagan's intent to gain acceptance from either American or 
Latin American audiences. That's not Arias' case. In his speeches 
there are cultural variations with respect to Reagan that will merit 
further discussion later. Each value's implications are seen 
separately. 
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Based on equality Reagan looks for common ground, that is to 
establish an atmosphere of equality. He doesn't want to talk 
vertically to unequals, but horizontally to equals. Arias avoids this 
appeal to common ground in most of his speeches. Instead he goes 
after humanistic principles which are ARCHETYPICAL in their 
symbolism such as peace, love, and reconciliation, regardless of 
whether they have the same specific meanings for all his audiences. 
While Reagan is specific in similarities, Arias is vague and general. 
For instance, Reagan goes to the Organization of American States and 
emphasizes the similarities in history and destiny between the U.S. 
and all Latin American countries. Arias, instead goes to Europe and 
United States and never mentions common ground, but talks about 
what Costa Rica is in particular, and what the presidents and peoples 
of Central America, in general, agree upon and carry out. 
Reagan's stand reflects the pursuit of an ideal of equality which 
makes it difficult for him to understand hierarchical patterns of 
organization overseas, with the consequence that he ends up ignoring 
political questions. Common ground, Condon and Yousef point out, 
would seem common enough across cultures. But the role 
expectations of the speaker, the philosophical and political realities of 
the society in which he speaks, and the values which lie beneath all 
these suggest some culturally related differences (1975, p. 245). In 
fact, a culture may value a leader as one who is above and beyond 
them, as with the typical Latin American dictator or as Condon and 
Yousef suggest "a culture may demand the leader to speak as one of 
the people, seeking all possibilities for cultivating that common 
ground" (p. 245). The latter fits Reagan's case better . 
Based on progress, Reagan tries to prove the adequacy and 
actuality of the cold war approach to contemporary conflicts, that is 
to establish an atmosphere of optimism. He wants to point out that 
the future will be bright if the lessons of the past are learned and 
included as part of a future orientation. Arias avoids this appeal to 
progress in most of his speeches. Instead he goes after an 
understanding that peace, love, democracy and reconciliation, are a 
painstaking process which cannot be forced from outside, or 
101 
accelerated imprudently. Despite the fact that Arias also draws 
lessons from the past, he seems more interested in applying them to 
the present, working out one problem at the time, allowing things to 
take a normal course. While Reagan is future oriented and motivated 
to action by doing things, Arias is present-oriented and being-active. 
Reagan, for example, updated Truman's words to engage in action to 
protect U.S. interest in Central America, seemingly threatened by 
communism. Suddenly everything looks so simple and linear, 
Truman's words becoming the cause or struggle for freedom, in its 
use by Reagan in Central America to get rid of of communism. 
Arias, instead, meets with Latin American presidents and his region's 
colleagues and talks about datelines and changing words into deeds, 
without specifics, not pressing for an immediate answer, or invoking 
action as a solution for everybody's problems. Rather he talks of 
dialogue and flexibility within different time frameworks. He seems 
to consider more factors and people being involved in the peace 
process, no one having the absolute truth or power to overcome the 
main problems. 
Reagan's stand reflects a temporal orientation to the future 
associated with doing in a linear fashion, where Arias is more 
present and being oriented in an interacting fashion, which makes it 
difficult for Reagan to understand the complexities of Central 
American problems and problem-solving methods, with the 
consequence that he ends up evaluating his allies negatively, and 
trying to get things done by himself rather taking into account 
Central American viewpoints and concerns. Progress is integrated 
with other values such as time and doing, which suits a rational view 
of the world, as noticed by Stewart (1971, p. 65). Progress, according 
to him, implies the dominant American belief in one's ability to 
master his environment. That implies, between Reagan and Arias, a 
potential for misunderstanding. Reagan negatively judging Arias or 
the Central American --independent from U.S. decision-making--
efforts for reaching peace, as insufficient, irrational, or too slow. By 
contrast Arias may judge Reagan as dominated by emotion, more 
interested in war than peace, or bellicose. 
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In contrasting Reagan and Arias' arguments, at least two 
implications can be drawn for these values. The first, equality, 
suggests that as long as Reagan the speaker stresses similarity across 
cultures he will miss political, economic and social cues vital for 
reaching his potential audience in order to be understood. The 
second, progress, indicates that because not all societies share the 
rational view of the world as one of linearity and subject to control 
as Reagan does, his message becomes a simplistic one. Because of 
this, his audience may not only overlook his content, but deny him 
intellectual abilities. Arias' stress on solutions that acknowledge 
differences between countries and within nations at present, rather 
than projecting into the future, allows him to focus on those aspects 
m which the five nation leadership agree upon. 
Doing and Individuality. Reagan's valued doing as form of 
activity, as well as Arias' valued individuality as perception of self, 
are not dissociated from other cultural values which may enrich the 
understanding of their conflict when dealing with the issue of 
intervention or non intervention in other nations affairs. In fact, 
when examining the preeminence of the value of doing in Reagan's 
orientation to action, the values of progress, understood as future-
oriented, and individualism emerge. Likewise, with Arias' reliance 
on individuality which is associated closely with being as oriented to 
action and present as time orientation. Therefore, any contrast 
between Reagan and Arias needs to be based on three-fold values: 
Reagan's doing-individualism-progress (future), and Arias' being-
individuality-progress (present). Progress, was discussed in the 
previous segment, so it won't be covered here. However, let us keep 
in mind that doing and individuality are the predominant values in 
each speaker's argument concerned with intervention. 
The differences between speakers begins with a discrepancy 
between Reagan's conviction that the U.S. must act to help those 
threatened by communism, while Arias seems convinced that 
intervention is useless, because the only defense of democracies is to 
be more democratic. Their noticeable difference is reflected also in 
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terms of cultural values. Reagan stresses "doing" and "individualism" 
while Arias stresses "being" and "individuality," while both are 
perceiving activity and the self differently. Accordingly, where 
Reagan tries to bring change to a situation by showing confidence 
that "where there's a will there's a way" Arias responds with sheer 
simplicity "we have other ways." That is, Reagan's focus on a linear 
approach to problems limits his vision, while Arias conceives of 
problems more as a part of an organic whole, not subject to change 
by focusing on cause-effect. Revealing as to their differences is 
Reagan's more technical approach in contrast to Arias' intellectual or 
philosophical approach. Arias' being oriented as form of activity, for 
instance, seems to enhance his persuasiveness before Central 
American audiences and political leadership, particularly the 
presidents who came together to sign the peace accords and who are 
responsible for carrying out political and economic reforms in their 
own countries, as individuals attached to their own culture's norms, 
and values. 
Some evaluations affecting the exchange of arguments between 
Arias and Reagan may be from the doer's perspective, who may feel 
pity (for Arias' unwillingness to alter Central American conditions 
and improve them), or a willingness "to get things done" whenever 
Central Americans seem to him " lazy, inefficient, or philosophical." 
From the perspective of Arias' being orientation, Reagan may seem 
"arrogant, simple-minded, or imperialistic." By shifting now to the 
perception of self held by each speaker, Reagan's individualism and 
Arias' individuality, it is possible to realize that the lack of social or 
traditional attachments in Reagan approach allows him to be 
apparently more independent than Arias. The latter conceives of the 
individual as tied to tradition and familiar aspects of Central 
American societies, but with political and social freedom to defend 
his system. An interesting implication may be that Reagan perceives 
Arias as constrained by atavism or tradition which may seem to him 
a sign of "primitivism or immaturity", while for Arias Reagan may be 
perceived as "selfish, irresponsible, pushy." These evaluations, 
mostly negative, may affect their mutual understanding when 
exchanging arguments across their original cultures. 
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Choice and 2ood/evil. The analysis of intercultural implications 
concerning the value of choice and its distinctive applications by each 
speaker's culture is carried out as part of the discussion of patterns 
of thinking culturally pervading Reagan and Arias. The reason is 
that dichotomies and relativism are more a matter of ways of 
thinking than subject or specific cultural values. The discussion on 
patterns of thinking is presented in pages 106-7 of this chapter. 
Fairness. Talking about the same thing doesn't mean sharing 
the same assumptions. In fact, when faced with the cultural value of 
fairness, found in either Reagan and Arias speeches, more differences 
than similarities can be drawn. First of all, the significance of the 
value fairness - accommodation to the weakness of another (Stewart, 
1971, p. 54) is relative to who is considered weak and to the 
speaker's convenience. Reagan approaches Central America by 
describing the U.S. and its neighbors as equals, as discussed in 
connection with common 
national security reasons 
Central American affairs. 
audiences by demanding 
ground, but at the same time he uses 
for intervening politically or militarily in 
Arias approaches U.S. and European 
"equality" in terms of external debt, when 
he really is asking for a special economic treatment, that is 
inequality. This is like a reverse approach, Reagan trying to acquire 
political support from Latin America, in order to impose his will 
there. Arias in trying to acquire economic support for Central 
America, is trying to allow the region's countries to be democratic. 
Reagan is trying to seem fair, in order to be legally unfair with those 
opposing his policies, while Arias is trying to seem unfair, to be fair 
with his regional neighbors. This is not as complicated as it seems. 
There are political and economic inequalities between both 
speakers' countries, as between the United States and Central 
America. However, while Reagan thinks of political and economic 
gaps with respect to the region, Arias thinks of only economic 
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disparities. Therefore, each of them is trying to gain some advantage 
from the status of affairs. But, because their political agendas 
underlie different cultural values, they misunderstand each other. 
Reagan, for example, tries to gain foreign acceptance for carrying out 
his anti-communist policies in Central America by sending more 
economic aid to the region's nations and taking some steps to 
eliminate some U.S. economic barriers to products coming from the 
Caribbean basin. In exchange, governments in countries like El 
Salvador and Honduras become beholden to U.S. decision-making, m 
areas such as foreign policy, economy, and national security. The 
difference with Arias' approach is that there is no political price paid 
by Central America for being helped from outside the region. Arias 
asks, first, for fair international treatment, which means that 
democracies are too fragile too carry the burden of an external debt 
acquired in most cases under dictatorships. Second, in exchange for 
that help Arias "promises" to keep democracy working, and asks for 
nothing else--no constraint of their political system through military 
or any other form of intervention. Obviously, fairness means to both 
leaders different things. But, nevertheless, the value is there. 
Reagan doesn't seem to think that he is taking advantage of the 
weak, rather he is helping them to be rid of communism. Arias 
doesn't seem to think that he is also taking advantage of the strong, 
because Central America is poor, or begging like a servant, rather he 
is asking for respect from the U.S. but acknowledging economic 
differences not political ones; Central America is as sovereign as the 
U.S. is Arias' bottom line. 
Mutual misunderstanding results from some of the implications 
of their contrasting cultural value, fairness. Mutual 
misunderstanding because of Reagan's difficulty in understanding 
why Arias, who is the weaker element in this equation, pretends to 
be treated like an equal without paying for his share. One may 
speculate that, if Arias wants to be considered an equal and treated 
fairly then he should not ask for help which he cannot reciprocate. 
He is not asking for fairness, but unfair play. On the other hand, 
Arias may see Reagan's fair play concerns as foolish, or hypocritical. 
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Why should he trust Reagan if he does not realize that Central 
American democracies are politically worthy and equals to the 
United States? Why should he consider fair Reagan's statement that 
the U.S. is not an aggressor, if the U.S. is applying economic pressures 
to achieve political goals on many Central American countries? 
Paradoxically, the implication that Reagan may be perceived as 
hypocritical or unfair by Arias, is consistent with Margaret Mead's 
notion that Americans cannot understand the deliberate and ruthless 
exploitation of a weak adversary by power and position in other 
cultures ( 1965). 
Patterns of thinking: implications 
Dichotomies and relativism. Dichotomous and relativistic 
patterns have been discussed, as have some of their implications, 
drawn under the subheading of choice and of good and evil. 
Dichotomous patterns which merged into the value of choice between 
good and evil, which dominates Reagan's rhetoric, and Arias' choice 
based on appropriateness to a particular context, which contemplates 
both, human nature and the world as mixtures of good and evil. 
Reagan's dichotomous pattern of thinking and Arias' relativistic 
pattern of thinking have been stressed before as resulting from 
culturally different values. These values are choices based on seemg 
human nature and the world as divided into good and evil, and 
choices based on seeing human nature and the world as a mixture of 
good and evil. Reagan's discourse fits into the former description, 
Arias' into the latter. In both cases, the speakers reflect their own 
cultural values concerning the kind of choices they are willing to 
make or have made in dealing with Central American problems. 
It is noteworthy to point out that in this particular case 
patterns of thinking and values are neatly contrasted to each other, 
justifying an additional discussion on their specifics and then, on 
their implications. 
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Dichotomous patterns in Reagan's speech have been discovered 
in this line of research. His tendency to describe as an either/or 
pattern fit what the General Semanticists define as a "two-valued 
orientation, which is [contrary] to the facts of a multi-valued reality 
[like that stressed by Arias]" (Condon and Yousef, p. 234). This 
either/or pattern was identified centuries earlier as a fallacy in logic, 
"the disjunctive fallacy." The pattern can be attributed to influences 
of language, as some writers have indicated, and to cultural 
assumptions irrespective of the language, as concluded from this 
thesis so far. 
This dualism differs from a dialectical system in that it, at least 
in Reagan' case, demands a choice of the better of the two rather 
than accepting the two as in a necessary opposition which will yield a 
third (thesis, antithesis, synthesis pattern). So consistent is this that 
even attempts by Reagan to seem neutral, make objective 
descriptions, usually involving choice, imply that one is better than 
the other. Thus modern and old-fashioned, slow and fast, peace and 
war, democratic and communist, protectionist or free market, are 
often not real choices; built into the usage of the terms is the 
expectation of one being better than the other. 
As noticed by Stewart et al., (1969) in the U.S., the process of 
decision-making unfolds primarily through the anticipation of the 
consequences of alternative courses of action, the either/or pattern. 
That is consistent with Reagan's claims that any political decision 
concerning the future of Central America must be based on either 
democracy or totalitarism (Argument III). In Costa Rican society, 
however, the function of the decision maker or makers is to evaluate 
a situation by classifying it according to pre-established categories. 
In the view of Kalman H. Silvert (1961), whose expertise concerns 
Latin American cultural differences, whatever action ensues, or 
whatever decisions are made, will follow automatically from this 
tradition of classifying activity (p. 11). 
A primary intercultural implication of these differences in 
decision-making is that Reagan may conclude that in underdeveloped 
Central America few decisions are required, where Arias thinks the 
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opposite. The exploration of some of the cultural values 
underpinning Reagan and Arias' opposite patterns of thinking bring a 
major understanding of the preceding implications and of others, 
cited later . 
Choice is a commonality between both speakers, but on which 
perspective becomes a major contrast. Reagan's dichotomous 
pattern, "either/or," has been fed by that value orientation, and has 
been strongly influenced by conservative religious views, of human 
nature and the world divided between good and evil, subject to 
change though, by active individualistic thrust. Instead, Arias' 
relativistic pattern, described before: a "both/and another" has been 
fed by that value orientation of man and the world as mixtures of 
good and evil. Because Reagan views the world and human nature as 
divided into polarities, it is possible that this affects his 
understanding of what Central Americans, through Arias' speeches, 
perceive as viable political systems, or even democracy. When 
Reagan, for instance, says that there are only two possibilities for the 
region, democracy or dictatorship, he is not talking about what 
Central America may think of democracy, that's taken for granted, he 
talks about U.S. conception of democracy. In his 1987 speech 
"Central America at a critical juncture", Reagan specifically details 
that democracy for him is "permanent, across-the-board human 
rights, guaranteed by a constitution and protected by the checks and 
balances of democratic government.. .democracy means returning 
power to the hands of the people" (p. 2). As a contrast, in his 1986 
address "Opportunities for democracy in Latin America" Arias 
stresses that it is possible to have "political democracy if we are able 
to enlarge our economic democracy. Freedom is out of reach of the 
dictator's paw only if it is based on justice and lack of poverty" (p. 5). 
Interestingly enough is the fact that Reagan stresses a democratic 
ideal concerned with political aspects, whereas Arias focuses on 
social and economic justice as chief concerns of democracy. 
It is possible to point to other differences in their perceptions 
about dictatorship, but the point has been made that Reagan's views 
on democracy differ from those of Arias. Therefore, a second 
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intercultural implication may be that for Reagan it is hard, if not 
impossible, to see that the choice he proposes could be perceived as 
less good than he thinks it is, because its meaning is culturally 
different. Moreover, Arias' relativistic choice, implies that he may 
see more than two alternatives for Central America, but from the 
intercultural point of view may have a hard time adjusting to the 
idea that Reagan does not see the realm of social and economic 
democracy as more important. In fact, Arias may evaluate Reagan 
negatively by assuming a shortsightedness on Central American 
problems, as well as a closedmindedness because he only stresses 
those political aspects of democracy, which for him are worthless if 
people cannot afford to live with dignity. 
Inductive and deductive patterns. Other implications drawn 
from the findings of this chapter concern the conflict between the 
two different patterns of thinking dominating Reagan and Arias' 
arguments: the inductive and the deductive, respectively. Reagan 
and Arias have often had corresponding positions in their topics and 
sometimes worked together under circumstances where political, 
social and economic factors were more salient Central American 
issues. Both speakers have met several times, and whether or not 
they have developed positive perceptions about each other, their 
discourses have shown sharp contrasts in terms of patterns of 
thinking. 
A potential intercultural implication pervading their exchange 
of arguments is that because political, social and economic factors 
seemed more salient, differences in patterns of thinking have been 
ignored. Instead, Reagan and Arias, each one considered the 
foreigner by the other, may be perceived as irrational, uncultured, 
arrogant or antagonistic. These descriptions do not exhaust the range 
of depreciatory reactions elicited by differences in patterns of 
thinking. Since international politics is not insulated from 
competitions for power and influence, it does not facilitate the 
recognition and understanding of cultural differences in thinking. 
This is illustrated by Arias' depiction of the opponents to his peace 
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initiative as people "anxious to bury the last hope, to close the door 
to the reason, reconciliation and dialogue in our America" (Discourse 
7, p. 14) and Reagan's claim that "anyone who demands anything less 
[than true democracy] is not serving the cause of peace" (Discourse 6, 
p. 2). 
The examples suggest that Arias' negative evaluation of those 
who, like Reagan, opposed his plan, are based on a lesser concern 
with facts, political agendas, accountability of democratic progress in 
the region. Arias deductively operates on the assumption that peace 
ideas fostered in Central America are more important while Reagan 
inductively stresses those democratic facts whose consequences will 
be subject to measurement. 
Further connections can be established with specific cultural 
values, but this section's main focus is the two prevailing patterns of 
thinking found in Reagan and Arias' argumentation processes. 
TIIE GOLDEN RULE 
A Far-reaching Intercultural Implication 
From the preceding discussion several implications have been 
drawn using the intercultural perspective. Summing up, there are 
noticeable differences between Reagan and Arias concerning their 
contrasting values. 
While Reagan's warrants are underpined by the cultural values 
of equality, progress-future, doing-individualism, fairness and choice 
between good or evil, Arias supports his claims with cultural 
variations of them. Arias' dominant values are equality, present-
orientation, being-individuality, fairness and choice of good and evil. 
Despite the use of similar nouns for two of the values mentioned, 
their meanings differ as explained in the respective discussions of 
equality and fairness. 
At the core of the intercultural implications of these contrasting 
values is the pervasive influence of the assumption of similarity, 
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which may be used unconsciously by both speakers. The assumption 
of similarity implies that others are like ourselves and therefore 
want to be treated similarly. Milton Bennett in his Overcoming the 
golden rule: Sympathy and empathy (1979, p. 407) has pointed out 
that underlying that assumption lies another: "that all people are 
basically the same, and thus they really do want the same treatment 
(whether they admit it or not)." This is what seems to happen in 
both speakers' discourses studied. 
The extent to which each man implies that underlying values m 
his argument are universal indicates an assumption of similarity. 
Since both speakers are from different cultures, they are pretending 
to persuade their own constituents of the rightness or 
appropriateness of each others arguments on specific issues. To do 
so they primarily start with their native culture's view of the world 
which permeates their search for common ground. Reagan looks at 
specific commonalties between the U.S. and Latin America on 
historical and political aspects, Arias focuses on humanistic concerns 
expressed poetically, and philosophically, that seem to him common 
enough across cultures. However, because they are trying to find 
commonalties in order to persuade and get their viewpoints across, 
most similarities found imply a single, absolute reality, which means 
that if there were not a single, discoverable reality, we could never 
be sure whether the similarity we observed was "really" the case, or 
whether it was merely a function of our point of view. Therefore, 
intercultural misunderstandings may result because such thinking is 
the foundation of ethnocentrism. 
Ethnocentrism is one of the main social consequences implied 
by the cultural values underlying Reagan and Arias' arguments. This 
is understood here as the tendency by each speaker to see their "own 
culture as the center of the universe - that is, as the true reality-
which affects all intercultural communication" (Bennett, 1979, 
p. 410). This concept is further refined by Porter and Samovar m 
their handbook Jntercultural communication: A reader (1976). 
Porter and Samovar say that, 
A major source of cultural variance in attitude is 
ethnocentrism, which is a tendency to view people 
unconsciously by using our own group and our own 
customs as the standard for all judgments ... The 
greater their similarity to us, the nearer to us we 
place them: the greater the dissimilarity, farther 
away they are ... We tend to see our own groups, our 
own country, our own culture as the best, as the 
most moral. This view also demands our first loyalty 
and produces a frame of reference that denies the 
existence of any other frame of reference. It is an 
absolute position that prohibits any other position 
from being appropriate for another culture (p. 10). 
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The preceding definition operates perfectly on Reagan's claims 
that Americans have a right entrusted by God to protect freedom 
anywhere, and Arias' stand on Costa Rica as a standard of democracy 
and role-model for other nations. Despite Reagan's intent to claim 
U.S. superiority and Arias more humble intent to brag about Costa 
Rican prowess in social, economic and political life, there is a 
consistent ethnocentric view in their arguments and underlying 
cultural values. Reagan and Arias use their own values as the basis 
for behaving toward others, and each other. There is a morality m 
behavior, whether or not they are aware of each others cultural 
values and patterns of thinkings. The conflict between their 
arguments, however, emerges when they find that no matter how 
much they try to persuade each other, and their audiences, many 
people don't respond to them. Then they face a choice, either they 
alter their behavior (and underlying cultural assumptions and 
values), or they must alter the unresponsive people. Supported by 
the ethnocentric conviction that those other people, Reagan, Arias, 
the Sandinistas, the guerillas, the Contras or, in general, the Central 
Americans are somehow wrong or ignorant, each speaker may choose 
the latter course. 
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In fact, neither Reagan, nor Arias needed to fight each other 
bare-handed, or any of their opponents. They just simply relied on 
public arguments exchanged directly or mediated through the media 
in Central America, the United States and Europe. Their arguments 
may escalate in tone and content, and their disagreements increase, 
but they continue trying to convince each other of their own 
rightness. Interestingly enough, ethnocentrism always remains at 
the core of the cultural values sustaining their public arguments. 
This is the most noticeable intercultural implication found in this 
research. 
CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The concerns of this thesis have been with the pattern of 
thinking and cultural values underlying political arguments 
exchanged in an intercultural setting and with how those patterns 
and values affect understanding across cultures. Used, if sometimes 
briefly, have been argumentation theories (Rieke & Sillars, 1984; 
Condon & Yousef, 1975; Toulmin, 1958), the narrative forms 
approach (Lewis, 1987), and intercultural communication 
perspectives (Bennett, 1986, 1979; Samovar and Porter, 1975; 
Condon & Yousef, 1975; Stewart, 1971; Stewart, Danielian & Foster, 
1969). 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
Major findings are presented here in three parts, e~ · 'l 
representative of a main line of inquiry, and answer to one of the 
research questions toward which this study has been oriented. 
Three questions about the role of cultural values and patterns of 
thinking in affecting international political understanding by way of 
arguments have dominated this research: (1) what salient arguments 
concerning Central American foreign policies exist in either Reagan 
and Arias' public discourse; how do Reagan and Arias' particular 
arguments reveal their respective underlying cultural values; and (3) 
how might the difference in underlying cultural values affect mutual 
understanding. 
The following results are based on an analysis first of 
Presidents Reagan and Arias' arguments using the Toulmin model, 
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second Lewis' narrative forms approach for Reagan's discourses, and 
third an Intercultural Communication Perspective as articulated 
chiefly by Condon and Yousef (1975), Edward C. Stewart (1969, et al., 
1971) and Milton Bennett (1976, 1986). 
The results are as follow: 
First, fifty salient political arguments concerning Reagan and 
Arias' respective policies toward Central American political, economic 
and military problems have been found. 
Second, each speaker's arguments have revealed contrasting 
underlying cultural values which operate by way of warrants 
pertaining to conclusions (claims). 
And third, these differences in underlying cultural values may 
affect the mutual understanding between the two political leaders, 
since their discourses did not acknowledge each other's cultural 
differences in values and patterns of thinking when engaging in 
public exchanges about contemporary Central American problems. 
Because of the novelty of this type of interdisciplinary 
interpretative research, the results found could not be compared 
adequately with previous research. However, some pertinent 
intercultural implications, as well as directions for action can be 
drawn. The differences found between the speakers were reduced to 
five value orientations: On the one hand, Reagan valued equality, 
progress with a future temporal orientation, doing and individualism, 
fairness. His thinking operates in a linear- inductive way, and relies 
on dichotomous patterns to make comparisons and judgments. On 
the other hand, Arias valued equality but respected traditional 
hierarchies and status, progress with a present temporal orientation, 
and he valued being and individuality. His thinking operates in an 
interactive-deductive, non-linear way, and relies on relativist 
patterns which are non-dichotomous, leading him to suggest rather 
than judge or compare. In addition, most of the warrants underlying 
cultural values appear to be built on the assumption of similarity 
which is not a recommended strategy for intercultural interaction 
"[I]ncreasing sensitivity to difference, [by] moving from 
'ethnocentrism' through stages of greater recognition and acceptance 
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of difference" (Bennett, 1986, p. 27) seems to be the key in order to 
acquire intercultural sensitivity and increase communication 
effectiveness across cultures. That is what Bennett has called 
e thnorelati vi sm. 
Because of the preceding noted differences between Reagan 
and Arias, the following misunderstanding, among others, could 
occur: mutual negative evaluation, reluctance to cooperate, distrust, 
different (if not opposite,) readings of each other's arguments, 
undermining of each others' efforts in Central America, and creating 
conditions for escalation of political conflict with unpredictable 
consequences. These likely misunderstandings may explain some of 
the change in attitude of the United States towards Costa Rica cited in 
the first chapter, which resulted in a substantial reduction of 
economical aid, less support to alleviate the Costa Rican external debt 
with the International Monetary Fund, and delays in sending high-
ranked U.S. embassy officials to Costa Rica, etc. 
However, further critical and descriptive research should be 
done to confirm such connections between U.S. governments policies 
towards Costa Rica and differences in cultural values and patterns of 
thinking underpinning open disagreement through public political 
arguments. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
Some limitations to this study should be noticed. First of all, 
when the disagreements between Reagan and Arias' discourses were 
noted, the point of departure was that they argue about similar 
issues from different standpoints and to similar audiences. However, 
it may be possible that some if not many of the addresses and 
speeches selected for this thesis were not directed toward each other 
or to the other's policies, but to their own constituencies. If that is 
the case, this thesis may not be useful to draw broad conclusions 
about the relation between the U.S. and Costa Rica, but as a potential 
line for further research. Secondly, the number of discourses 
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selected, fourteen in all, and arguments chosen, fifty altogether, may 
not be enough to draw generalizations about how cultural differences 
affect political understanding internationally. Those discourse were 
selected because they focus on Central American issues, and 
articulate two distinctive policies toward the solution of the state of 
affairs in the region where U.S. and Costa Rica have concern for 
political and economical stability at the core of their foreign policies. 
It is important for future researchers to explore content in 
areas of Ronald Reagan and Oscar Arias' discourses which were 
overlooked in this research because of the selective use of speeches 
made. Additionally, the application of more formal methods of 
content analysis may bring major understanding about how 
differences in cultural values by way of warrants pertaining to 
claims affect understanding across cultures. 
RECOM11ENDA TIONS 
In order to change or improve Reagan and Arias' intercultural 
perspective, they must acknowledge that "fundamental to 
ethnorelativism is the assumption that cultures can only be 
understood relative to one another. There is no absolute standard of 
'rightness' or 'goodness' that can be applied to cultural behavior. 
Cultural difference is neither good nor bad, it is just different. One's 
own culture is not anymore central to reality than any other culture" 
(Bennett, 1986, p. 46). 
At this point, taking into account the findings of this research 
and Bennett's affirmation in the sense that intercultural sensitivity is 
not natural, I am going to suggest some concrete actions that can be 
easily taken that can help Reagan and Arias, as political speakers, can 
improve and their mutual relationship as representatives of different 
cultures. Each speaker must be more sensitive in intercultural terms, 
but not simply sensitive in understanding their counterpart's culture 
specifics, what Stewart (1971) calls cultural norms or customs from 
which each member of a culture is usually aware. In order to be 
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better at intercultural communication, both leaders must overcome 
their ethnocentric point of view and assume a difference-based 
approach to intercultural interaction. That is, to assume differences 
implies that to interact within a culture, a person can keep his or her 
own identity. It means, for instance, that Reagan and Arias, will 
interact based upon their own frame of reference, trying to create 
meaning together and attempting to originate a third culture. The 
concept created by John Useem, Ruth Useem, and John Donoghue 
(1963) supposes a culture different from either Reagan's or Arias' 
culture, that is from either the first or the second culture. In the 
third culture (Useem, et al., 1963, p. 171) it is assumed that the 
relationship between the members of the two societies, Costa Rica 
and United States for example, as well as the two societies 
themselves, should be coordinate. Instead of assuming that 
everybody is the same, a difference-based approach implies that 
there are differences among people from different cultures and one 
must respect them. Therefore, they need to shift completely from 
the similarity-based approach to the difference-based approach; 
otherwise they may continue being attached to a philosophical 
perspective which share the following kind of thinking: "the Central 
Americans or the U.S. Americans have to learn from us because we 
are better; our institutions must be imitated by those countries from 
where the political opponents or allies come; if they do what we do 
they will have what we have: i.e. freedom, higher standard of living, 
fair rules, better health, peace, democracy, etc." It is my concern also 
that through education and training in intercultural communication, 
as Bennett stated, politicians as well as public officials will be able to 
modify their "natural" conduct. So, a positive way to start a change 
in the presidents' intercultural approach is to improve the kind of 
training that they and their staff and cabinet receive and provide. 
Actually almost none of the Reagan and Arias staffers undertook any 
training or advising concerned with the intercultural communication 
perspective. In addition, for both statesmen some basic reading 
would be advisable that will give them a better understanding of the 
assumptions that support the intercultural communication. 
1 I 9 
In conclusion, the direction that I suggest for both political 
speakers is to encourage adjustment to each other's views rather 
than try to assimilate each other, taking into account only their own 
states' interests. This must be accomplished by creating or 
increasing cultural self-awareness and sensitivity. I think that 
Reagan and Arias should be more aware of their own culture, values. 
patterns of thinking and norms when engaging in mutual political 
debates. Each speaker must learn to respect the other's culture in 
general as something normal, maybe different from their own 
culture but not wrong. The orientation of their rhetoric could be to 
try to create a third culture or perspective from which arguing, 
facilitated by the fact that they need each other to achieve their 
democratic goals. This will allow each to increase his repertoire, and 
not impose his own U.S. culture or Costa Rican culture as a substitute 
of the other's culture, even if one or both of them realizes a kind of 
weakness in the other's position, because of a cultural bias, when 
commg to political debates before their own constituency or before 
foreign audiences. 
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APPENDIX 
REAGAN'S AND ARIAS' ARGUMENTS 
This appendix includes the selection of public addresses, 
speeches and discourses exchanged by the Presidents Ronald Reagan 
and Oscar Arias concerning the Central American situation. Reagan's 
rhetorical pieces were made public between 1982 and 1988, where 
Arias' speeches were presented between 1986 and 1988. Fourteen 
discourses has been included in this section, seven for each speaker. 
A second selection took place for this thesis research, leaving for 
study purposes twenty-seven arguments from Reagan's discourses 
and twenty-three from Arias' discourses. The following arguments 
have been numbered from 1 to 27 for Reagan, and from 28 to 50 for 
Arias. Each of the arguments presented has been broken down into 
its parts in accordance to Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation 
(1958). 
Discourse 1 
"Aid to the Caribbean Basin" 





[There are several reasons why the U.S. and Latin America share a 
common destiny.] 
Backing: 
1- The migrants in US and Latin America faced, 
a) the dangers and dreams of build a new world 
b) moved from colonialism to nationhood 
c) came from Europe for better life and searching of God 
d) fought for independence and freedom 
2- Ideals and principles are also similar 
a) Rooted in self-government and nonintervention 
b) Belief in the rule of the law 
c) Belief that a nation cannot be liberated by depriving its people of 
liberty 
d) Knowledge that a state cannot be free when its independence is 
subordinated to a foreign power 
e) Knowledge that a government cannot be democratic if it refuses to 
take a test of a free election. 
Warrant: 
(Since), Nations who seek and share common destiny are 
consubstantial 
Claim: 
(So), "We are the new world ... We [ Latin America and the US) are all 
America." 




John F. Kennedy has said that "all people in America have the 
mission to demonstrate that man's unsatisfied aspiration for 
economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free 
men working within the framework of democratic institutions." 
W: 
(Since), people who share same aspirations are the same. 
B: 
John F. Kennedy is a credible source 
c 
128 
(So), in the "commitment to freedom and independence, the people of 
the hemisphere are one". 





There is a new colonialism in the Caribbean Basin which endanger 
democratic development. 
B: 
1 - Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua served as a vehicle for the 
expansion of Soviet-backed Cuban-managed support for violent 
revolution in Central America 
2 - Communism has exploited and aggravated temporary economic 
suffering to seize power, and then to institutionalize economic 
deprivation and suppress human rights 
3 - Six million people worldwide are refugees from communist 
systems. 
4 - Guerillas systematically burn, bomb and destroy bridges, farms 
and power and transportation systems to worsening economic and 
social problems in Central America. 
W: 
Communism and democracy are the two world ideologies at struggle. 
c 
(So), "There are only two possible futures for Central America : 
[democracy or dictatorship]" 
Reasoning by Classification 
Arg. IV (*) 
P. 324-5 
D: 
Communists fear the success of democracy. 
B: 
a) Cuban and Soviets train guerillas to destabilize successful 
democracies. 
b) Communists exploit Central American economical problems 
through an international campaign. 
c) Cuba is receiving now more military supplies than m any year 
since 1962 missile crisis. 
d) Nicaragua serves as a platform for covert military actions 
W: 
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(Since), "Democratic success will make the radical message a hollow 
one." 
c 
(So), "Foes of freedom will destabilize Caribbean basin countries." 




"Freedom's foes would stamp out human rights, pluralism and free 
institutions." 
B: 
a) Guerrillas armed and supported by and through Cuba 
attempting to impose Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in El Salvador. 
b) 194 Ts Rio Treaty has established reciprocal defense 
responsibilities linked to "our common democratic ideals" 
( consubstantial). 
W: 
(Since), The US supports freedom, (Policeman role). 
c 
(So), "Freedom and peace requires U.S. help for those nations 
confronted with communist aggression." 
Reasoning by Sign 
Arg. VI (*) 
P. 325 
D. 
"The people of the Caribbean and Central America are in a 
fundamental sense fellow Americans." 
B: 
13 1 
1 - Freedom, pluralism and free enterprise are common values to US 
and Central America and the Caribbean people. 
2 - US as well as Central America and the Caribbean belong to the 
same Western civilization. 
W: 
(Since), Freedom is the common destiny for the hemisphere. 
B: 
Freedom cannot survive if US neighbors live in misery and 
oppression. 
c 
(So), "[US] must help Central America and the Caribbean people to 
protect those values and principles that shape the proud heritage of 
this hemisphere." 
Reasoning by Generalization 
Discourse 2 
"The problems in Central America" 




"[CA] problems directly affect the security and well-being of [US] 
people" 
Backing: 
a) Many US cities are closer to Central American countries than to 
Washington D.C. 
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b) In an European crisis half of our (US) supplies for NA TO would go 
through the Caribbean basin by sea. 
c) Two thirds of all US foreign trade and petroleum pass through the 
Panama canal and the Caribbean. 
d) In early 1942 a handful of Hitler's submarines sank more tonnage 
there than in all the Atlantic Ocean. They did so without an single 
naval base. 
e) Today Cuba is host to a Soviet combat brigade, a submarine base 
capable of serving soviet submarines and military air bases visited 
regularly by Soviet military aircraft. 
Warrant: 
(Since), Regions which affects the security and well being of the U.S. 
are as important as the U.S.-proper. 
Backing: 
It is in the public interest to care about Central America and the 
Caribbean troubled area. 
Claims: 
(So), "Central America is the US lifeline to the outside world." 








a) send massive economic aid to the new regime in Nicaragua, more 
than any other after the Sandinist revolution of 1979: By January 
1981, our emergency relief and recovery aid to Nicaragua totaled 
$118 million. US sent five times more aid to Nicaragua in the first 
two years of Sandinist rule, then in the last two of Somoza's regime. 
b) Nicaragua reject US peace efforts. 
c) Nicaragua treated us as enemies. 
d) Sandinists broke their promises for democratization before the 
OAS. 
W: 




(So), "Our actions were hardly the actions of a nation implacably 
hostile to Nicaragua." 
Reasoning by Sign 
Arg. IX (*) 
P.451 
D. 
Salvadoran leftist guerrillas have turn against their own people. 
B: 
a) Guerrillas destroyed hundreds of buses and trucks to keep the 
people from getting to the polling places. 
b) Their slogan was brutal;" Vote today, die tonight." 
c) A woman threatened by the guerrillas when voting told them 
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: "you cant' kill us all." Guerrillas don't want elections they may know 
they would be defeated." 
d) The government has invited the guerillas to participate in the 
election and is preparing an amnesty law. But they sabotaged the 
economy. 
W: 
(Since), Those who turn against their own are only out for 
themselves. 
c 
(So), "Salvadoran guerrillas are a small minority who want power for 
themselves and their backers." 




The "US has attempted to have a dialogue with Nicaragua. But 
[Nicaragua] persists in spreading violence." 
B: 
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a) Costa Rica is a peaceful and unarmed democracy which has been 
object of bullying and threats from the Nicaragua's dictators 
b) 36 new military basis have been built in Nicaragua (only 13 were 
during the Somoza regime). 
c) The headquarters of the Salvadoran guerillas is in the capital, 
Managua, Nicaragua. From there attacks are directed against El 
Salvador. 
W: 
(Since), What is true of these cases is true of all. These are signs of 
war. 
c 
(So), "Nicaragua refuses to make peace.[ ... ] They are against peace." 





The goal of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan backed "professional 
guerrilla movements in Central America is as simple as it is sinister -
to destabilize the entire region from the Panama Canal to Mexico." 
B: 
a) Cayetano Carpio, Salvadoran guerrilla leader, has ,said that after El 
Salvador falls, El Salvador and Nicaragua would be "arm-in-arm and 
struggling for the total liberation of Central America." 
b) Nicaragua like to pretend that they are today being attacked by 
forces based in Honduras. 
c) Nicaragua radio announced on April 18th the creation of a new, 
unified revolutionary coordinating board to push forward the 
Marxist struggle in Honduras. 
d) Nicaragua, supported by weapons and military resources provided 
by the communist bloc, represses its own people, refuses to make 
peace and sponsors a guerrilla war against El Salvador. 
e) More than a million of Central Americans had fled from Central 
America violence. 
f) President Ortega has said that Nicaragua are willing to receive 
nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union if it is offered 
W: 
(Since), The US has a stake in preserving stability. 
c 
(So), The "US will support the security of the region's threatened 
nations." 




President Truman said in 194 7 that the "US must support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures." 
B: 
a) Truman's policies secure decades of peace, prosperity and 
freedom. 
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b) Political and strategic stakes of postwar Europe are the same m 
Central America today. 
W: 
(Since), Today the situation is the same as then. "The political and 
strategic stakes are the same [in Central America]." 
B: 
Truman is a credible source 
c 
(So), "President Truman's words are as apt today as they were m 
1947." 
Reasoning by Generalization 
Discourse 3 
"Central America Policy" 




The "US doesn't start wars." 
Backing: 
138 
a) U.S. won't send troops to Central America, like it did in Vietnam 
b) Soviet Union provides Cuban with $4 billion in assistance and it 
sends tons of weapons to foment revolution in our hemisphere 
c) U.S. instead help its friends defend themselves. 
d) U.S. maintain military strength in order to deter and defend 
against aggression - to preserve freedom and peace. 
Warrant: 
(Since), The U.S. defense policy stresses military strength to preserve 
peace and freedom. 
Backing: 
U.S. defense policy is based on fair play and freedom as values. 
Claim: 
(So), "U.S. will be never the aggressor." 




"People in CA want hope and better lifes." 
B: 
a) Costa Rica is a well-established and healthy democracy. 
b) Honduras made a peaceful transition to democracy in 1982. 
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c) In Guatemala political parties and trade unions are functioning; 
this country can return to full constitutional government in 1985. 
d) 26 of 33 Latin American countries are democracies or striving to 
become democracies. 
e) El Salvador is a democracy but many of its people cannot farm 
their land, they will be killed by the guerrillas if they do. 
W: 
(Since), Only democracy and freedom guarantees people's hope for a 
better future. 
B: 
Majority and Freedom 
c 
(So), "Central American people want freedom and democracy." 




Those who dissented in the past from the US position against the 
Nazis and U.S involvement in World War II did not stop the war. 
B: 
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a) People who called for not involvement equals the isolationist of 
the late1930's who knew what was happening in Europe but chose 
not to face the terrible challenge history had given them. 
b) The appetite of international aggressors is never satisfied. 
c) Isolationist used a policy of wishful thinking. 
W: 
(Since), Isolation didn't stop the Nazis in the past, there is no reason 
why it can stop now the Sandinistas or the communists. 
B: 
Wishful thinking policy is dangerous 
There is no control of the events. 
c 
(So), "[Isolationism] assures war instead of preventing it." 
Reasoning by Analogy 
Discourse 4 
"Nicaragua" 




Delivered to the American people 
Nicaragua is a Soviet-Cuban backed communist regime. 
Warrant: 
141 
(Since), The Soviet Union and Cuba back regimes because of a desire 
to dominate. 
Claim: 
(So), The "Soviets and [the] Cubans can become the dominant powers 
in the regional corridor." 





The "Sandinistas are transforming their nation into a safe house, a 
command post for international terrorism." 
B: 
a) Sandinists sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras that led last summer to the murder of four US marines in a 
cafe in El Salvador. 
b) Italy has charged Nicaragua with harboring their worst terrorist, 
the Red Brigades. 
c) Sandinist are involved in the international drug trade; a picture, 
secretly taken at a military airfield outside Managua, shows Federico 
Vaughn, a top aide to one of the nine commandants who rule 
Nicaragua, loading an aircraft with illegal narcotics, bound for the 
United States. 
W: 
(Since), Nations that harbor and support terrorists are outlaws. 
B: 
Sandinists threat the public interest and freedom. 
c 
(So), "Nicaragua is an outlaw regime." 




Freedom fighters are fighting communism in hopes of democracy. 
B: 
a) Freedom fighters who had fought the old Somoza dictatorship 
took the hills when the Sandinist betrayed the revolution. 
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b) They like the French resistance that fought the Nazis, begin 
fighting the Soviet bloc communist and the Nicaraguan collaborators. 
c) Today its numbers more than 20.000 volunteers but are running 
out of supplies and cannot fight against the Soviet helicopter 
gunships. 
W: 
(Since), Those who support and fight for democracy help the U.S. 
c 
(So), "The resistance has contributed directly to the security of the 
U.S." 




The U.S. has been acting responsible in Central America. 
B: 
a) Ten times US officers have met and tried to reason with the 
Sandinists. 
b) Ten times those officers were rebuffed. 
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c) In 1985 US endorsed church-mediated negotiations between the 
regime and the resistance. The Soviets and the Sandinists responded 
with a rapid arms buildup of mortars, tanks, artillery and helicopter 
gunships. 
d) The Soviet Union, Warsaw pact, Fidel Castro, Arafat, Qaddafi and 
the Ayatollah decided to support the communists in Nicaragua, US 
didn't take a last decision on this respect. 
W: 
(Since), Responsible nations pursue all arenas of peace. 
c 
(So), "US have sought and still seeks - a negotiated peace and a 
democratic future in a free Nicaragua." 




There are signs that Nicaragua isn't preparing for peace. 
B: 
a) Soviets, East Germans, Bulgarians, North Koreans, Cubans and 
terrorists from the PLO and the Red Brigades are in Nicaragua. 
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b) Soviets have invested $600 million to build Nicaragua into an 
armed force almost the size of Mexico's, a country 15 times as large, 
and 25 times as populous. 
c) Daniel Ortega go to Cuba to endorse Castro's cause for the 
worldwide triumph of communism. 
W: 
(Since), To stand for peace, a nation cannot harbor aggresive 
intentions. 
c 
(So), "Nicaragua doesn't stand for peace." 
Reasoning by Sign 
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Discourse 5 
"State of the Union" 




Backed by U.S. diplomatic effort in the region, democracy in C.A. 1s 
moving forward despite aggression from Nicaragua. 
Backing: 
a) More than two thirds of Latin American countries is democratic 
contrasted with one third ten years ago. 
b) US has fostered economical and military aid to countries willing 
to become democracies. 
c) Nicaragua is the only country in Central America which has 
resisted diplomatic efforts to become democratic. In fact, they 
sponsor guerrillas against other democracies such as El Salvador. 
d) The headquarters of the Salvadoran guerrillas are in Managua. 
e) Freedom and basic human rights are not granted for all in 
Nicaragua. 
Warrant: 
(Since), The only thing that can stop democratization is violent 
communist expansion. 
Claim: 
(So), "[US] diplomatic efforts for democratization in Central America 
will fail if communism prevails and expands from Nicaragua." 








a) Soviet backed and Cuban managed military build-up in Nicaragua 
b) International terrorists camped there. 
c) Political repression and a belligerent attitude against its neighbors 
d) Freedom fighters have dwarf Sandinists forces gaining time to US 
democratic efforts in the region. 
W: 
(Since), Noble struggles prevail. 
B: 
Communism can only be deter by military strength. 
c 
(So), "(The] Freedom Fighters won't allow the Soviets to have a 
beachhead [on the U.S. doorstep]." 
Reasoning by Cause 
Discourse 6 
"Central America at a Critical Juncture" 




"Nicaragua does not grant freedom to all its citizens." 
Backing: 
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a) A Christian Democrat legal demonstration of 4.000 person-rally 
was harassed by "divine mobs" paramilitary Sandinist forces. 
b) Former president of Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campins, who was 
there condemn the repression. 
c) A dozen of radio stations remain closed or censored in Nicaragua. 
d) Only two media were reopen "La Prensa" and "Radio Catolica." 
e) Only a few political prisoners were release. 10.000 remain 
imprisoned. 
Warrant: 
(Since), Democracy guarantees freedom for all. 
Backing: 
Freedom and Majoritarism 
Claim: 
(So), "The Sandinistas in Nicaragua are not democratic." 




"Nicaraguans are against tyranny and they fight for this ideal." B: 
a) The US independence freedom fighters of 1776 like the 
Nicaraguans today stood against outside tyranny, and freedom. 
b) The US freedom fighter like those in Nicaragua were mainly 
farmers fighting against odds. 
W: 
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(Since), Those who fight communism in Nicaragua today and those 
who fought for independence in 1776 are alike. 
c 
(So) "They [Freedom Fighters] are fighting for independence [in 
Nicaragua]." 





The U.S. is committed to preserve freedom and democracy anywhere, 
particularly, on its doorstep. 
B: 
Central America and Caribbean. 
W: 
(Since), The commander-in-chief (President) is the protector of that 
moral commitment. 
c 
(So) Reagan "won't walk away from the fight for freedom in Central 
America." 
Reasoning by Cause 
Discourse 7 
"State of the Union" 




Delivered to the American People 
The Sandinistas broke their promises for democratic reforms, by 
failing to comply with international accords. 
Backing: 
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a) Consensus among the four Central American democratic Presidents 
that the Sandinists have not comply with the Arias peace plan. 
b) They did not comply with the 1979's OAS agreement to 
democratize Nicaragua after the revolution. 
c) Roger Miranda, former high-level Sandinist Major, revealed that as 
Sandinists talk of peace its government has established plans for a 
large 600,000-man army. 
Warrant: 
(Since), Past violations of trust can only be overcome by large acts of 
good faith. 
Backing: 
Communism uses democratic facades to hide their real intentions 
Claims: 
(So), "[Sandinist'] challenge is to take irreversible steps towards 
democracy." 




There are signs of democratization in Central America. 
B: 
152 
a) 90% of CA countries are democratic now, as contrasted with 33% 
ten years ago. 
b) Resurgence of democracy is owed to those who have struggle to 
take control of their own destiny. 
c) Democratic rights negotiate with church authorities and release of 
few political prisoners even in non-democratic Nicaragua result from 
resistance by freedom fighters. 
W: 
(Since), Moves toward democracy reflect a general trend. 
c 
(So), "Political freedom is winning a battle against totalitarism. [ ... ] 
Freedom is finding its way in CA." 




"Democracy in the Americas" 
Date: December 5, 1986 International Press Club, Washington DC 
Argument XXVIII (*) 
Page 11 
Data: 
Never have so many people been able to freely elect their leaders as 
has been in the last 5 years. 
Warrant: 




(So), "Latin America is living an era of return to democracy." 





Using the "pretext of saving democracy," severe economic 
deprivations are being forced in Latin American countries. 
W: 
(Since), Unfair economic treatment precludes democracy. 
B: 
154 
In account that economical and political development is only possible 
m peace. 
c 
(So), "Sacrificing the political system of freedom to very severe 
economic pressures could have serious consequences for the political 
future of Latin America." 





Costa Rica is peaceful, neutral and believe in self-determination for 
Nicaragua and all countries. 
B: 
a) Costa Rica first proclaimed its neutrality 163 years ago. 
b) Costa Rica has reiterated its neutrality during its history on more 
than ten occasions because of continuous internal armed conflict in 
Nicaragua. 
c) Again Costa Rica reiterated its neutrality before a new internal 
conflict in Nicaragua after the Sandinist revolution. 
d) Costa Rica has encouraged peaceful negotiations and dialogue 
between nicaraguans. 
W: 
(Since), Physical intervention in other country's affairs is not 
appropriate for neutral, peaceful democracies. 
B: 
(In account of the fact that) Non-intervention is the base of peace 
among nations. 
c 
(So), "Nicaraguans are the ones who must solve their own internal 
problems." 
Reasoning by Generalization 
Arg. :XXXI (*) 
P. 13 
D: 
"Costa Ricans believe in democracy not in totalitarism." 
B: 
a) For the last five years Costa Rica has been active proponent of 
democracy and freedom. 
156 
b) Costa Rica support a lasting peace for the Americas through the so 
called Alliance for Democracy. 
W: 
(Since), Democracy cannot be neutral in the battle of ideas but it can 
with respect to war. 
B: 
Democracy attains freedom of expression not violence. 
c 
(So), "Costa Rica is neutral with respect to war." 
Reasoning by Sign. 
Discourse 2 
"The roads to freedom" 




Democracy causes peace. 
Backing: 
a) Costa Rica is a democracy whose people live in peace. 
b) Costa Rica has been bordered on the North (Nicaragua) by 
oppression and violence. 
157 
c) Oppression and violence are part of most tyrannies, and troubled 
countries in Central America. 
Warrant: 
(Since), Only democracy can guarantee reconciliation, allow peace, 
and preclude violence from crossing borders. 
Backing: 
Tyrannies should fall to have democracy. 
Claim: 
(So), "Only if we endeavor to enable all people to enjoy democracy, 
[and] cause the downfall of all tyrants equally, can we prevent 
threats to world peace from growing in the Americas." 




Internal and external factors are detrimental to Central American 
economies. 
W: 
(Since), Good economical conditions precludes poverty and social 
unrest. 
c 
(So), "Central America needs ... fair treatment in trade and finance to 
avoid war and oppression." 
Reasoning by Cause. 
158 
Discourse 3 
"La Paz esta primero" (Peace is first) 
Date: February 26, 1987 State's dinner offered by the president of 




Several discussions have taken place to foster a major role of Central 
Americans in the peaceful solution of their own conflicts. 
Backing: 
a) Contadora Group and its Latin American support group. 
b) Central American Presidents summit in Guatemala; it is now also 
as Esquipulas I 
Warrant: 
(Since), Words are part of a commitment, action is the next logical 
step. 
Backing: 
Words without deeds isn't useful (Pragmatism) 
Claim: 
(So), "Peace and democracy demand datelines and deeds, no just 
words. The accords in good faith bring us closer to the peace, if we 
are able to put them into practice." 
Reasoning by Classification. 
Discourse 4 
"Oportunidades para la democracia in America" (Opportunities for 
democracy in Latin America) 
Date: October 25, 1986, Cariari Hotel, Exchange Conference on "La 
democratizaci6n del hemisferio" (The Democratization of the 
hemisphere) 
Argument XXXV (*) 
Page 5 
Data: 
Undemocratic regimes deny individual human rights. 
Backing; 
159 
a) Under dictatorship most citizens experience injustice and poverty. 
b) A free man shouldn't expect equality, freedom of expression, 
dialogue and transaction, and peace in a dictatorship, but democracy. 
Warrant: 
(Since), Individual rights are the basis of peace and justice. 
Backing: 
Individual is above government. 
Claims: 
(So), "Democracy is the only road to peace and justice [in Central 
America]." 




History shows that those who are afraid of freedom allowed 
oppression of any sign to exist. 
B: 
160 
a) Many individuals lived and still live under oppression from either 
leftist or rightist regimes. 
b) People who are value-less or afraid of freedom oppressed its own 
people. 
W: 
(Since), Political oppression can only be exerted by people who are 
afraid of freedom and without human values. 
B: 
Majority has a voice only within democracy. 
c 
(So), "The only defense against the enemies of freedom is to 
strengthen freedom and democratic institutions." 





New democracies do not receive the economical and political support 
expected from international economic institutions and the 
industrialized world. 
B: 
a) Dictatorships have received better economic treatment than most 
new democracies. 
b) New international crisis and enormous external debts may new 
democracies' economies very fragile. 
c) International creditors put the hardest conditions on new 
democracies to pay their obligations. 
W: 
(Since), Economical and political support from the industrialized 
world and international economic institutions are prerequisite of 
democracy. 
c 
(So), "[It] is too early to talk about consolidation of democratic era m 
Latin America." 








a) Urban lower class and countryside's population don't have an 
active participation in political programs which affect their destiny. 
b) Social and economical obstacles limit their involvement in public 
affairs. 
c) More migration from the countryside to the cities contributes to 
increase political tensions and subsequent urban violence. 
W: 
(Since), People denied a voice will respond with violence. 
B: 
Democracy is based on the participation of majorities. 
c 
(So), "Migratory problems and violence will continue spreading." 
Reasoning by Generalization. 
Discourse 5 
"La Paz no tiene fronteras" (Peace doesn't recognize borders) 
Date: December 10, 1987 Oslo, Norway 
Argument XXXIX (*) 
Page 5 
Data: 




a) This process involves numerous decisions based on consultation 
with many people from different countries. 
b) Peace is an attitude, way of life, and a way of conflict-solving 
which is based on consensus. 
c) Most successful peace negotiations are based on understanding 
and mutual respect. 
Warrant: 
(Since), "[Peace] cannot be forced on the smallest nation nor can it be 
imposed by the biggest nation." 
Backing: 
Consensus attains taking into account the voice of the majority 
Claim: 
(So), "The endless process [of peace] requires that we work 
together." 
Reasoning by Generalization. 




Defeatist statements about Costa Rican peace plan paralyze people 
and jeopardize peace efforts in Central America 
B: 
It is more easy to forecast defeat than triumph, war than peace. 
W: 
(Since), Peace is to be sought as desirable 
B: 
Defeatism denies human will. 
c 
(So), "I can't accept defeatism." 




Latin American tyrannies are opressing their people 
B: 
Torture, exile, gigantic external debt, corruption and injustice are 
the heritage of dictatorships in Latin America. 
W: 
(Since), The oppresion of the people should never be supported 
B: 




(So), "We [democrats] should be neither political nor economic allies 
of governments which oppress their peoples." 
Reasoning by Generalization. 
Arg. XXXXII (*) 
P.11 
D. 
There are those in Central America who preach dogma and stifle 
creativity 
B: 
Pascal said that "we know too much to be skeptics. We know too little 
to be dogmatic." 
W: 
(Since), That which stifles human creativity is bad/evil 
B: 
Pascal is credible source 
c 
(So), "Dogmas are the enemies of human creativity [individual 
freedom]." 




C.A. population's freedom clamor for centuries had not been 
adequately addressed by politician and public officials. 
B: 
166 
Most tyrannies oppressed, exiled, and tortured Central Americans to 
quiet claims for freedom, peace and justice. 
W: 
(Since), People's call for freedom cannot long be supressed. 
B: 
The voice of the Majority should be respected 
c 
(So), "Ignoring the clamor for freedom may condemn Latin America 
to another century of horror and death." 




Costa Rica has been strongly free and democratic without having 
an army. 
B: 
a) Lowest index of unemployment in the Western Hemisphere 
b) Strong policies to guarantee housing to all its citizens 
c) Free and mandatory education for all. 
d) Socialized health care for everybody. 
W: 
(Since), What free people believe in their souls and live can't be 
taken away 
c 
(So), "[Democracy] is invulnerable before the totalitarian attacks." 




Some people pursue war in Central America 
B: 
167 
a) They accept the war as the normal course of events in the Central 
America scenario. 
b) They react with wrath and fury when peace efforts take place m 
Central America. 
c) For them history consists of military victories. 
W: 
(Since), The pursuit of war is antagonistic to the pursuit of peace. 
B: 
Civilized behavior is rooted in rationality 
c 
(So), "No matter how noble the crusade is [peace efforts], some wish 
for and encourage its failure." 




Nuclear and conventional war have their own horrors. 
B: 




(Since), Nuclear war and conventional war are equally harmful and 
threatening to humankind. 
B: 
Life is sacred 
c 
(So), "[We must] equally fight together against the possibility of 
another Hiroshima, or another Vietnam." 




"La paz- suprema esperanza del mundo" (Peace - supreme hope of 
the world) 
Date: University of Peace, October 6, 1988 
Argument XXXXVII (*) 
Page 8 
Data: 
Conflicting parties in Central America are having a hard time 
reconciling their differences to reach a peace accord with each other. 
Backing: 
a) Same parties who fight each other claim for peace. 
b) More intransigent parties in peace talks are those who claims for 
keeping the dialogue open. 
Warrant: 
(Since), Reconciliation is a prerequisite to peace 
Claim: 
(So), "[In Central America] there is no peace because there 1s no 
reconciliation." 
Reasoning by Cause. 
Discourse 7 
"Architects of the century of peace" 





"The Central American Peace Plan is being crucified [as Christ was m 
his time]." 
W: 
(Since), The force of peace could not be silence. 
Claim: 
(So), "History repeats itself [with the Arias Peace Plan]." 




The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are negotiating peace and reducing nuclear 
armaments through peaceful dialogue. 
W: 
(Since), Conflict between superpowers is not different than conflict 
between Central American nations. 
c 
(So), "There is no reason to support the use of military force in the 
solution of Central American conflict." 





Various events and people in Central America show desire for peace 
B: 
An indigenous woman in Guatemala thanks Oscar Arias for his efforts 
for peace after the signature by Central American presidents of the 
peace accord of Esquipulas I. 
W: 
(Since), The desire for peace is permeating Central America. 
c 
(So), "Central America is committed to peace." 
Reasoning by Generalization 
